

PRINCETON STUDIES IN  
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND POLITICS

*Series Editors*

*Jack L. Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg, and Fareed Zakaria*

Recent titles:

*The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* by Christian Reus-Smit

*Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* by David A. Lake

*A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* by Marc Trachtenberg

*Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy*  
by Etel Solingen

*From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* by Fareed Zakaria

*Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan*  
by Sarah E. Mendelson

*Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* by Leon V. Sigal

*Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* by Elizabeth Kier

*Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making*  
by Barbara Rearden Farnham

*Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* by Thomas J. Christensen

*Satellites and Commisars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of the Soviet-Bloc Trade*  
by Randall W. Stone

*Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* by Peter Liberman

*Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*  
by Alastair Iain Johnston

*The Korean War: An International History* by William W. Stueck

*Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*  
by Thomas Risse-Kappen

*The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* by Hendrik Spruyt

*America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* by Tony Smith

*Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years*  
by Beth A. Simmons

*Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* by Janice E. Thompson

*We All Lost the Cold War* by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein

*The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* by Scott D. Sagan

# The Sovereign State and Its Competitors

AN ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS CHANGE

---

**HENDRIK SPRUYT**

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

## C O N T E N T S

---

LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES	ix
PREFACE	xi
INTRODUCTION	3
PART I: CONTINGENCY, CHOICE, AND CONSTRAINT	9
CHAPTER 1	
Structural Change in International Relations	11
<i>Neorealism and Its Critics: The Origins of the State as an Issue in International Relations</i>	12
<i>Variation in Units as Variation in Systems Structure</i>	15
<i>Unilinear Explanations of Change</i>	18
<i>The Fallacy of the Unilinear Evolutionary Image</i>	20
CHAPTER 2	
Organizational Variation and Selection in the International System	22
<i>A Nonlinear View of Evolutionary Change</i>	22
<i>A Proposed Causal Model for Explaining Institutional Variation and Selection</i>	25
<i>A Nonlinear Account of State Formation through War</i>	29
CHAPTER 3	
Modes of Nonterritorial Organization: Feudalism, the Church, and the Holy Roman Empire	34
<i>Feudalism: Rule by Personal Bonds</i>	36
<i>Universalist Claims of the Church</i>	42
<i>The Holy Roman Empire</i>	51
<i>Conclusion</i>	55
PART II: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MODES OF ORGANIZATION	59
CHAPTER 4	
The Economic Renaissance of the Late Middle Ages	61
<i>The Catalyst: The Expansion of Trade and the Growth of Towns</i>	61
<i>Imagining the Sovereign State</i>	67
<i>Conclusion</i>	76
CHAPTER 5	
The Rise of the Sovereign, Territorial State in Capetian France	77
<i>The Beginning of the French State: The Consolidation of the Capetian Dynasty (987–1328)</i>	78

<i>Why the Emergence of the French State Does Not Follow from the Character of Warfare</i>	82
<i>The Confluence of Material Interests of Monarchy and Towns</i>	86
<i>Shared Perspectives and Social Coalitions</i>	102
<i>Conclusion</i>	105
CHAPTER 6	
The Fragmentation of the German Empire and the Rise of the Hanseatic League	109
<i>The Northern Renaissance and the Impact of Long-distance Commerce</i>	112
<i>Reasons and Consequences of German Fragmentation</i>	113
<i>Structure and Objectives of the Hanseatic League: "Concordia Domini Foris Pax"</i>	122
<i>Conclusion</i>	128
CHAPTER 7	
The Development of the Italian City-states	130
<i>The Impact of Italian Luxury Trade</i>	130
<i>Centrifugal Forces in the Italian Kingdom and the Absence of a Royal-urban Alliance</i>	135
<i>City-state Rather than City-league</i>	142
<i>City-state and Sovereign, Territorial State Compared</i>	146
<i>Conclusion</i>	149
PART III: COMPETITION, MUTUAL EMPOWERMENT, AND CHOICE: THE ADVANTAGES OF SOVEREIGN TERRITORIALITY	151
CHAPTER 8	
The Victory of the Sovereign State	153
<i>The Conventional Explanation: Darwinian Selection by War</i>	155
<i>Advantages of Sovereign Territoriality over the Confederated City-league</i>	158
<i>Fragmented Sovereignty in the Italian City-states</i>	172
<i>The General Nature of Institutional Selection</i>	178
<i>Conclusion</i>	179
PART IV: CONCLUSION	181
CHAPTER 9	
Character, Tempo, and Prospects for Change in the International System	183
<i>The Dynamics of Change in the International System</i>	183
<i>Possible Scenarios for Contemporary Change</i>	188
NOTES	195
BIBLIOGRAPHY	265
INDEX	285

MAPS	
5.1 The Extent of the Capetian Royal Domain	80
5.2 France in the Mid-eleventh Century	81
6.1 The Hanseatic League	110
7.1 The Italian City-states in the Late Fifteenth Century	131
TABLES	
4.1 A General Explanation of Unit Change	63
4.2 Expected Preferences of Towns Based on Character of Trade	65
4.3 Historical Paths of Institutional Development	67
5.1 Estimated Population of Major French Towns	87
5.2 Estimated Population of Major Flemish Towns	88
5.3 Some Estimates of Annual French Royal Revenue	94
6.1 Estimated Population of Some of the Major Northern Towns	113
7.1 Estimated Population of Italian Towns	132
8.1 Two Dimensions of Hierarchy and Fixed Territoriality	154

## Structural Change in International Relations

In a Europe without states and without boundaries the concept of  
"foreign affairs" had no meaning.<sup>1</sup>

The rise and decline of various types of entities and state systems must of  
necessity be a fundamental concern of a comprehensive  
theory of international change.<sup>2</sup>

DESPITE Robert Gilpin's exhortation, international relations theory has paid little attention to change in the types of units that constitute the international system. Gilpin himself, after having classified unit change as the most fundamental type of transformation, turns his attention to the distribution of capabilities—the standard research program for neorealists.

However, if Gilpin is correct that the change from city-state to empire, from empire to feudalism, and so on, is important for understanding international politics, then we need to seriously engage the questions of how units change and how such change affects the international system. These questions have been raised most explicitly by critics of neorealism. These critics have specifically focused on the feudal-state transformation as an example of systems change.<sup>3</sup> How did the sovereign state emerge? How has its rise affected international relations? This chapter begins with a discussion of these questions and proceeds to argue that the constitutive type of unit in the international system is a critical facet of structure.

With the feudal-state transformation as a starting point, this chapter also explores various accounts of unit change. Most of these accounts explain institutional evolution as a unilinear process. Such a perspective is both theoretically and empirically flawed.

Because a unilinear view sees the development of units, specifically the feudal-state transformation, as a process of sequential stages, it affirms the consequent. Methodologically, the absence of any real variation on the dependent variable—one only seeks to explain the emergence of the state—makes it impossible to select among rival independent variables. Empirically, unilinear accounts fail because they neglect the multiplicity of institutional alternatives that were available during this historical change. As a consequence, the competition between different institutional arrangements is neglected, and analysis is performed solely on the internal dynamics of particular polities. International relations thus gives way to comparative politics.<sup>4</sup>

NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE  
AS AN ISSUE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In Kenneth Waltz's interpretation of Durkheim's theory, the international system is structured according to organizing principle, functional differentiation, and distribution of capabilities.<sup>5</sup> Because of the lack of organizing authority, that is, because of anarchy, the second element of the structure drops out. Under anarchy, actors will pursue self-sufficiency rather than division of labor and subsequent reliance on others. For Waltz, the international system is similar to Durkheim's premodern society based on mechanical solidarity.<sup>6</sup> Because of the absence of central authority, little or no functional differentiation is possible.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, under anarchy only the distribution of capabilities matters for the structure of the system. The character of the unit and unit change are thus unimportant for understanding structure.<sup>8</sup> This view, by the way, is also upheld in the literature spawned by this neorealist perspective.<sup>9</sup>

John Ruggie has launched a sustained critique of this view. He argues that Waltz's view of Durkheim is mistaken. In contrast to Waltz, Ruggie suggests that functional differentiation does occur. Waltz neglects the dynamic element in Durkheim's theory. The cause of evolutionary progress in society lies in the increase in dynamic density—the total volume of transactions and communications.<sup>10</sup>

Ruggie adduces Medieval Europe as an empirical case to demonstrate that a strict application of neorealist theory fails to capture the logic of international relations as conducted at that time. As with all forms of political organization, feudal authorities occupied a geographical space. But such authority over territorial areas was neither exclusive nor discrete. Complex networks of rival jurisdictions overlaid territorial space.<sup>11</sup> Church, lords, kings, emperor, and towns often exercised simultaneous claims to jurisdiction. Occupants of a particular territorial space were subject to a multiplicity of higher authorities.

Given such a logic or organization, it is impossible to distinguish the actors conducting "international" relations, operating under anarchy, from those conducting "domestic" politics, operating under some hierarchy. Bishops, kings, lords, and towns all signed treaties and waged war.<sup>12</sup> There was no one actor with a monopoly over the means of coercive force.<sup>13</sup> The distinction between public and private actors was yet to be articulated.<sup>14</sup>

To understand such interactions as international relations under anarchy is an anachronism. Were lords subject to the king? Was the king subject to the church? Was the church subject to the emperor? The answers to those questions were inevitably contextual and intersubjective. Warring lords might subject themselves to royal jurisdiction for mediation, yet at other times rebellious lords might wage war on the king himself. Richard of England and Philip Augustus of France, at war in the later twelfth century, submitted to papal demands to end their dispute and join forces for a crusade. Yet in many instances

they also acted as independent kings without recognizing higher authority. Indeed the very word *international* is a posterior and an anachronistic conceptualization of that era. It suggests that there was a distinct realm of national (internal) affairs which was conceptually distinguishable from a realm of international (external) affairs. In other words, we can only speak of international affairs as synonymous with actions under anarchy because the feudal-state transformation defined the realms of domestic and interunit behavior. The condition of anarchy, as we apply it today, implies the existence of a particular type of unit. The neorealist view of anarchy presumes that there are discrete units with mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction.<sup>15</sup> The medieval system, however, was quite different than that of the contemporary state system. Jurisdiction was neither discrete—jurisdictions overlapped—nor exclusive—different authorities might claim final jurisdiction on the same matter. The medieval case thus demonstrates how the character of the units has dramatic implications for the structure of the system. Certainly there was anarchy in the sense of a lack of world hierarchical authority. But when that condition applied, or to whom it applied, were in fact indeterminate.<sup>16</sup>

Ruggie's analysis is partially based on structuration and poststructuralist theory. Structuration theory criticizes neorealism for not accounting for the formation of structure.<sup>17</sup> Because of its empiricist orientation, neorealism objectifies structure as a given entity rather than as the result of interaction by agents. Anarchy is perceived as an observable, objective entity rather than as a social construct. Alternatively, structuration theory seeks to establish how interaction between agents creates a specific structure and how, in turn, structure constrains agents. Agents and structure, that is, units and system, are mutually constitutive.

Although the freedom of the individual is constrained by a given structure, this constraint is not such that the agent is determined by that structure. By redefining the nature of their interactions, individuals create a new structure which imposes constraints on others. In many ways, the agent-structure debate resembles the classic micro-macro problem.<sup>18</sup>

Poststructural theory is even more radical than structuration theory in its critique of neorealism, for the epistemological orientation of poststructural theory lies closer to that of critical theory and Foucault.<sup>19</sup> Poststructural theory views neorealism's particular depiction of international relations as a manifestation of a dominant conceptual framework. Neorealists understand the anarchical condition of exclusive entities as a natural and inevitable phenomenon because they have unreflectively accepted a particular way of thinking about the world. They do not recognize the state system as a social construction that has a specific historical origin. Poststructural theory, in contrast, advocates an archaeology of the state.

In short, both structuration theory and poststructuralism suggest that neorealism takes the ontological nature of the system as constant and as consisting of discrete units. As Ruggie shows, this was not always historically true. Neo-

realism does not acknowledge this because of its objectivist perspective which defines anarchy as a given, ahistorical condition. By contrast, Ruggie suggests that we need to account for the emergence of territorial discreteness—the exclusivity of authority over fixed space, which is typical of the modern state.

Structuration theory and poststructuralism thus wish to make the emergence of the sovereign state a fundamental issue in the study of international relations. They indicate, furthermore, that the emergence of an anarchical state system was not merely due to a reordering of the social and political map in a material sense but was equally due to the reconceptualization and rearticulation of social and political order. The sovereign state had to be invented.<sup>20</sup> Any account of state formation will have to take this notion of conceptual change into consideration.

Both structuration theory and poststructuralism, however, are not without problems of their own. Arguably, poststructuralism has, as of yet, offered little in the way of substantive theory.<sup>21</sup> It is, by its own account, largely a meta-theory. Structuration theory, at least in some versions in the realm of international relations theorizing, professes to use a Lakatosian research methodology. Hence, it claims additional empirical explanatory power to realism but accepts the general epistemological position of realist research.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, one should expect its empirical focus to be more explicit than that of poststructuralism.

However, it is not entirely clear how to operationalize this program. More specifically, if one takes structure and agency as mutually constitutive in all instances, then structure must be understood in a constructivist sense as the poststructuralists do. That is to say, structure would be primarily, if not completely, a creation of individual agents. Consequently it would be difficult to specify what the constraining characteristics of a particular structure are given its amenability to continual reconstruction and reinterpretation.<sup>23</sup>

The second problem with operationalizing a structurationist program is that agent-structure problems permeate all levels of politics. It depends on what one takes to be the agent and what the structure. The individual can be embedded in the structure of a bureaucratic organization. That organization, taken as an agent with a particular corporate identity, is in turn embedded in a larger political structure, and so on.

The research method that I propose circumvents both problems. It takes the agent-structure problem to bear on two sets of issues. First, it focuses on the interaction of individuals and the state. It takes a methodological individualist approach to explain how the state came into being but embeds these choices in the constraints of the existing political structure and relative distribution of power. On a second level, it takes the state as agent and sees it as embedded in the structure of a system that imposes constraints on it—the state system. In so doing, one stays closest to a deductive understanding of the system, in the neorealist sense, while at the same time problematizing the emergence of that system.<sup>24</sup> I argue, therefore, contra Waltz, that systems theorizing that takes the dominant type of unit into account is not reductionist.

#### VARIATION IN UNITS AS VARIATION IN SYSTEMS STRUCTURE

In his seminal work on neorealism, Waltz compares the international system to a market.<sup>25</sup> The distribution of capabilities between units is analogous to market share distribution. The polarity of the system is the conceptual equivalent of oligopolistic or monopolistic markets. The distribution of market share leads to expectations about individual firm behavior. One can a priori expect that firms will behave in a particular way if a given distribution of market shares occurs. The major powers in international politics are the logical analogue of price setters in the market.

Against Waltz, I argue that the market is not uniquely determined by the distribution of market share. The constraints imposed by the market are not simply determined by the number of firms but also by the *type* of firms that dominate that market. The relative efficiency of units, that is, of rival companies, puts constraints on companies to organize similarly. This is not simply a question of size. For example, American firms may face pressure from more efficient Japanese or European firms in terms of organizational makeup. Fordist production might be obsolete in the face of craftlike production.<sup>26</sup> This, too, can be understood as imposing a structure to which the firm has to conform. However, these constraints do not follow from the interactions between actors; these are not inductive “rules of the game.”<sup>27</sup> Given a particular economic milieu—the technology to alter production quickly, the flexibility of demand, etc.—a particular type of organization, once created, compels others to follow suit. Competitive efficiency dictates unit, that is, firm behavior. Although the distribution of market share is important, it is not the only structural trait of the environment faced by actors.<sup>28</sup>

A similar logic operates in unit transformation in the international system. Here, too, the units are faced with the necessity of competitive efficiency and effectiveness. Once new unit types have been generated, they operate in competition with others. The unit that is best able to capitalize on environmental changes, which caused the search for new forms of organization in the first place, exerts a competitive, marketlike pressure on the others. This is the first sense in which new units create a different structure.

But the international system, unlike the market, also selects units by mutual empowerment of actors.<sup>29</sup> In this sense the structurationist critique that neorealism objectifies the system is correct. Here the analogy between the state system and the market does not hold. The selection of firms in a market environment does not work by the mutual empowerment of like firms. The market does not reflect mutual agreements by firms to allow only similar firms.<sup>30</sup> The metaphor of the market differs in that respect from the international system.

Historically, the establishment of a state system led to a recategorization of who was entitled to exercise the means of violence. In the feudal system, the exercise of violence followed crosscutting obligations. Feudal lords had multiple superiors to whom they owed allegiance. The medieval system further

lacked any conception of private versus public authority. Kinship structures, for example, claimed the legitimate use of violence and retaliation.<sup>31</sup>

The state system, by contrast, has led to a specific categorization of what is to count as internal or external violence and who may exercise such violence. The state claims a domestic and external monopoly of force. As a consequence, nonstate actors are stripped of coercive means—mercenaries and privateers thus have disappeared.<sup>32</sup>

The state system, or rather the state actors who made up that system, thus recognized or denied certain forms of organization as legitimate international actors.<sup>33</sup> The Hansa, for example, was not allowed to be an equal participant at the Peace of Westphalia. Individual free cities, however, were permitted to participate at conferences and sign treaties. This was not just a matter of material power; it was also a question of whether such actors were compatible with a statist form of organizing international transactions.<sup>34</sup> Likewise, the modern system empowers third world actors as states, even though they internally diverge from the standard European pattern.<sup>35</sup>

Similarly, universal empires are difficult to accommodate in a state system. Traditional universalist empires, such as the Ottoman, were based on a different logic of organization. Such empires sought to exercise political control over their sphere of economic production and trade, and herein they diverge from the statist logic of organization where political rule and sphere of interaction are separated. China and the Parthian Empire, for example, could exist in their respective spheres of influence without having to formally agree upon borders. “Similarly, the Roman Empire conceived the limes not as a boundary, but as a temporary stopping place where the potentially unlimited expansion of the Pax Romana had come to a halt.”<sup>36</sup> The limits of political control were measured by that which was maximally feasible and economically desirable. Such empires existed with indifference to the pursuits of the other—short, of course, of military incursions on their respective spheres of influence. The contemporary state system, by contrast, is explicitly based on the premise that the sphere of interaction is much larger than the sphere of political control.<sup>37</sup>

The empowerment of particular actors, however, should not be understood as social norms or rules in the Grotian perspective. Hedley Bull, for example, argues that diplomatic procedures led to a particular structuring of international behavior.<sup>38</sup> Actors needed to conform to these rules and norms in order to participate in the international system. In this account the Ottomans could play no role in the European state system because they lacked the shared understanding of international “rules of the game” of the European states.

This book is sensitive to the notion of shared conceptual frameworks, but unlike Grotians, it seeks to account for why they exist. Grotian theory provides no such accounting and thus cannot help us explain why the nature of international politics changed so dramatically in Europe.

I submit that these rules are consequences of different logics of organization. The argument that the Ottoman Empire was excluded because it was not part of European society and culture does not hold. The alleged shared civilization

of Europe, for example, did not prevent Francis I from seeking Ottoman support against Spain in the sixteenth century. I agree that the Ottoman Empire was fundamentally at odds with a state system and could only play an ad hoc role in the European diplomatic process. However, the real reason why the Ottoman Empire was excluded from the European theater had less to do with its understanding of diplomatic rules of the game than with its universalist logic of authority. As Bernard Lewis suggests:

In the Muslim world view the basic division of mankind is into the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb). The one consists of all those countries where the law of Islam prevails, that is to say, broadly the Muslim Empire; the latter is the rest of the world. Just as there is only one God in heaven, so there can be only one sovereign and one law on earth.<sup>39</sup>

Universalist imperial systems do not confine their authority by mutually agreed upon spatial parameters, that is, borders.<sup>40</sup> It is thus antithetical to the external equality of states which sovereign territoriality presupposes.

Dislike units are thus based on different conceptions of internal and external politics. The development of sovereignty meant a formal demarcation of political authority on territorial grounds. Unlike universalist empires or the translocal organization of the Hansa, states thus have very precise limitations to their claims to rule. States, unlike empires or the Hansa, do not extend political control over the entire sphere of principal economic interaction.

Consequently Gilpin is right in suggesting that conflicts during periods of systems change are likely to be multidimensional. Changes in unit type are simultaneously changes in domestic and external politics. Such changes are thus tied up with changes in social coalitions regarding material interests and conceptual perspectives.<sup>41</sup> The emergence of sovereign states meant, therefore, a dramatic break with older institutional forms, such as empire and papacy, which claimed to rule over the entire Christian community.

In essence, the agents that make up the state system thus create a particular structure of interunit behavior. The very fact that some institutions are empowered as states, whereas others are denied that status, demonstrates how constraints have been placed on the subsequent choices of social actors.

The ordering of translocal interaction by spatial borders and internal hierarchy also allowed for a mechanical conceptualization of politics.<sup>42</sup> By restricting violence to sovereign entities, by recognizing formal borders, and by agreeing on specific channels of communication, such as embassies, some management of competition became possible. Mattingly rightly sees the Peace of Lodi (1454) between the city-states of Italy as the first true balance-of-power system.<sup>43</sup>

I thus argue that unit change imposes a particular structure on international relations. The structure of the system is also determined by the particular type of unit that dominates the system in a given historical period. Such structure is not derivative of the interactions between units, nor is it an aggregation of unit-level attributes. Hence the view that I advocate is not a reductionist understanding of the system.<sup>44</sup>

## UNILINEAR EXPLANATIONS OF CHANGE

If unit change, such as the shift from feudal organization to sovereign, territorial state, changes the structure of the international system, what accounts for such change? What explains, particularly, the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state? There are of course a great variety of accounts that deal with the emergence of the state. Much of this literature, however, suffers from a similar conceptual error; it argues that evolution is a unilinear process.<sup>45</sup> Such accounts suppose a progression of subsequent stages with a new type of unit superseding the old.

The decline of the feudal system, however, did not straightforwardly lead to a system of states but gave rise to multiple institutional arrangements, any one of which—at that time—appeared to be viable. The institutional evolution of the international system was therefore not unilinear.

Many unilinear accounts of state emergence are, at least implicitly, driven by the classical accounts of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.<sup>46</sup> Even accounts that pay more attention to the predatorial nature of international politics sometimes commit the same error. These latter types of accounts are correct in their attempts to explain change by looking at the relative ability of different forms of economic or military organization.<sup>47</sup> Some institutional arrangements are better at performing certain tasks in a new economic or military environment. Where they go wrong is in affirming the consequent, that is, by focusing solely on the winners. Hence, existing institutions are presumed to be efficient.

Evolution, however, is driven by fits and starts. At critical junctures a multiplicity of new forms emerge.<sup>48</sup> Gradually some of these alternatives are weeded out. We must therefore first explain not merely why states superseded feudal organization but why a variety of alternatives emerged following feudalism. We need, secondly, to account for the superiority of the state vis-à-vis these alternatives. Standard accounts do not do this.

Unilinear theory in its purest form assumes necessity in evolution. One type of organization logically and inevitably follows the other. Unilinear theory also assumes continuity in history. The new is explained by the reasons for demise of the old. For example, the capitalist state is believed to be a solution to the problems that emerged from the objective limits of feudalism. Socialist states become inevitable because of the logical contradictions of capitalism. As I will try to demonstrate, I disagree with the claims of necessity and predictability.

In the world systems variant of neo-Marxism, the emergence of the state can be explained by the emergence of the world capitalist system.<sup>49</sup> For Wallerstein, the evolution of the world economy determines the nature of the unit. "The states are thus, we are arguing, created institutions reflecting the needs of class forces operating in the world economy."<sup>50</sup> The emergence of the state is due to unilinear historical progress.<sup>51</sup>

There is, however, nothing inevitable about the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state. It arose because of a particular conjuncture of social and politi-

cal interests in Europe. Functionalist and teleological accounts cannot explain the variation in types of institutional arrangements other than the sovereign state. As a consequence, world systems theory misdates the emergence of states. States preceded the development of a capitalist world economy, rather than the reverse. Indeed, the differentiation of Europe into different states might be the very reason why capitalism developed in Europe and not elsewhere.<sup>52</sup>

Wallerstein is thus susceptible to the structurationist critique that he cannot account for the particular nature of the system. Since the system is wholly determinate of the unit, he cannot really account for change in the system. He presents an agentless history and thus "is forced into an explanation of that transition [feudal to capitalist] in terms of exogenous shocks and the teleological imperatives of an immanent capitalist mode of production."<sup>53</sup>

Even Perry Anderson, who is more sensitive to variation in European political organization, explains the decline of the feudal system by the fact that it had reached its "objective limits."<sup>54</sup> The absolutist state emerges as "a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination, designed to clamp the peasant masses back into their traditional social position."<sup>55</sup> As with Wallerstein, Anderson's account remains decidedly within a teleological framework. It is an account wherein economics determines politics. Only the specific nature of feudalism determines the next phase of development. The emergence of states can thus be reduced to explaining change in the mode of production.

For Durkheim, the internal social environment is the ultimate cause of social evolution.<sup>56</sup> Durkheim attributes societal evolution to the gradual increase in population, rising levels of moral and legal interaction, and increasing dynamic density which require a new division of labor. Durkheim, therefore, also suggests a unilinear evolutionary account.<sup>57</sup>

Max Weber is far less susceptible to the critique that he has a unilinear view. Indeed, some see his work primarily as a taxonomy of how particular elements of economy, authority, and culture interrelate without a theory of development.<sup>58</sup> From another perspective, however, Weber does advance an evolutionary theory that depicts the unilinear development of instrumental rationality in society. Society is ever more based on formal and hierarchical modes of authority and rests on instrumental rational calculations.<sup>59</sup>

Some accounts that focus on relative ability take a unilinear view when they argue that given a particular technology of war, or a particular economic milieu, a given type of unit will emerge that is optimally suited for that environment.<sup>60</sup> Depending on the theorist, the state is believed to have displaced feudal organization either because it was better at waging a new type of war or because it was better suited for a new economic climate. Whether military or economic dynamics are the trigger for change, such theories share common ground in arguing that new functional necessities required a shift in the economies of scale of political units.<sup>61</sup> Bean, for example, argues that change in the character of warfare necessitated a certain change of scale. His argument suggests that the size of the feudal manor was inadequate to provide the resources for larger

armies. Bean creates the impression that feudal units must have given way to states because increased army size was the most efficient way of fighting war. Because of its larger scale, the state could raise larger armies and extract more revenue. The state was thus simply due to an increase in size.

Explanations that focus on the comparative superiority of one form of organization over the other do not, of course, have to be unilinear. In fact, my own account relies heavily on the logic of competitive selection. The problem is that many of these explanations often compare institutions diachronically rather than synchronically. As a result, they end up with a linear sequence of successive and progressive types.

#### THE FALLACY OF THE UNILINEAR EVOLUTIONARY IMAGE

The neo-Marxist, neo-Durkheimian, neo-Weberian, and some forms of competitive efficiency explanations commit the same conceptual fallacy. They try to explain how states displaced feudal units, but they do so with a bias toward unilinear evolution. For neo-Marxists, states are an answer to economic contradictions in feudalism. For neo-Durkheimians, the state evolves because of increasing dynamic density. Some neo-Weberians see an evolutionary drift toward instrumentally rational, formal organizations—as evinced by the modern state. Competitive efficiency arguments submit that states were militarily and economically more competitive than feudal units, particularly in terms of scale. All of these thus suggest that evolution is unilinear wherein through a straightforward process the more efficient form displaces the older form. Such an interpretation of change, however, is wrong.

The unilinear evolutionary view is incorrect on several counts. First, because it neglects the variation in different types of units, such an explanation in effect perceives no variation in the dependent variable. Consequently this literature cannot accurately specify which independent variables were critical in explaining change. It focuses solely on one case—the feudal-state transition—and uses *post hoc ergo propter hoc* arguments.

Second, the unilinear evolutionary view fails to distinguish between the causes that led to the emergence of various institutional types and the causes of subsequent selection. The reasons that explain the emergence of the state need not explain why states won in the selective process *vis-à-vis* their institutional alternatives, for example, city-leagues and city-states. By not recognizing this, one fails to acknowledge the advantages of state sovereignty *vis-à-vis* other types of organization that existed simultaneously. The process of subsequent evolutionary selection is different from the process that generates a particular form—just as is the case in biological evolution.<sup>62</sup>

Third, one cannot say the state displaced feudal organization because it was more efficient. City-leagues and city-states were also more efficient than feudal organization in mustering resources and fostering trade. A good account of social evolution will therefore have to explain how different alternatives arose and how sovereign states displaced their synchronic alternatives.

Fourth, some of this literature imputes preferences from outcomes. At critical junctures, however, individuals cue in to many new institutional opportunities rather than to one specific type. This literature uses “as if” arguments to link individual preferences to the functions that an institution performs, but there is little examination of the real choice process.<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, I take for granted that changes in military and economic milieu affect which type of organization might be more efficient and effective. But the type of institution that emerges is the result of individual bargains in response to those changes. For example, territorial states developed that were superior to feudal lordships in war because some political entrepreneurs, specifically kings, had incentives to adopt new technology. In short, shifts in military milieu alone cannot explain the development of particular institutional arrangements. Rather, the reverse is true: sovereign, territorial states made adoption of new technology imperative. As Eugene Rice notes, there were other places, notably China, that had access to gunpowder technology before Europe but never developed its military uses in full.

This difference suggests the existence in Renaissance Europe of a very powerful pressure to exploit the new invention for military purposes. This pressure, becoming acute about 1450, came from the larger territorial princes and derived its force from a fundamental political reality of the age: the consolidation in Europe of . . . the sovereign territorial state.<sup>64</sup>

The fundamental reality that existed in Europe before the military revolution was thus the failure of empire. It was exactly because discrete territorial units existed in constant competition that political entrepreneurs desired technological innovation.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, the institutions that individuals create need not be optimal. Survivability is not derived from the conditions imposed by the deeper environmental milieu, whether it be economic or military. Institutions might be caught in low-level equilibrium traps.<sup>66</sup> Instead, survivability of an institution derives from its competitive ability *vis-à-vis* its synchronic competitors which have been created by other coalitions.

The next chapter clarifies my proposed alternative methodology. I propose that a microlevel account can explain the variation in types of units during their generation without contracting generative cause and subsequent selection.<sup>67</sup> This account is partial to recent discussions in both economic history and historical sociology.<sup>68</sup> I submit that different material interests and belief systems of social groups and political actors lead to variations in political alliances. The impetus to form new coalitions came from changes in the overall milieu. The variation of these coalitions explains the emergence of a plurality of institutional types at the end of the feudal era.

## Organizational Variation and Selection in the International System

Most available explanations fail because they ignore the fact that many different kinds of states were viable at different stages of European history, because they locate explanations of state-to-state variation in individual characteristics of states rather than in relations among them.<sup>1</sup>

THIS CHAPTER presents my model of change. It begins with a discussion of two theories of change which have informed my nonlinear view of institutional evolution. I argue that a change in the constitutive units of the system is only likely to occur after a broad exogenous change, or an environmental shock, if you will. Such an exogenous change will lead to political and social realignments.<sup>2</sup> The divergent composition of these political alliances accounts for the variation in new institutional types. In the long run, however, some institutions will disappear given the competitive nature of the international system. In short, following a broad, contingent change in milieu, actors choose to create institutions that meet their material interests and ideological perspectives. But the subsequent viability of institutions is constrained by their relative competitiveness.

### A NONLINEAR VIEW OF EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

This book is influenced particularly by the images of change proposed by two theorists, Fernand Braudel and Stephen Jay Gould. Both classify change by periodization and pace. Fernand Braudel, the French historian, suggested that the pace of change operates at three levels.<sup>3</sup> This parallels the different types of systems change in international relations. Gould's view of Darwinian selection, specifically the punctuated equilibrium model, serves as a useful metaphor in classifying institutional change.

Braudel argued that the pace of history can be captured by a threefold classification. It is fastest at the level of everyday occurrences, a heterogeneous tapestry textured by individuals' decisions and events in life. This is *l'histoire événementielle*, the history describing continually changing microlevel actions. The tempo of such change is rapid and is paced by *individual time*. At the intermediate level, history is less transitory. Economic changes and political shifts are more structural in nature. This is social history that aggregates individuals and human structures. Change, particularly in economic affairs, fluctu-

ates in cycles of ten, twenty, or perhaps even fifty years. Using not only the metaphor of economic cycles but even its terminology, Braudel called this the history of *conjunctures*. Finally, there is the level of history that seems to move at a virtually imperceptible pace. Looking at his own rural roots, Braudel saw little change in village life between the Middle Ages and the early twentieth century because the objective conditions of life had not altered all that much. Demography, geographic conditions, and the technology of communication all conspired to make life appear unchanged to the individual. Such forces, however, were critically important in explaining the long-term fortunes of geographic areas such as the Mediterranean basin, or in demonstrating the relative similarity in conditions facing the French farmer of the Middle Ages and of the nineteenth century. The objective conditions that created such structural stasis made for the history of the *longue durée*.

In the Braudelian scheme, the tempo of change thus varies between the instant, the cyclical, and the *longue durée*. The task of the historian is to demonstrate the interplay between these three. Seen from another perspective, *l'histoire événementielle* and *longue durée* occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of agency and structure. Through microlevel choices, individual agents create a history of events. Conversely, factors such as weather and mortality rates often structurally determine the course of history over a long time frame.

Braudel's taxonomy of pace resonates across disciplines.<sup>4</sup> Scholars of international relations have been similarly confronted with the problem of how to categorize change.<sup>5</sup> One way of doing so strongly resembles Braudel's categorization of tempo. Change in international relations might be categorized as interaction change, rank order change, or change in the constitutive units.<sup>6</sup> Interaction change, the change of diplomatic practices, is the most susceptible to individual decision making. Such practices are influenced by the presence of particular decision makers and by specific strategic choices. By contrast, shifts in the distribution of capabilities occur less frequently.<sup>7</sup> Changes in relative power, and the subsequent challenges to the existing rank order by ascending powers, occur, by some accounts, every century or century and a half. Such changes might correspond with periodic cycles in the economy. Finally, unit change, for example, the change from city-states to empires, or from empires to feudal organization, occurs the least often. When a particular type of unit comes to dominate the international system, it transforms the deep structure of the system. The more frequent changes in interactions and rank order occur without affecting the particular character of this deep structure. For example, diplomatic practices and the rank order of states have changed in the past decades, but all this has happened without affecting the existence of a system of sovereign, territorial states. These historical periods in which particular types of units tend to dominate constitute the *longue durée* of international politics.

But using a Braudelian scheme does not explain why such transformations occur infrequently or how such changes might look when they do occur. Here the punctuated equilibrium model can be of some use.<sup>8</sup> This second image of change comes—somewhat ironically—from biology.<sup>9</sup> Stephen Jay Gould

rearticulates the Darwinian perspective and challenges common interpretations of Darwin's view of evolution as a linear and progressive process.<sup>10</sup> Both the "ladder" and the "cone" views of evolution are, according to Gould, mistaken. In the ladder interpretation, evolution is defined as progression along steps of a linear process. Each step follows from and is superior to the preceding step. In the cone view, evolution is perceived as a process of continual change wherein life becomes progressively more diversified and more complex, and hence more advanced. Both of these views are wrong. "Evolution, to professionals, is adaptation to changing environments, not progress."<sup>11</sup> One explains evolution not by suggesting that the existing life form is superior to the previous—Gould beautifully illustrates that early life forms were highly complex—but by demonstrating how it is well suited to exist in the new environment.

Gould differs from Darwin, however, on the pace of evolution. In Gould's view, change can be dramatic and very quick. It takes the form of "punctuated equilibrium." Stages of relative tranquility are interrupted by sudden and dramatic changes. Such broad exogenous change—punctuation—will lead to a flurry of radically new forms.<sup>12</sup> In the long run, some of these forms may die out and a period of relative tranquility will ensue—a period of relative equilibrium. Whatever forms survive are not explained by reference to the types preceding the exogenous shock but by reference to the new environment and the now simultaneously existing forms which emerged after the shock.<sup>13</sup> Gould's discussion of this two-staged nature of evolution is worth emphasizing in detail.

Darwinism, on the other hand, is a two-step process, with different forces responsible for variation and direction. Darwinians speak of genetic variation, the first step, as "random." This is an unfortunate term because we do not mean in the mathematical sense of equally likely in all directions. We simply mean that variation occurs with no preferred orientation in adaptive direction. . . . Selection, the second step, works upon *unoriented* variation and changes a population by conferring greater reproductive success upon advantageous variants.<sup>14</sup>

Gould's view of evolution serves as an alternative to the unilinear imagery that I criticized in Chapter 1. But is it appropriate for social science, and international relations in particular? Social and biological evolution are different, and the critical difference between them is intentionality in the first, variation, phase of evolution. Although biological organisms mutate at random, social groups may intentionally form political coalitions to deal with particular environmental constraints. Nonetheless, even here Gould's theory proves to be a useful metaphor.<sup>15</sup> First, the institutional outcomes of such bargains need not be efficient responses to external challenges. Furthermore, these outcomes are not a priori predictable because they involve elements of political strategy (more on this below). Moreover, the actors, when forming these coalitions, are incognizant of the long-term ability of their preferred institutions to compete with rivals. Created institutions are thus unoriented toward their long-run survivability, and the causes behind their emergence are different from the causes of their demise.

Second, empirically we can distinguish periods in which particular units (feudal, imperial, or territorial states) have become dominant following a dramatic change in military organization, economy, or culture. That is, changes in political organization seem to be preceded by broad shifts in constraints and opportunities imposed on social actors by the external milieu. Punctuations such as defeat in war, revolution, or emergent capitalism lead to a flurry of institutional innovations. Such phenomena are the sociopolitical equivalent of speciation events in biology.

Third, there are good reasons why actors do not redesign institutions unless conditions force them to do so. Transaction costs, set belief systems, and standard operating procedures mitigate against frequent overhaul. Moreover, given the fact that institutions reflect a particular distribution of power, such changes are unlikely to occur without fundamental shifts in that distribution.<sup>16</sup> Once one form has established itself as dominant, relative stability in institutional types should follow.<sup>17</sup> There is a certain path dependency in institutional design.

In short, the uneven nature of political change is well captured by the punctuated equilibrium model. Given that existing institutions cater to particular interests and reflect specific distributions of power, institutions will be "sticky." Only when dominant coalitions change, or interests and perceptions shift, will there be an opportunity for institutional transformation.

Most importantly, this metaphor warns us that history does not work by optimal design. The species or institution that proves to be successful over time is only successful *vis-à-vis* its synchronic alternatives. Following a punctuation event, type A might prove to be better than type B or C. But type A need not be an optimal response. Indeed, if type A did not emerge as a type in the variation stage, type B might become dominant in the subsequent selective process with C. For example, changes in the economic and military milieu of China did not lead to territorial states there. Yet it is clear that the Tang and Sung empires were well ahead of European development. But neither expanding trade nor gunpowder caused territorial states to emerge.<sup>18</sup> As in the first step of Darwinian evolution, the emergence of new types is not predictable by the change in milieu alone. However, once some new types have established themselves, the second step of the Darwinian process—selection—will reward only some or even only one of these.

#### A PROPOSED CAUSAL MODEL FOR EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION AND SELECTION

I essentially argue that broad-based external change has a variety of internal repercussions. In response to such an external change, new political coalitions will form, based on material interests and shared conceptual frameworks. The expansion of trade was the critical external change that set this process in motion during the High Middle Ages. The variety of novel institutional arrangements—city-leagues, city-states, and sovereign, territorial states—can be

explained by the particular nature of new political coalitions in response to the changing environment. The three cases I examine—the Hanseatic League, the Italian city-states, and the French territorial state—are all explained in this fashion. The growth of trade and corresponding increase in urban centers gave birth to new sets of arrangements between kings, aristocracy, burghers, and church.

Many theorists have argued that the internal developments of a country cannot be understood without taking into account that country's position within its external environment. This view lies at the heart of Hintze's explanation of how a state's external vulnerability, because of geographic location, might lead to authoritarianism.<sup>19</sup> The argument that changes in the economic market led to political realignment lies at the basis of Barrington Moore's explanation of authoritarianism and democracy.<sup>20</sup> Theda Skocpol's explanation of revolutions and Peter Gourevitch's account of foreign economic policies also follow this logic.<sup>21</sup>

Similarly, social realignments explain the emergence of new types of political organization, for example, during the High Middle Ages.<sup>22</sup> Actors have particular interests and perspectives and corresponding preferred forms of organization. An external change, a change in the overall milieu in which that society is placed, will lead to a shift in the relative power of social and political actors. Individuals will seek to capitalize on their improved relative position and change the existing political institutions. I thus take a methodological individualist perspective. Individuals have reasoned preferences to support one institution over another. The emergence of new institutions must thus be traced back to the ability of actors to pursue those preferences.

The outcome of such realignments, however, is not a foregone conclusion.<sup>23</sup> Realignments are essentially permutations and combinations of bargains based on material interests and shared belief systems.<sup>24</sup> Some actors choose in a satisfying way. They might lack information or might be ignorant about the probability of achieving their most preferred outcome. Moreover, because powerful actors may have widely divergent preferences, second-best solutions and compromises abound. Furthermore, actors work with divergent discount rates. The long-term future of the city-state clearly was not in anybody's mind in the period leading up to the Italian Renaissance. Political entrepreneurs and burghers were more concerned with immediate success in war or profit. To make matters worse, outcomes might even be serendipitous or accidental to what actors set out to achieve. Finally, institutions might be caught in low-level equilibrium traps.<sup>25</sup>

In short, we cannot simply deduce institutional outcomes from preferences or impute preferences from observed outcomes. The pure rational choice variant of methodological individualism, in assuming outcomes from efficient calculations, runs the risk of committing the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy. Institutions are interpreted "as having arisen because of the functions they must have served, when they in fact appeared for purely adventitious reasons."<sup>26</sup> As Keohane notes, a sound functional analysis should show a causal

connection between the functions of an institution and its existence. Similarly, James Caporaso criticizes rational choice for not examining the actual choice process.<sup>27</sup>

For these reasons, my research tries to inductively ascertain what preferences individuals actually had and what choices they made. I further examine how preferences were aggregated and played out in political bargaining. In doing so, the role of beliefs and norms must be taken into account, in conjunction with the material interests of the individuals in question. Beliefs and norms inform one's preferences. Hence, in order to ascertain the actual preferences of an actor, that individual's belief system must be examined. To label particular types of behavior, for example, a noble's pursuit of honor, as irrational by holding it to a strict cost-benefit logic misses the point. The choice of that individual should be understood by the conceptual context through which that individual's preferences are formed.<sup>28</sup> Weber's notion of elective affinity is one way of reconciling material interests and belief systems, without claiming the priority of the first and reducing the latter to epiphenomenal status. By using his insight, I try to demonstrate the preferences I ascribe to individuals.<sup>29</sup>

The focus on individuals' ideas is important, moreover, because it addresses a problem that is neglected in some accounts of rational bargaining but that should be clearly central to it. Such accounts, although they correlate interests to outcomes, fail to clarify how second-order collective action problems are overcome. Even when new institutions might benefit the members of a potential political coalition, that coalition might not form because of freeriding. The existence of shared beliefs will thus make the link between material preferences and institutional outcomes more plausible.

I will analyze three cases: the rise of the sovereign, territorial state in France, the emergence of the Hanseatic city-league, and the rise of the Italian city-states.<sup>30</sup> My analysis of the three cases starts at roughly the end of the tenth century. In France, the Capetian Dynasty ascended to the throne. In three centuries it would extend its control from a small royal domain around Paris to an area roughly similar to contemporary France. In those same three centuries, German imperial pretensions came to naught. Both Germany and Italy fragmented into a variety of urban leagues and city-states. It is in this period, then, that feudal lordships, universalist claims by the church, and German imperial designs started to give ground. Instead, sovereign statehood, urban leagues, and city-states made their appearances.

My discussion ends at about the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which formally acknowledged a system of sovereign states.<sup>31</sup> This is not to say that the process of eliminating alternatives to states had been completed by then. But it did indicate that the variety in the types of units that existed in the Late Middle Ages was gradually being reduced, until later only a system of states remained.

I chose these cases for several reasons. First, I argue that all three were affected by the rise of trade, my independent variable. During the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, Europe went through a remarkable period of

economic growth. This exogenous variable set a process of realignments in motion. Second, the variation in types of units allows me to demonstrate that the success of the state was not a foregone conclusion, as many theories on the rise of the state suggest. Third, the differences in capacities—not necessarily in favor of the state—clarify that the rise of the state was not simply a matter of efficiency of scale, that is, of size. As shown in this study, all these cases were viable contenders with states. Fourth, this variation dispels some alternative explanatory accounts. Emergent capitalism (neo-Marxist theory), dynamic density (neo-Durkheimian arguments), military technology (competitive ability perspectives), and conceptual shifts (neo-Weberian theory) do not suffice as ultimate explanatory variables. Each of the three cases were susceptible to emergent capitalism and increased transactions. All of these also had access to the new military technologies and sets of ideas. Yet they demonstrate different institutional solutions.

In short, by acknowledging this variation in contending alternatives, I can more accurately identify the causes of unit change. Furthermore, this variation allows me to suggest reasons why the other forms were inferior, without simply affirming the consequent.<sup>32</sup>

Critical to my analysis is the separation of the generative causes of such new institutional arrangements from the causes that led to the demise of some. It is clear from the contemporary state system that states have displaced other forms of organization. The second part of the explanation of unit transformation therefore requires an account of the selective process that favored states over these other types. The full account of this selective process is presented in Part III of this book.

I will argue that selection occurs both by systemic pressure on the less competitive types and by societal choices of actors who switch their allegiances. Systemically, from a top-down perspective, there are three main reasons why states survived and displaced other forms of organization. First, the internal logic of organization of the sovereign state had less deficiencies than its rivals. Sovereign, territorial states were better at rationalizing their economies and mobilizing the resources of their societies.<sup>33</sup> Second, state sovereignty proved to be an effective and efficient means of organizing external, interunit behavior. Sovereign states could more easily make credible commitments than their non-sovereign counterparts. Third, sovereign states selected out and delegitimized actors who did not fit a system of territorially demarcated and internally hierarchical authorities. The organizational principles of territorial states and city-leagues were mutually incompatible, exactly because the latter had no specific borders.

Selection, however, also occurs by social choice, from the bottom up. Since sovereignty is an institutional mechanism which creates a focal point for coordinating behavior, members of sovereign societies can achieve gains from long-run, iterative cooperation. If the benefits of long-term cooperation outweigh the benefits of short-run defection, social actors have an incentive to defect from institutions that do not provide for these benefits.<sup>34</sup>

Institutional mimicry constitutes a second form of social choice.<sup>35</sup> For example, once the benefits of sovereign statehood became apparent, the German feudal lords started to behave like territorial rulers. They started to call themselves princes and to perform regalian tasks such as regulating weights and measures, standardizing coinage, and rationalizing justice. Although technically still part of the empire (which would last in name until 1806), these principalities gained all the trappings of sovereign statehood. The Peace of Westphalia formally acknowledged their status and granted them all the rights of state actors, such as signing treaties, exchanging diplomats, and waging war (albeit not against the empire itself).

My key point, therefore, is that institutional structures have particular domestic and international consequences. This is not a comprehensive theory of late medieval and early modern Europe. Readers searching for a detailed account of the Hundred Years War, the defeat of Burgundy, or a clarification of the implications of the new Atlantic trade routes will search in vain. Instead my focus is on the advantages of fixed territorial borders and the benefits and costs of weakly established hierarchy. I do not deny the specific importance of individual traits of kings, weather patterns, or fortunes of war to clarify the rise and fall of specific states. But this is not an argument about specific states. In a sense, this is not even the history of France, Germany, or Italy. Instead it is an argument about the relative merits of particular logics of organization. The historical cases should be seen as examples of a larger set of diverse organizations—France was not the only territorial state, the Hansa was not the only city-league. My account suggests why some actors preferred one form of organization over others and why in the long run only sovereign territoriality survived as a logic of organization.

#### A NONLINEAR ACCOUNT OF STATE FORMATION THROUGH WAR

Charles Tilly suggests, as I do, that any account of change in the type of units must deal with the nature of institutional variation that existed in medieval Europe and the subsequent consolidation of the state. He explicitly recognizes the omission of this in some of his earlier work.<sup>36</sup> He also gives one of the few accounts of change that takes internal and external variables into account.

Tilly's recent model of explanation is extremely powerful.<sup>37</sup> The explanation he presents explicitly acknowledges the variety of institutional types that differed from the national state. Indeed, in its broad outline, Tilly's formula parallels my own. Shifts in the milieu lead to internal crises. Domestic factors produce a certain outcome. Then international systemic factors eventually lead to the dominance of one of the organizational forms. It is precisely the similarity in general perspectives that makes Tilly's model a valuable benchmark for evaluating my analysis. It will also clarify how my argument differs from a commonly held view that the rise of the sovereign state must be primarily attributed to warfare.

Tilly argues that the creation of new types of units in Europe basically proceeded along two dimensions. The first dimension was coercive intensive and the second was capital intensive. "In the coercion intensive mode, rulers squeezed the means of war from their own populations and others they conquered, building massive structures of extraction in the process."<sup>38</sup> This method of resource mobilization occurred in regions that lacked strongly developed towns, such as Brandenburg and Russia. Areas that had well-developed towns, such as Italy and the Netherlands, had to make bargains with capitalists—the capital-intensive mode of resource mobilization.

National states such as England and France combined both coercive- and capital-intensive modes. "In the intermediate capitalized-coercion mode, rulers did some of each, but spent more of their effort than did their capital-intensive neighbors on incorporating capitalists and sources of capital directly into the structures of their states."<sup>39</sup>

Gradually, competitive pressure selected out those organizations that used only one of the two methods of resource mobilization. The national state, which utilized both of these methods, proved to be better at waging war.<sup>40</sup> The series of wars that permeated Europe from 1500 on thus selected out the city-states and city-leagues. These unit types proved unable to muster the resources that national states could bring to bear.

My account differs from Tilly's on several issues. First, Tilly explains the variation between types of organization by differential responses to the functional demand of waging war. My account is based on the impact of economic change and subsequent politics of coalitional bargaining. I see the economic transformation of medieval Europe as the primary independent variable which made new political coalitions possible. These coalitions embarked on different institutional paths prior to the military revolution. Second, Tilly explains selection among rival modes of organization by their ability to wage war. From my perspective, the ability to wage war is itself determined by the efficacy of particular institutional arrangements. For example, the ability of a particular mode of organization to raise revenue and prevent freeriding will affect its war-making capacity. That is, the ability to wage war is an intervening variable, itself determined by institutional makeup. Third, Tilly's focus is different from mine. Tilly is primarily concerned with the state's ability to raise revenue from its society for war. Given this focus, there is no doubt that the military revolution led to an exponential increase in state demands on society following the Middle Ages. By contrast, I am interested in the question of how sovereign territoriality became one of the logics of organization that emerged in the Middle Ages. Thus, although I am also concerned with the capacity of government to extract resources, I focus more specifically on the emergence of sovereign territoriality in contrast to nonterritorial and nonsovereign types of organization.

Given Tilly's focus and presuppositions, it is logical that he sees the variety of coercive-intensive or capital-intensive paths emerge particularly after 1400. This corresponds with major breakthroughs in military technology—artillery,

modern fortifications, massed infantry—after 1400 or even later by some accounts. This environmental change forced governments to seek more revenue from their populations in order to guarantee the security of their respective polities.

However, some historians, such as Joseph Strayer, place the origins of the state at an earlier date. Tilly suggests that if Strayer is right, then his own argument is flawed.<sup>41</sup> It is not merely a question of the exact dating of the origins of the state. As I discuss in Chapter 5—and this is the critical point if Strayer's chronology is correct—centralization cannot be explained by war making alone. First, weak kings were not the logical providers of protection. Second, given that there was no increase in competitive pressure, since the military revolution had not yet occurred, central governments must have provided other inducements to powerful groups.

The French Capetian kings started from a very weak material basis. Powerful lords, such as the duke of Normandy, wielded more military might. If war making were the primary explanatory factor, then such lords should have been more successful than the king. That is, if state making were simply a bargain for protection, there is no reason to assume that the king would be the logical provider of protection, or that a centralized kingdom should be the result. The question thus becomes, how could weak kings bargain their way to greater strength?

This suggests that a focus on social alliances will be more fruitful. To argue that national states centralized and accumulated coercive force by combining elements of the coercive- and capital-intensive path still leaves unanswered how this occurred. A focus on social alliances will, for example, clarify why rulers started to protect property rights<sup>42</sup> and will thus suggest why centralized rule was more attractive than feudal rule.<sup>43</sup> This is of course Douglass North's point. Although Tilly views North's theory as a direct counterargument to his own,<sup>44</sup> I believe that a closer analysis of microlevel incentives and political bargains, such as North's or my own, actually fills some gaps in Tilly's argument.

I agree that the relative strength of towns is the first step in explaining the variation between states (city-states, national states, etc.). However, the relative power of the towns alone cannot explain everything. One needs an account of how towns bargained or allied with rulers. For example, one could not predict that many German towns would become independent solely by taking their relative power into account. The course of German urban independence was equally determined by Frederick II's choice to ally with the lords against the towns. The specific strategy pursued by political coalitions remains, therefore, important.

Furthermore, if towns are critical, as Tilly suggests—and I agree with him—then their presence needs to be explained. I argue that the emergence of many of the new towns in northern Europe, and the growth of the Italian towns, can be precisely attributed to the economic dynamics of the Late Middle Ages.

Hence, this reinforces my point that the important change in milieu is the change in the economic system, which preceded changing methods of warfare.

In short, Tilly explains the variation in unit type by different responses to the functional necessity of waging war. These different responses can in turn be explained by regional variation in the strength of towns. I argue, by contrast, that variation can be explained by different responses to a changing economic environment. The particular different responses can in turn be explained by the nature of internal political coalitions.

The second difference with Tilly's model is his account of international selection. For Tilly, selection is rooted in the unit's security performance. From my perspective, the critical variable is institutional structure. This in turn explains the ability to wage war. Whether or not a particular type of organization will survive depends on its ability to prevent freeriding, its credibility to commit in international treaties, compatibility with other types of organization, and the benefits that it provides to its subjects (in order to prevent defection).

Sometimes Tilly's account appears to explain the success of national states simply by the amount of resources under control, not by the particular mix of coercive-intensive or capital-intensive means. The national state centralized and accumulated more coercive means than its rivals.<sup>45</sup> The physical size of the state makes the difference. Tilly suggests, for example, that "large states" replaced other types.<sup>46</sup> The Italian city-states fell to the French and the Netherlands to England, not because they were capital intensive but because they were not large enough to muster sufficient resources.

I locate competitive ability in the nature of the unit's organizational structure.<sup>47</sup> One cannot argue that capital-intensive states lost out to national states because the latter could use coercion and capital-intensive means to mobilize resources. One could very well argue that the more capital-intensive units were more suited to purchase resources for war. In fact, states that rely more on coercive means to extract resources might be at a disadvantage.<sup>48</sup>

My alternative explanation of variation and selection has several benefits over Tilly's perspective and similar accounts that focus predominantly on warfare. If, as Tilly proposes, war making is the crucial selecting mechanism, then it is difficult to explain why so many small states survived. Why, for example, were the minuscule German states recognized as treaty signees equal to France or England, even in the middle of the nineteenth century? As Tilly himself notes, he regards some small entities such as Monaco or San Marino today as states, because other states treat them as such.<sup>49</sup> In other words, it is the empowerment by other states of such entities that allows them to continue to operate in world affairs rather than their ability to wield force. Furthermore, if the size of the national state is actually the explanation, how can smaller states replace a larger? Why did the Netherlands replace Spain? In my account this can be explained by looking at possible institutionally superior arrangements.<sup>50</sup>

In summary, I basically disagree with Tilly on two dimensions. First, I explain institutional variation by the specific nature of social coalitions following

economic change rather than by different responses to the functional prerequisite of war making. Second, I argue that whereas war is an important factor, the ability to wage war itself needs to be explained by institutional analysis. I would argue that on these dimensions, however, my theory complements Tilly's analysis by specifying the particular bargains underlying the state-making process.

## The Victory of the Sovereign State

Sovereignty simultaneously provides an ordering principle for what is "internal" to states and what is "external" to them. It presumes a system of rule that is universal and obligatory in relation to the citizenry of a specified territory but from which all those who are not citizens are excluded.<sup>1</sup>

IN THE preceding chapters I have argued that the economic transformation of the Late Middle Ages inspired individuals to create new forms of organization in western Europe. Universalist empire, Roman theocracy, and feudalism gave way to the sovereign, territorial state, the city-league, and the city-state.

These new institutional forms differed from each other in their degree of internal hierarchy and in whether or not their authority was demarcated by territorial parameters. Sovereign, territorial states contained a final locus of authority. Although my main emphasis has been on France, the same was true for other states such as England. Sovereignty need not imply absolutism. Even Hobbes recognized that sovereignty could take the form of parliamentary rule. But within sovereign states there existed a final decision-making structure which brooked no outside interference and which gradually claimed a monopoly on violence and justice. In addition, the sovereign state confined itself territorially. That is, sovereigns claimed hierarchy within borders and recognized no higher authority.

The city-league formed the antithesis of the sovereign, territorial state. Because of its confederated nature, its locus of final decision making was ambiguous. Did it reside with individual cities or with an executive body of the league of towns? Confederation, as in the case of the Hansa, left this highly unclear. Moreover, the city-leagues were nonterritorial in character. Although individual towns were surrounded by city walls, the leagues were not only noncontiguous, they lacked borders altogether. They were functionally but not territorially integrated for mutual defense of liberty and commercial interests. In short, unlike the sovereign state, the Hansa did not differentiate its authority by territorial specification, nor did it recognize a final locus of authority, either internally or externally.

The city-state formed an intermediate category of institutional structure. With the sovereign, territorial state it had in common a strict demarcation of jurisdiction by fixed borders. Also, externally the dominant city acted as the focal point for interunit contacts. But like the city-league, the city-state was internally divided. Given that the city-state consisted of one city dominating

TABLE 8.1  
Two Dimensions of Hierarchy and Fixed Territoriality

		Internal Sovereignty	
		<i>Fragmented</i>	<i>Consolidated</i>
Territorial Demarcation	<i>Borders</i>	Italian city-states	French state
	<i>Lack of borders</i>	Hanseatic League Feudalism	Universalist Empire Universalist Theocracy

other towns, the latter always contested the rule of the leading center. Sovereignty in the city-state, to use Tilly's terminology, was fragmented.

These two facets of organization, internal hierarchy and territorial demarcation, can be used to examine all the systems of rule discussed so far (see Table 8.1).

As I have already argued, feudal organization, with its crosscutting and overlapping jurisdictions, lacked both a clear center as well as territorial borders. Empire and church both claimed final decision-making power but lacked clear territorial specification of their authority. In theory all other political actors were their subjects.

It is clear that the Hansa, the Italian city-states, and the French state all cued in to the new market opportunities created by the transition from local in-kind trade to long-distance monetarized commerce. Yet from these three synchronic alternatives, only one survived. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the city-league no longer proved to be a viable competitor to the sovereign state. The Hanseatic League basically ended in 1667, when the last diet convened. And although the decline of the city-states proved to be less dramatic, they, too, gradually fell by the wayside.<sup>2</sup>

What happened in the three centuries preceding Westphalia that allowed sovereign states to become the constitutive elements of a global state system?<sup>3</sup> The historical literature on the rise and decline of specific types of units often emphasizes the importance of unique and critical developments. Particular policies, changing fortunes in war, shifting trade routes, and idiosyncrasies of rulers all provide plausible explanations. For example, the changing location of the herring schools, the silting of the harbor in Bruges, or the opening of the transatlantic routes are sometimes presented as explanations for the waning of the Hansa.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, some believe that the discovery of African circumnavigation struck the fatal blow to the Italian city-states.<sup>5</sup> Others see the influence of the guilds or the pursuit of landed interests as reasons for their decline.

No doubt many of these observations are pertinent and contribute to the explanation of why the Hansa and the Italian city-states drew to a close. But can we elicit general lessons from their demise? That is, although the descent of the Hanseatic League, or of Venice and Florence, are interesting in their own right, the broader and theoretically more challenging question is, why did they die out as institutional alternatives to the sovereign state? The diminishing fortunes of the Hansa and Venice do not fully explain why city-leagues and city-states,

as particular logics of organization, should have disappeared. After all, sovereign states have also risen and declined, but that has not led to the disappearance of the sovereign state as an institutional form. Quite the contrary. We need, therefore, to go beyond the historically particular to theorize about the general implications of certain institutional arrangements.

This chapter suggests that organizational types have particular properties, which in the case of city-states and the Hansa contributed to their decline. I shall use the Hansa and the Italian city-states as institutional cases from which we can deduce certain general consequences. To be specific, we need to examine what consequences the presence or absence of internal hierarchy and territorial demarcation had for the survivability of those types of institutions.

The sovereign, territorial logic of organization replaced the alternative modes of authority in Europe because of several major factors. Institutions that internally had a final decision-making authority were in a better position to overcome the feudal remnants of economic and legal particularism. The king's interest in rationalizing and improving the overall economy coincided with the interests of the mercantile elements in society. Such institutions were, competitively speaking, more effective and more efficient in curtailing freeriding and defection, and hence they were better at mobilizing the resources of their societies.

But there were additional reasons why sovereign, territorial institutions spread. Given the existence of a final decision maker, sovereigns could credibly speak on behalf of their constituencies. One knew that the kings, or the kings-in-parliament, could force their subjects to follow through on agreements they had reached. Moreover, because of their territorial character, states were compatible with one another. Their respective jurisdictions could be precisely specified through agreement on fixed borders. So not only could sovereigns speak on behalf of their subjects, they could also precisely specify who their subjects were. And by extension, perhaps even more importantly, borders enabled sovereigns to specify limits to their authority. City-leagues in particular were unable to do so, and hence they were difficult to incorporate in a system of states. Sovereignty, therefore, also spread by mutual recognition.

Finally, institutional selection occurred by mimicry and exit. Attractive institutions were copied by political elites.<sup>6</sup> In addition, societal actors voted with their feet. They left institutions that were less to their liking and sought entry into those that best met their interests and belief systems.

#### THE CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATION: DARWINIAN SELECTION BY WAR

For some, institutional selection in international politics occurs primarily, perhaps even solely, through war. Given the anarchical nature of the international system, force is viewed as the final arbiter regarding the viability of any institution. In this Darwinian milieu those less able to defend themselves are annihilated. The small fall prey to the large.

One body of literature that has closely studied how war operates as a selective mechanism is the hegemonic rivalry literature.<sup>7</sup> It argues that dominant actors in the system are periodically challenged and defeated. Thus, Spain gave way to the Netherlands and England. In turn, the Netherlands lost its position to England. But a closer look at this literature reveals that it focuses on a different set of issues than the one with which we are concerned. The hegemonic rivalry literature largely focuses on rank order change between similar types of units. It explains, in Gilpin's terms, rank order, or systemic change.<sup>8</sup> War determines position. My work, however, focuses on the selective process between dislike units. Specifically, why did sovereign states prove to be superior to city-states or city-leagues?<sup>9</sup> This form of selection is constitutive rather than positional. To use Gilpin's terminology again, it is a systems change, a change in the character of the constitutive units of the international system.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the fact that hegemonic rivalry literature and long-cycle literature pay little attention to the type of competing units, it is still worth examining whether their causal explanation might also hold true for competition between different forms of organization. That is, could selection between dislike units be explained by success in war? Because of the predatorial nature of the international realm, all units have to be able to wage war in order to survive. Accordingly, if particular forms of organization fall by the wayside, this must be explainable by their inability to wage war as effectively as their rivals. It is simply a matter of Darwinian survival of the fittest.

There are several variations to this type of explanation. One variant compares sovereign states to the preceding feudal mode of organization. According to this explanation, sovereign states could raise more revenue and larger concentrations of troops than their feudal predecessors. In short, efficiencies of scale made sovereign states superior in waging war.<sup>11</sup> The problem with this type of account is that the synchronic alternatives to the sovereign states, that is, city-leagues and city-states, were also superior to feudal forms of organization. As we have seen in the past few chapters, the ability of states to develop new military technologies, hire mercenaries, and use artillery were also part of the repertoire of the states' rivals. The Hansa had the ability to raise considerable numbers of troops and to equip large fleets. Its successes against Denmark, England, Holland, and Sweden attest to that. When Lübeck aided Denmark against Sweden in the sixteenth century, it did so with some of the largest and most advanced ships of the time.<sup>12</sup> City-states were even closer to the cutting edge of military developments. Italian military engineers were eagerly sought after. For example, Italians were hired by the English Crown to build its fortifications against the Scots.<sup>13</sup> The city-states also institutionalized the *condottieri*, the professional captaincy with its specialized military entourage. In short, the question remains as to why the sovereign state proved to be superior to these synchronic rivals, not why it was superior to feudal organization.

A second variation correctly compares the sovereign state to its synchronic rivals and argues that the state surpassed city-leagues and city-states because of

its command of a larger territorial space and greater population. The successful invasion by France of the Italian peninsula in 1494 is thus explained in this fashion.<sup>14</sup>

This argument is more powerful than the first, but again success or failure does not depend simply on efficiency of scale, whether construed in terms of territory or size of population. As previously shown, some Italian city-states could muster equivalent amounts of resources for long periods of time. Although it is true that France had a population ten times larger than that of Venice, Venetian revenue in the middle of the fifteenth century was 60 percent higher than that of the French Crown. In a day and age before the *levée en masse*, when revenue bought troops and fleets,<sup>15</sup> revenue mattered more than population size.<sup>16</sup>

If some forms of organization failed because of comparatively inadequate territory and population, how, then, could the Dutch success against Spain or France, or the rise of the Portuguese, be explained? The Dutch Republic and Portugal each had populations of about 1.5 million—comparable to Venice—yet they succeeded in becoming leading powers of the international system of the early sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>17</sup>

Another perplexing puzzle to solve is why many small sovereign, territorial states continued to survive.<sup>18</sup> The continued existence of many small German principalities is the most stark example. Furthermore, one may ask why the Hansa disappeared whereas some of the individual towns that had been members continued as independent actors in the international system. The traditional story that the militarily strong simply annihilated the weak does not hold. Weak individual German cities continued to operate in the international state system—as it took form after Westphalia—whereas stronger city-leagues disappeared.

If size and population are only crude and sometimes incorrect predictors of the ability to raise resources for warfare, what does explain the success of the sovereign state? I submit that competitive success lies in the particular institutional makeup of different forms of organization. What was it about the Venetian institutional arrangement, or for that matter of the Dutch Republic, that made such territorially small units such powerful actors?<sup>19</sup>

Warfare is thus an important selective mechanism, but success in warfare is only an indicator which itself needs to be explained. No doubt there are many variables that matter. The organizational skills and training of the Dutch armies under Maurice of Nassau propelled the Dutch to the forefront of military prowess. The success of the Swedes might not be explainable without the specific abilities of Gustavus Adolphus. The legendary capabilities of the Swiss pikemen derived, to considerable extent, from their village independence and poor countryside.<sup>20</sup> One variable, however, namely the nature of institutional arrangements, has often been neglected.

The analysis developed in this chapter suggests that the different institutional logics of city-states, city-leagues, and sovereign states had long-term

consequences for their ability to raise revenue and troops for war. That is, the institutional choices of individuals in the Late Middle Ages produced long-term consequences for the ability of some of these units to compete. The argument that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sovereign states were able to wage war more successfully than their institutional rivals is thus correct, but it tends to beg the question, why could they do so?

The long-term effects of the different logics of organization were also weighed by actors in terms of systemwide organizational outcomes. That is, some forms of organization were more preferred partners than others. We can thus solve the puzzle of the survival of small states by analyzing why they, unlike other forms of organization, might be more acceptable to their fellow actors in the international system.

Given that the French state and Hanseatic League were the most distinct cases, the consequences of these two different ways of structuring political order provide us with the clearest insights. By concentrating on these logics of organization, we can draw conclusions that can then be applied to the Italian city-states.

#### ADVANTAGES OF SOVEREIGN TERRITORIALITY OVER THE CONFEDERATED CITY-LEAGUE

Selection in international politics occurs basically through three mechanisms. First, selection operates through Darwinian survival of the fittest. The intentionality of the agents who have created and continue to favor particular institutions is largely irrelevant. As in biology, some species are more adept at surviving in their new environment whereas less-suited species die out. Similarly, not all institutions that are created following changes in their social environment will be equally successful in the long run. Thus, city-leagues proved to be less effective and less efficient than sovereign, territorial organization on a variety of dimensions.

Second, I will argue that selection occurs by mutual empowerment. Here social selection differs from the unintentional biological process. Unlike what happens in natural selection, individuals create their own environment by preferring and tolerating only certain types of institutions. Sovereign, territorial actors had reasons to prefer similar systems of rule elsewhere. Although this process is thus less structural than Darwinian selection, the iterative choices of individuals limit the opportunities and possibilities for others. In that sense a structural situation is created as well, albeit from a more sociological perspective.

Third, selection also occurs by deliberate mimicry and exit. Political elites copy institutional forms that they perceive as successful. At the same time, social groups switch their allegiance to those types of organization that better meet their interests.

#### *Selection by Darwinian Pressure: The Advantages of Internal Hierarchy*

##### STANDARDIZATION AND CERTITUDE

One advantage of sovereign authority was the existence of an actor, whether a king or king-in-parliament, who could tackle the legacies of feudal particularism. Sovereigns had a vested interest in rationalizing the overall economy because it led to higher revenues and larger military capacity. "It was in the common interest of the king and the middle class to remove the barriers, physical and feudal, which obstructed internal trade."<sup>21</sup>

One of those feudal barriers to trade was the lack of standardization. Medieval measures and weights were of a mind-boggling variety. Ronald Zupko notes that in late tenth-century England there were fifty major measures. By the Late Middle Ages this had increased to several hundred major measurements with 25,000 local variations.<sup>22</sup> The situation in the rest of Europe was no better.

This multitude of measurements had several causes. It sprang first of all from seigniorial control over measurements. After the decline of the Carolingian Empire, many of the lords had taken over the rights to issue specific measures and weights. Such lordships were reluctant to surrender their authority because control over measures provided income through, for example, charges for use of scales. Moreover, many of the payments to the lords were still in-kind, and hence manipulation of such measures yielded direct benefits. Lordly monopoly over the only legal measures and scales also provided a means of social control. A second cause for this diversity was that measures were representational rather than abstract. Measures often reflected human body parts (the foot, the ell(bow) or particular structural contexts of human labor.<sup>23</sup> A third cause lay in the odd duality of measurement. There were different measures for buying and for selling.<sup>24</sup> We have also seen, for example, in the case of the Hansa, that measures became smaller and lighter the farther the point of origin of the product. Merchants thereby obtained profit, while circumventing the church's demands for a just price; prices might remain the same, but the quantity delivered diminished. Modern consumers will unfortunately recognize that practice as alive and well.

Furthermore, some authorities were competent in setting standards, others had rights to enforce them, and still others had rights to lease public weights and measures to private actors. Needless to say, this proliferation of measures was hardly conducive to commerce, and the bourgeois sought means to overcome this variety. What kinds of institutions managed best to overcome the consequences of feudal decentralization?

The Hansa did not manage to standardize a system of measurements. The confederated nature of the league left considerable autonomy to the towns, and they were unwilling to relinquish their authority regarding weights and measures. Attempts to introduce particular measurements of volume, for example,

by using the size of the Wismar or Rostock barrel as an indicator of a particular quantity, proved to be illusive.<sup>25</sup> Many towns continued to use their particular customary measurements. At one point the Hansa tried to induce standardization by requiring the regional groups, the quarters, to follow the measurements of the dominant town of that group. The Dutch, Prussian, and Westphalian towns, for example, were thus supposed to follow Cologne.<sup>26</sup> This was to little avail. The Rostock barrel did make some inroads as a measure of volume but only for certain products. All in all, the process of standardization was of dubious success. "But with the other measures such standardization was not achieved. . . . The same must be said for measures of length. . . . With regards to measures of weight, there was no standardization either."<sup>27</sup> Merchants of course made the most of local control over measures. In other words, cheating was not beyond Hanseatic traders. They would, for example, use a smaller barrel or a double-bottomed barrel but put the Rostock benchmark on it. The common saying was that the Dutch preferred to sell wood rather than butter, because of their use of extremely thick barrels.<sup>28</sup>

Enforcement of Hanseatic decisions rested with municipal councils. But such councils were often dominated by the very merchants who were responsible for their violations. Enforcement of standardization therefore remained problematic. The German cities lacked a sovereign authority who could exercise such justice. Although all towns would have benefited from standardization, they had individual incentives to freeride.<sup>29</sup>

In France, kings took it upon themselves to attempt to standardize measures as early as the twelfth century. Philip Augustus tried to standardize measures for the water merchants of Paris.<sup>30</sup> Attempts to introduce some standardization throughout the kingdom date from Philip the Long (1316–1322) and started again after the Hundred Years War with Louis XI (1461–1483).<sup>31</sup> Their policies were pursued by many successive kings. Louis XII tried reform in 1508. Francis I issued an edict in 1540 claiming royal control: "But the supreme authority of the King incorporates the right to standardize all measures throughout his kingdom, both in the public interest and for the sake of promoting commerce, among his subjects and with foreigners."<sup>32</sup> Henry II decreed in 1557: "All lords in the city, suburbs and environs, who hold the privilege of measures, are obliged to furnish the names of their weights and measures. . . . Old standards not harmonizing with our measures, shall be broken up. . . . All shall be required to regulate their measures according to ours."<sup>33</sup> Charles IX, Henry III, and Louis XIV all continued with these attempts to control and standardize measures.

The royal attempts met strong opposition. The actors who opposed standardization were the old enemies of the bourgeois: clergy and nobles, who opposed this loss of seigneurial control.<sup>34</sup> At the outbreak of the French Revolution there were thus still hundreds of different measurements throughout France, particularly in agricultural areas. In the towns, by contrast, standardization was more successful.<sup>35</sup> Robin Briggs's overall assessment is that by the beginning of Louis

XIV's reign, considerable strides had been made in economic regulation and codification of customs.<sup>36</sup>

Despite the fact that standardization of weights and measures did not succeed as far as the burghers wanted, this was not perceived to be a problem endemic to the type of rule in France. Indeed, here the merchants and traders preferred more authority for the king rather than less. The *Cahiers de Doctrines*, the letters of grievances sent to the court before the revolution, clearly indicate that people thought that the only authority that could end this haphazard system was the French king.<sup>37</sup> There were literally hundreds of petitions for standardization—most of which demanded standardization on a national level.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, although the king had only limited success in changing this situation, he did manage to institutionalize methods of converting different measures. Kings tried to draft tables of conversion to make it easier for commoners and traders to deal with the plethora of measurements. The Hansa lacked an actor that could enforce such standardization on relatively independent towns.

As if this plethora of measures and weights was not enough to give merchants considerable grief, they also had to contend with a large assortment of coinage issued by the same particularistic authorities. The private accounts and letters of Thomas Betson, a Merchant of the Staple of the late fifteenth century, gives new meaning to the term *transaction costs*.<sup>39</sup> How did the various institutions fare in reducing this assortment?

The French state fared better than the Hansa in centralizing the minting of coin.<sup>40</sup> The league did not manage to standardize a particular coinage, and many towns continued to mint their own. "They [attempts at reform] remained without significant success until the great coin reform movement of the 16th century, and then only in a very limited way. In France, by contrast, the Crown, since Louis IX, had successfully curtailed the coining privileges of the lords, and took coining back into its control."<sup>41</sup>

Although a few towns adopted the Lübeck coinage, many others adopted different standards.<sup>42</sup> Such diffusion of coinage dated from the decline of the Holy Roman Empire. Historically the issuance of coinage was a regalian right, only to be exercised by the highest authority. Consequently, during the Roman Empire and the Carolingian period, the issuance of coinage occurred only under strict supervision of imperial administration. Although the German emperor tried to maintain such control, this became increasingly impossible in the face of his failed Italian strategy and his surrender of Germany to the feudal lords. From then on, coining passed into the hands of dukes, to many of the counts, even to the level of viscounts, and to individual towns. "The number of issuers in the thoroughly fragmented Empire of the thirteenth century seems as infinite, and many of them as insignificant, as the wave of 'feudal' denier [penny] strikers in Post-Carolingian France."<sup>43</sup> The surrender of such regalian rights was formally acknowledged in the Golden Bull of 1356 but had in fact started a good deal earlier. By the sixteenth century the situation had gotten

worse. By then there were roughly 2,500 local and regional authorities, and although not all of these minted, the chaotic currency and money conditions continued to greatly hamper German commerce.<sup>44</sup>

The diversity of mints thus had two consequences. First, merchants and tax collector had to develop some way of comparing different currencies. In addition to other currencies, the Hanseatic merchant had to contend with Lübeck, Pomeranian, Prussian, and Rigan marks, Brandenburg thalers, Rhenish guilders, Flemish pounds, and English pounds sterling.<sup>45</sup> Second, the actual value of the coin might vary depending on its regional place of origin. Different coiners used different metal contents.<sup>46</sup> Needless to say, this lent itself to considerable abuse by the minter.

In France, coinage became regulated by the king.<sup>47</sup> Louis IX decreed in 1265 that royal coin should be good throughout the realm, whereas baronial currency was only to be used within their domains and had to be of equal value. "The barons needless to say were outraged at this systematization."<sup>48</sup> Philip V's economic program of 1321 tried to repress the unpopular currency issued by the nobility and revalued the royal coinage.<sup>49</sup> Even prior to that, by 1300, the French kings had reduced the number of vassals claiming the right to issue coin from three hundred to about thirty who actually minted their own currencies.<sup>50</sup> The kings managed to standardize metal content and institutionalized a system based on the pound, the shilling, and the penny (*livre, sol, denier*), a system that originated first in the Carolingian Empire. The king thus reduced the number of mints in the kingdom and thus increased certitude in transactions. "So that in the later Middle Ages the only effective non-royal coinages in France were those issued by a handful of the greatest, near-autonomous princes . . . such as the duke of Brittany and the duke of Guyenne who was also the king of England."<sup>51</sup>

One might counter at this point that increased hierarchy also has a negative consequence. Central control over coinage should also lead to debasement. It is true that the French king, just as feudal minters, would debase coinage to obtain revenue.<sup>52</sup> But the king was not unconstrained. Continued debasement would lead to lack of confidence in such currency and raise the ire of merchants.<sup>53</sup> Empirical evidence suggests that the general tendency was the more consolidated the central government, the less debasement of coinage.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, it could be argued that the level of tolerance toward debasement is at least equal within all systems of rule, whether league, city-state, or territorial state, because capital always had the option to exit. French kings had an interest in establishing exchange rates to prevent such flight from occurring.<sup>55</sup> The burghers at times could put a halt to debasing.<sup>56</sup> In any case, on the issue of variation in minting, the French king brought some standardization to the multitude of mints and coinage types.

Likewise, French royal justice centralized the legal system more so than the Hansa. The Hansa continued to exist with a variety of legal codes on the municipal level.<sup>57</sup> Since the enforcement of Hansa decisions had to be carried out by the individual town councils, implementation varied greatly. Furthermore, the

Hansa did not have any formalized system for determining whether particular issues called for municipal, regional, or Hanseatic decisions. Part of this was due to the absence of a formal constitution for much of the Hansa's existence.<sup>58</sup> The members of the Hansa refrained from drafting such a constitution because they believed that a formal list of membership, which would consist of the signatories to that constitution, would prompt states to cut deals with individual towns and encourage freeriding. Paradoxically, then, the Hansa feared that a formal organizational listing would dilute its power to act as an organization for all the towns.

In France, by contrast, one of the tasks that kings early on reserved for themselves was the right of adjudication. Going back to feudal claims of arbitrator and judge, the newfound power of the kings transformed these ancient rights into factual exercise of royal power.<sup>59</sup> At the highest level, justice was meted out by the royal high court, i.e., the Parlement. Thus Philip Augustus (1180–1218) argued that the king was the highest legislator. Louis IX outlawed trial by combat in 1258.<sup>60</sup> Kings also started to enforce property rights and contracts under the motto *pacata sunt servanda*.<sup>61</sup> In short, the king rationalized juridical procedure.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, the French king institutionalized the means of raising revenue. The two largest taxes were the royal *taille*—from the 1460s responsible for about two-thirds of revenue—and the *gabelle*, the salt tax.<sup>63</sup> Although these might have had some negative influence on the level of business, they were at least standardized and could thus become part of the regular business calculations of those engaged in commerce.

The ad hoc nature of Hanseatic revenue precluded such business certitude.<sup>64</sup> The incidental tolls and customs, which the Hansa allowed some of its towns to raise, duplicated the very problem that feudalism had previously posed for mercantile pursuits.<sup>65</sup>

To sum up, the Hansa proved to be less efficient in reducing transaction costs and providing collective goods than the sovereign state. It did not manage to provide standardization of weights and measurements, enforce centralized justice, establish a general system of coinage, or establish a regular means of raising revenue for a general fund.

#### PREVENTING FREERIDING AND THE KING AS PUBLIC ACTOR

The confederated nature of the Hansa led to continuous freeriding and defection. There were always incentives to disavow the edicts of the diet. Defection from international agreements, for example, by engaging in piracy, led to deterioration of relations with trading partners such as England. The gains accrued to the individual town and merchants engaging in that particular practice. But the costs were borne by the entire Hansa. Although there were means of dealing with defectors—the most serious was exclusion from the Hansa—these mechanisms did not always work. Enforcement still required detection of the perpetrator—not easy to come by on the high seas—and a majority of Hansa members voting for punishment of the defecting party.<sup>66</sup>

Such defection also included renegeing on contributions to military campaigns and individual bargaining with non-Hanseatics. For example, the Saxon towns did not wish to contribute to the military defense of the Wend towns. When the Wend towns fought the Danish in the 1420s, members of the Saxon group agreed to send help. However, they procrastinated in sending troops until Lübeck had effectively defeated the Danes by itself.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the Dutch towns on the Zuiderzee were unwilling to support campaigns against the Hollanders who were not members of the Hansa.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, when the Hansa was at war with the two Dutch provinces of Holland and Zeeland in 1438, the Prussian regional diet continued to authorize voyages to those areas.<sup>69</sup>

In economic matters, towns such as Hamburg and Elbing were all too willing to defect from Hansa stipulations that no privileges were to be granted to English traders using the Hansa ports on the Baltic and the North Sea. Hamburg granted English traders special privileges from 1568 to 1577.<sup>70</sup> It finally withdrew these privileges when threatened with exclusion from the Hansa. Elbing was eager to give the English a base in Prussia. Likewise, Danzig became a major port for English trade in corn and flax.<sup>71</sup> Cologne was yet another town willing to pursue its individual interests in trade with England at the expense of the Hansa. The effect of all this was a gradual erosion of Hanseatic trade hegemony. In 1570—well after the peak of the Hansa—Hansa merchants still shipped 25 percent of English trade. But by 1600 this had been reduced to 3 to 4 percent.<sup>72</sup>

Defection and freeriding in the Hanseatic League were driven by mutual distrust between the towns and the decentralized institutional arrangements of the Hansa. Although the league had towns, such as Lübeck, that could sometimes override collective action problems, other towns did not view Lübeck's interests as necessarily compatible with their own.<sup>73</sup> The Prussian towns, for example, distrusted the treaty that the Wend towns, primarily Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, had signed with the Danish king in 1435.<sup>74</sup> Although the Wend towns had actually negotiated the treaty on behalf of all the Hansa, the Prussian towns believed that the Wend towns had only sought to further their own particularistic interests.

Sovereign actors capitalized on this mutual distrust. The Danish king only recognized the treaty for ships flying the flag of the Wendish towns, in the hopes of creating a rift. The king exacted tolls on the Prussian ships that crossed through the Sound but took care not to demand tolls from Wend ships. Similarly, England was eager to close deals with individual Hansa towns and thus circumvent the protectionism of the entire league. When obstructed from access to Bruges, where the Hansa had a major trading office (Kontor), the English moved their trade to Antwerp which was a relay station for trade with Cologne, thus fostering competition between Cologne and other Hansa towns.<sup>75</sup>

The centralized role that the general Hansetag might have played was further eroded by the regional Tage. Although the regional Tage represented one

way of coordinating policy in a more manageable geographical size and issue-specific manner, regional interests tended to erode the general policy of the league. When English merchants began to make inroads into the eastern Baltic, they were welcomed by the Prussian towns which wanted to sell grain to the English. The Wend towns, however, opposed this since they had made money as middlemen between England and the Prussians.

In France, by contrast, the interests of the subjects of the realm and the interests of the king largely coincided. What was good for France was good for the royal coffers. The king, as a political entrepreneur, has his own reasons to provide collective goods and control freeriding. "Making peace prevail, therefore, served a variety of interests: those of merchants, the fiscal advantage of princes and the presumed obligation of the latter to pursue the common good."<sup>76</sup>

This is most clear in the activist policies of the French Crown from the later fifteenth century on through the mercantilist era. Aside from seeking to improve economic efficiency by the standardization and regulation which I have already mentioned, the crown engaged directly in manufacturing and commerce.<sup>77</sup> Louis XI (1461–1483) is thus regarded as the "father of French mercantilism" and was "Colbertian before Colbert."<sup>78</sup> He tried to standardize measures, attract foreign craftsmen, and protect domestic industry. In the sixteenth century, the French Crown also engaged in saltpeter mining and industry that was relevant for the manufacture of munitions.<sup>79</sup> It also protected by means of patents the profitability of new inventions. By the seventeenth century, mercantilism had come into full swing with the policies of Colbert (1661–1683). The crown regulated the movement of bullion, tried to reduce imports, and fostered internal efficiency by reducing the large number of tolls.<sup>80</sup> It also engaged in a sustained effort to improve land transport.<sup>81</sup> No doubt royal absolutism was not always appreciated, certainly under Louis XIV's imperialist policies. But in general, "many towns also profited from the slow and difficult unification of the realm."<sup>82</sup>

Most noteworthy, perhaps, defense became defense of the realm.<sup>83</sup> The standing army, since the late fifteenth century, thus became an instrument of the state rather than an instrument for the defense of the king's private property. The king's ambitions and the fate of France were closely tied, and the army was no longer based on the system of feudal service owed the king in exchange for grants of land.

The development of the king as protector of the realm was closely tied to the dissociation of the realm and the royal domain.<sup>84</sup> For the Franks, "the kingdom of France was the king's thing; . . . there was no 'public thing'; the state belonged to him."<sup>85</sup> With the later Capetians, the royal domain, which had originally been synonymous with private property, became an unalienable entity. Unlike a feudal estate, it could not be estranged by inheritance or sold. Hence the argument that the English king could not acquire part of France even if the French king so wished. Through the subtle transition from royal domain, which

was simply the personal holdings of the king, to the public realm, the quality and functions of the king had changed.<sup>86</sup> The private domain became the public state.

The king had two bodies—the person was gradually distinguished from the office. Whatever might happen to the individual as king did not affect the status of the crown. Although this was originally justified within the medieval mentality which perceived duality as pervading many physical phenomena, it was increasingly grounded in Roman law, wherein the king was the fountain of law. Ecclesiastical kingship was transferred to law-centered kingship, thereby opening the way to national states and absolute monarchies.<sup>87</sup> Salisbury could, therefore, already plausibly argue in the twelfth century that the king “is, and acts as, a *persona publica*. And in that capacity he is expected to consider all issues with regard to the well-being of the *res publica*, and not with regard to his *privata voluntas*.”<sup>88</sup>

Although this theory was especially articulated in England, similar ideas took root in France. Louis VII (1150) argued that the magnates owed service “to realm and Crown.” Philip Augustus asked for military support “for the defense of our head as well as of the crown of the realm.”<sup>89</sup> In short, the king acquired public status. The Hansa, by contrast, lacked a theory legitimating sovereign power. This was partially due to the absence of clear internal hierarchy and diffuse demarcation from non-Hansa authorities.<sup>90</sup> There simply was no clear center that could operate as a sovereign.

There were thus specific reasons why social groups perceived that the king might have the interests of the realm at heart. The king benefited from the overall welfare of the state, whereas the leading towns of the Hansa did not necessarily gain from the overall welfare of the league. Individual towns rightly perceived that the disparate members had various interests which were not always served by the actions of the diet.

In short, sovereign, territorial rulers were recognized as political entrepreneurs who had vested interests in decreasing the remnants of feudal economies. In standardizing coinage, reducing the number of weights and measures, and creating more legal certitude, they reduced transaction and information costs. The greater degree of internal hierarchy was also more suited to control freeriding and defection. This in turn affected their ability to wage war more effectively than city-leagues. Arguably, the Hansa of the seventeenth century was less able to wage the type of war that the French state could engage in at the time. But this was due to the organizational flaws of the Hanseatic League, not to any inherent lack of size or population. Scholars of the Hanseatic League repeat the same theme. There was “no effective governing body to coordinate the Hansa’s interests.”<sup>91</sup> Consequently, when sovereign, territorial rulers started to increase their powers, they could prey on individual towns and regions that lacked united opposition.<sup>92</sup>

Nevertheless, the demise of the Hansa was long and protracted. There was no decisive battle that sealed its fate. Decline was relative, not absolute. In-

deed, the tonnage of Hanseatic shipping was 50 percent higher in 1600 than it was in 1500. This tonnage was equal to the total owned in the Mediterranean and larger than that of England. But the Hansa had lost ground relative to the Dutch who by 1600 had a fleet of almost three times the tonnage of the Hansa.<sup>93</sup> Overall there was an economic revival after 1550, and the Hansa tried to remedy some of its institutional defects by agreeing on yearly assessment and a constitution in 1557. Like the Italian city-states, it lingered for a long time.<sup>94</sup> By some accounts even the Thirty Years War did not ruin the Hansa’s economic prospects.<sup>95</sup> But there were other forces at work as well. The European world was gradually shifting to a system of sovereign, territorial states, and in that system the Hansa had no place and its towns lost their desire to maintain the league. Consequently, the last Hanseatic diet convened in 1669.

#### *Selection by Mutual Empowerment: Credible Commitments and Territorial Jurisdiction*

International exchange requires a modicum of domestic stability on the part of the contracting parties and at least some expectation that each will adhere to the terms of the agreement. Internal stability is required to guarantee that the negotiating partner can indeed commit the individuals on whose behalf he or she is negotiating. The direct correlate of that condition is that the party that is committing itself to particular agreements can be expected to continue the terms of the bargain over a period of time. In short, can the other party engage in iterative behavior over time?<sup>96</sup>

The Hanseatic diet did not clearly specify on whose behalf it was negotiating or to what extent its members were bound by the terms of certain agreements. Because of this, as well as the Hansa’s inability to curtail defection, the league was an unattractive partner to international agreements. An illustrative example is provided by the conflicts and negotiations between England and the Hansa. The Merchant Adventurers, an English association of traders, argued in 1551 that privileges for the Hansa should be rescinded because “none of their charters named particular individuals or towns so that there was no way of knowing who ought to enjoy the pretended privileges.”<sup>97</sup> This was also perceived to be greatly detrimental to the king, and the Merchant Adventurers claimed that the crown lost 17,000 pounds sterling in customs duties because nonleague members enjoyed league privileges. One of the primary demands of the Privy Council in the negotiations of 1560, in the “*Moderatio in commercio*,” was that the Hansa provide an explicit list of the members entitled to such privileges.<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless, by 1589 the problem still was not resolved and once again the English insisted that the Hansa provide them with a specific membership list.<sup>99</sup> The English Crown wished to know which ships docking in English ports could legitimately claim the benefits that would follow from the treaty. Otherwise any trader could claim affiliation with the Hansa. The league, however, refused to provide such a list.<sup>100</sup> It feared that such a list would make individual towns the target of English encroachment. A state might provide

benefits to individual towns and thus encourage their defection from the league, or conversely, it might impose costs on some others, hoping that the league as a whole would not take action.

The Hansa furthermore argued that it could not be held responsible for infringements of treaties by individual towns.<sup>101</sup> Although the Hansa claimed that privileges were obtained for all its members, and thus acted as a legal body, it suspended such uniform legal status when costs were imposed. The Hanseatic diet absolved itself from responsibility for towns that violated agreements, yet at the same time it argued that benefits negotiated by representatives of the Hansa should fall to all members. The problem was that agreements were negotiated and ratified with the Hanseatic diet, but enforcement depended on the further ratification of the individual town councils. Thus, when the Prussian towns refused to sign the 1437 treaty, England wanted to suspend privileges for them. The Hansa, however, claimed that privileges should be given to all Hansa towns, including the Prussians, regardless of their individual position on the treaty.<sup>102</sup>

Even when agreements could be obtained, the Hansa was not able to prevent individual towns from defecting from agreements once they had been reached. The drawn-out trade wars with the Hansa and England were thus driven by the continued defection of Hanseatic towns.<sup>103</sup>

This also meant that territorial lords were able to gain concessions by negotiating with individual towns directly. During the conflicts of the fifteenth century, Cologne pursued several negotiations on its own, despite the fact that external representations were supposed to be handled by delegates of the Hanseatic diet. When England obtained privileges from Hamburg, against the wishes of the Hansa, Hamburg claimed to be a free city "which had the right to adopt any policy."<sup>104</sup> In addition, this lack of committed membership highly complicated the nature of warfare. If a state went to war with the Hansa, this did not automatically mean that one was at war with all the Hansa members. For example, the Dutch towns that were Hansa members tended to excuse themselves from fighting Holland and Zeeland.<sup>105</sup>

In sovereign states, by contrast, the responsibility for redress of violations by subjects was put on the shoulders of the sovereigns.

They strictly controlled all "letters of mark" and reprisals against foreign merchants, and in their place substituted due process of law, or agreed procedures. By means of registered obligation they also tried to guarantee the authenticity, validity and execution of trading agreements. In lands ruled by custom the contracts were enforced by the affixing of public seals.<sup>106</sup>

Sovereign authorities thus took it upon themselves to regulate trade. Without sovereign assistance, merchants had to rely on self-help. When a merchant had been defrauded by an alien, it was standard practice to take revenge, by violent means if necessary, on other aliens from the same place of origin as the perpetrator.<sup>107</sup> The result was not uncommonly a spiral of mutual retaliations. Sovereigns, however, started to create focal points for institutionalized redress. Only their subjects would obtain benefits from such regulation, and likewise they

would punish members of their own society who violated agreements. Defectors were subject to royal jurisdiction, and hence, unlike the Hansa, there was a clear enforcement mechanism to prevent freeriding. Sovereign authorities provided specific loci of authority through which cooperation could be organized. From the early Middle Ages on, kings started to reserve the right to represent their subjects in foreign affairs.<sup>108</sup> The provision of such trade regulation was one of the facets that made sovereign, hierarchical authority attractive.<sup>109</sup>

In correlation to the king's claim to represent the subjects within a given territorial space, the exercise of private external actions was curtailed. Admittedly this was not a sudden process. As Thomson notes, private subjects who were nominally subject to a sovereign continued to exercise violence for many centuries.<sup>110</sup> Piracy, for example, was a recognized means of foreign policy, and blurred all distinction between private and public violence.<sup>111</sup> Increasingly, however, such practices became incompatible with sovereign authority. Such a system of rule implied that there could only be one principle source of foreign relations.

The inability of the Hansa to credibly commit had several consequences for the league's survival. Because the league could not control defection, it could not credibly consign itself to long-run agreements with joint gains.<sup>112</sup> Game theory corresponds here with some of the sociological literature. Institutions originate where repetitive behavior occurs between two actors. The more this repetition occurs, the more the actors expect a typical pattern of behavior from the other. Social roles develop which signal what type of behavior one may expect. When these roles are passed on to actors not immediately involved in the initial interactions, these roles become externalized.<sup>113</sup> Actors should, therefore, prefer those types of institutions that clearly indicate the type of behavior one might expect from that actor. In short, political elites should prefer systems of rule in their environment that can commit their members. The representatives of the Hanseatic Diet were often not able to give such guarantees.

#### MARKET VERSUS TERRITORIAL STATE

The Hansa and the sovereign state were ultimately driven by different principles regarding their preferred extension of political order. The nonterritorial Hansa resembled, in a way, the imperial form of organization. Although it lacked the central authority of imperial control, it shared with the classical empire the objective of having the widest possible extension of political control over its sphere of economic interactions.<sup>114</sup> Commerce would be organized by incorporating as many towns as possible in the league. Political control would thus ideally correspond with this sphere of economic extension.

Sovereign states, by contrast, are delimited by explicit territorial parameters. Although states might very well seek expansion, their claim to authority is limited by their recognition that authority only extends to their borders. They can coexist with similar types of units in segregated territorial spaces and yet interact extensively across these borders. Although certain border areas, provinces,

or previously held areas might be in dispute, states are not logically predisposed to extend their political control to other areas. Sovereignty is based on the principle of juridical equality.<sup>115</sup>

Imperial modes of organization, such as Frederick II's claim to universal rule or that of the Roman theocracy, did not recognize formal borders as limits to their extension. Although the Hansa of course made no claim to world rule, it, too, did not limit its political authority by formal borders. It tried to extend its control transterritorially, and thus "it had no territorial boundaries, but spread out over wide areas on both land and sea."<sup>116</sup> In non-Hansa towns where the league had important trading interests, it would seek special privileges and rights of jurisdiction over its members within the given areas of such towns.<sup>117</sup> In London, for example, the Hansa controlled the Steelyard area and had jurisdiction there. Until 1556 the Hanseatic traders paid fewer duties in England than English citizens engaging in trade.<sup>118</sup> The territorial contiguity of the state with its fixed borders was thus at odds with the nonterritorial character of the Hansa.

Moreover, league membership included towns within sovereign states, thereby reintroducing the feudal problem of crosscutting jurisdictions. Thus, when England seized a large fleet of Hanseatic ships, the ships from the Dutch town of Kampen were released with the other ships from the Burgundian Netherlands, with which England had no quarrel. However, since Kampen was also a member of the Hanseatic League, and since the league's ships were not released, England could have decided otherwise.<sup>119</sup> Towns could simultaneously be subject to a territorial lord, albeit sometimes nominally, and subject to the dictates of the league. Thus the Dutch towns on the Zuiderzee, of which about twelve were members of the Hansa, had to divide their loyalties between the Hansa and the Dutch towns of Holland and Zeeland, who often fought the Hansa.<sup>120</sup>

Consequently, the Hansa did not fit well within a system of sovereign states. This clarifies its precarious position at the Peace of Westphalia where the league sought representation.<sup>121</sup> The league had considerable difficulty obtaining standing at the conferences in Osnabrück and Münster. The German princes particularly wished to deny the Hansa legal standing. They argued that "1. The Hanseatic cities are either intermediate cities, who are represented by their lords, or imperial cities, and in that capacity naturally represented at the conference. 2. The Hansa cities were not mentioned in the religious treaty of Augsburg of 1555. 3. One does not really know what the Hansa in essence is."<sup>122</sup>

Although the Hansa was eventually mentioned in the final draft, the towns were only consulted on the issue of repayments. Because its nonterritorial logic of organization did not mesh with that of the state system, and because the league could not bind all its members to the agreements, the Hansa was not acceptable as a player in international politics.

The issue of Hanseatic recognition was not simply a matter of material resources. If it were, why would the independent imperial cities gain standing?

The individual cities certainly did not have more resources than the league. The answer is that imperial cities, such as Lübeck, could be regarded as small states. Individual towns such as Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg could therefore participate in the Peace negotiations. The issue was whether the league as an organization of towns could participate in the new order of international politics which was hammered out during the negotiations in Osnabrück and Münster. The answer was negative. Scarcely twenty years later the Hansa dissolved itself.<sup>123</sup>

Selection of particular types of units thus also proceeds by empowerment. International actors determine who is to count as a legitimate international participant. The Peace of Westphalia made the territorial lords of the basically defunct Holy Roman Empire full participants in the international system.<sup>124</sup> The ministates were acknowledged as legitimate participants in the international realm and would continue to play that role into the nineteenth century.<sup>125</sup>

#### *Selection by Directed Adaptation: Mimicry and Exit*

Students of organization theory and scholars of international relations have been vexed by a similar question: Why are institutions similar, or at least why do they become similar over time? One explanation, quite analogous to my own, suggests that institutional isomorphism occurs through competitive pressures and noncompetitive mechanisms.<sup>126</sup> We have just discussed how the first operated in early modern Europe. The latter process explains how less efficient organizations can continue to persist. I have already suggested one noncompetitive mechanism in international politics—the mechanism of mutual empowerment.<sup>127</sup> A second process consists of agent-driven choices. Political entrepreneurs copy institutions that they perceive to be successful in reducing uncertainty and achieving objectives such as a larger revenue and increased military capacity. Copying thus increases one's chances at relative success. It also enables such elites to be recognized as equals within the state system, by mutual empowerment. In a material sense, they are then more suited to pursue long-run gains through treaties. From an ideological perspective, they are perceived as the equals of the leaders. Social actors at the same time vote with their feet. They prefer to exit the less successful system and switch their loyalties to that system of rule that is more likely to meet their goals.

Thus, the German lordships, once they perceived the revenue and strength of sovereign state competitors, started to copy that kind of institutional makeup. Like their royal counterparts, they established hierarchical control within their borders. Within these principalities, weights and coinage were increasingly standardized, and princely adjudication became the norm.<sup>128</sup> In effect, these lordships became increasingly like miniature sovereign states. After the Peace of Westphalia, they were officially recognized as such.<sup>129</sup>

Furthermore, as I discussed above, there were advantages to sovereign statehood. Externally, states could credibly commit themselves and engage in long-

run iterative relations. As the advantage swung in favor of sovereign states, only similar forms of organization were recognized. Domestically, sovereigns proved to be better at reducing transaction costs and providing for collective goods. As a consequence, sovereign states eventually managed to raise more revenue than their alternatives. For example, although French revenues in the second half of the fifteenth century were not vastly larger than those of city-states, they increased dramatically in the sixteenth century.<sup>130</sup> The Hansa, despite its attempts to levy an annual tax on each town, succeeded far less in mobilizing such resources.<sup>131</sup>

All of these factors suggested to the German lords that sovereign, territorial statehood was the most preferable form of organization.<sup>132</sup> The Hansa similarly tried to copy institutional forms that were more successful. In the sixteenth century they pursued closer cooperation with the emperor, in an attempt to create the royal-urban alliance that had faltered centuries earlier. By then, however, the emperor lacked the power to override the territorial lords of Germany.<sup>133</sup> The Hansa also entertained the idea of forming a tighter association incorporating all German cities or even forming a government along the lines of the Dutch Republic.<sup>134</sup> Although this would still have left the towns considerable autonomy, the tighter association would have allowed closer cooperation and have prevented defection. The idea failed because of the towns disparate interests. In short, the Hansa could not be transformed into a territorial state with a sovereign.<sup>135</sup>

Towns, perceiving the benefits of territorial entities, increasingly defected from the league. This went beyond freeriding. They allied with local lords, now increasingly acting as sovereign, territorial rulers. The estates basically agreed with the princes to construct states made up of contiguous territories.<sup>136</sup> The tasks of organizing long-distance commerce were increasingly taken over by states and their consular services, thereby making the *Kontors* and offices abroad less necessary.<sup>137</sup>

Some Hansa towns simply failed to appear at the diets or refused to pay their dues.<sup>138</sup> Rather than remain part of the transterritorial league, towns were incorporated within the borders of existing sovereign states or became small territorial states in their own right. Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and other German cities became independent actors and signed treaties just like any other state.<sup>139</sup> Although these were later incorporated into the united Germany after 1870, Bremen, Hamburg, Danzig, and others maintained some residue of independent decision making as *Länder* (in the Federal Republic) or free cities, even after 1870.

#### FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ITALIAN CITY-STATES

The previous discussion of the Hansa and France presented the starkest contrast between two distinct logics of organization. The sovereign state had two specific traits: external, territorial definition and internal hierarchy. The Hansa

lacked both those elements. The city-state demarcated itself externally from other authorities by territorial borders—therein it resembled the sovereign state.<sup>140</sup> Internally, however, it lacked a clear sovereign. Although the dominant city monopolized external contacts, internally its jurisdiction over the subject towns was always contested. Sovereignty, in other words, was fragmented. Given that we have discussed the consequences of such institutional facets above, we can now briefly apply these insights to the Italian city-states.

#### *Darwinian Selection: The Consequences of Contested Sovereignty*

As seen, medieval commerce was bedeviled by a variety of measures, weights, and coins, irrational means of trial, and a bewildering collection of local customs. This feudal particularism was combatted internally by the king, who also tried to become the external focal point for transnational interactions. The surviving mercantile manuals of Mediterranean commerce reveal that Italian merchants had to combat problems similar to those of their northern counterparts, internally as well as abroad.<sup>141</sup>

However, unlike in the sovereign state, hierarchy in the Italian city-state was ambiguous as “power inside the city-state was always being challenged from within.”<sup>142</sup> In this it resembled the city-league. This fermentation within the Italian cities and city-states left them, in the long run, in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis their territorial counterparts in rationalizing their economies.

The lack of a clear sovereign authority in Italian city-states was due to several causes. First, the formation of the Italian states occurred through the annexation of other towns by dominant cities. Thus the two hundred to three hundred independent communes of the thirteenth century were amalgamated into roughly a dozen small states by the end of the fifteenth century. All these towns, however, had considerable autonomy before such incorporation, and many did not relinquish their local autonomy even within the framework of a larger city-state. “Large responsibilities were left to cities—a distribution of power that some historians have called a diarchy.”<sup>143</sup> Although the dominant city would appoint a governor or local elites to subjected towns, any attempts to bring them fully under the dominant city’s rule were negated by the towns’ long history of independent development.

From the angle of the dominant city, subject cities were looked upon as vanquished areas at the disposal of the victor. “For a long time the relationship of Venice and its dominions was probably that of a conquering city-state and a conquered exploited empire. It was not that of a capital and provinces.”<sup>144</sup> The Venetian relation to its *Terra Ferma* (the mainland) was not unique. The organization of the Florentine city-state was similar.

Moreover, it never occurred to the Florentine republicans to adopt one measure . . . namely transforming their city-state into a territorial state. . . . For them, Florence existed for the sole benefit of some three thousand privileged Florentines; and the Florentine dominion existed solely to be governed and exploited by the Dominante,

the "Dominant City." Having refused to enfranchise the vast majority of their compatriots . . . they were not surprised when every one of the subject cities surrendered to the Imperial Army in 1529–1530 the moment it was abandoned by its Florentine garrison.<sup>145</sup>

This attitude and lack of integration are thus evident in the slow extension of citizenship by the dominant city to its subject towns and rural areas.<sup>146</sup> Even in later centuries citizenship was only conferred on the leading elites of the subject towns rather than the towns as a whole.<sup>147</sup> In short, the subject towns had little incentive to acknowledge the sovereign authority of the dominant city.

Second, hierarchy of authority was also less pronounced because of endemic factionalism within the dominant city itself. Town government continually fluctuated between despotic, oligarchical, and democratic regimes. Each of these would use government to serve its particular ends. Unlike the French system, where increased centralization benefited the towns, and paid off the nobles and clergy, the Italian system was set up in a more exclusive manner. The exercise of sovereign authority was thus always inclined to further particularistic rather than collective ends.

Moreover, various factions claimed for a long time the legitimate right to exercise violence. In France, by contrast, the king came to be the common provider of protection. He embodied the national interest. His private interest in expanding the welfare of the realm coincided with the interests of individuals within the realm. In the Italian case, no actor could be plausibly identified as an unbiased provider of collective goods. Just as in the case with the leading towns of the Hansa, the provision of public goods was tainted with particularistic interests. What was touted as being for the good of the city-state in reality most often benefited only the dominant city or often only the elite of that city.

A disproportionate share of the tax burden was placed on the surrounding countryside and subject cities.<sup>148</sup> Legnano, subject to Verona, constantly contested its taxation and duties. Later it was Verona's turn to protest domination by Venice on similar grounds. Although the share of tax on trade declined dramatically in the course of the seventeenth century, the amount of taxes provided by the Terra Ferma went up dramatically.<sup>149</sup>

In the previous discussion of the Hansa and the French state, I suggested that because of its confederated institutional nature, the Hansa was less successful in rationalizing the economy, preventing defection, providing for collective goods, and reducing transaction costs. The fragmented sovereignty of the Italian city-states had difficulties dealing with these problems as well.<sup>150</sup>

Standardization of weights, measures, and coinage seems to have come relatively late to the Italian city-states. Venice attempted to suppress local mints, but by 1490 there was still a prevalence of local patron saints on coinage, indicating that such mints were still operative.<sup>151</sup> Subject towns had previously exercised these regalian rights themselves, and they were unwilling to give up their control. Consequently there continued to be a large variety of coins, which differed in name and intrinsic value.<sup>152</sup>

Despite the presence of Roman law, many towns judiciously guarded their privileges. They raised their own revenue and levied their own customs duties. Consequently, economic integration proceeded slowly. In Florence, internal trade barriers continued to exist, despite efforts by the Medici to curtail these in the sixteenth century. Venice was remarkably late in eliminating internal customs barriers (1794).<sup>153</sup> Although the evidence is anecdotal, in general there was "no planned action to create a more economically integrated region with deliberate policies to favour freer patterns of internal flows of goods."<sup>154</sup>

Given their inferior status and the burdens placed upon them, the subject cities were eager to defect when such an opportunity arose. Pisa preferred domination by the French king to that of Florence. The Sienese likewise preferred the French or Ferraro to domination by Florence. Venice destroyed one of its subject cities, Adela, in 1509 for prematurely admitting the French.<sup>155</sup> Subject cities welcomed foreign invaders. There was little if any identification with the dominant town. *Patria* or *Nazione* referred only to the city of birth.<sup>156</sup> Subject cities referred to Venice as the city of "The Three Thousand Tyrants."<sup>157</sup> For these reasons the capital cities kept their subject towns heavily garrisoned.<sup>158</sup>

In short, city-states looked internally somewhat like city-leagues. There was an absence of a central actor who had incentives to further the overall interest of the city-state. The dominant town exploited the subject cities as it saw fit. Conversely, subject towns judiciously guarded their autonomy and were willing to defect from the city-state whenever the opportunity presented itself. Consequently, rationalization and standardization came relatively slowly to the Italian city-states. Although such processes took a long time in France as well, there were at least political entrepreneurs who had vested interests in furthering the consolidation of a more unified national economy and social groups which benefited from the process.<sup>159</sup>

#### *Mutual Empowerment: Fixed Boundaries and Transnational Focal Points*

I can be short on this point. City-states behaved no differently in international affairs than sovereign, territorial states. Externally the city-states resembled sovereign states rather than city-leagues. Because their authority was bound by specific territorial parameters, they were able to participate as equals with states. The dominant Italian actors had recognized the territorial status quo among themselves after the Peace of Lodi in 1454, and they made elaborate lists identifying which towns were allies (*amici* and *collegati*) of specific dominant towns. There were thus circumscribed spheres of jurisdiction. It has been argued that Venice started the first systematized diplomatic service in history.<sup>160</sup>

Moreover, the dominant city monopolized the foreign relations of the subject towns.<sup>161</sup> As far as the other actors in the system were concerned, the city-state provided a clear focal point for negotiations. With the league, by contrast, it was

ambiguous whether individual towns or the Hanseatic Diet were the most appropriate channels for diplomacy. That was not the case with the Italian city-states.

City-states, therefore, survived for a long time within the state system. The diplomatic role of Venice, for example, lasted well past its relative economic decline. Like the German principalities which converted themselves into miniature states, the Italian city-states were logically compatible with the state system, as it emerged after Westphalia. Again, this was not a reflection of their material power or geographic size.<sup>162</sup> Instead this was the result of their empowerment as equivalent actors on the international scene, because of their external similarity to sovereign, territorial states.

#### *Institutional Mimicry and Exit*

The benefits of sovereign authority were not lost on the rulers of the Italian city-states. Especially after the incursions of the French and Spanish, which began in the later part of the fifteenth century, political leaders tried to restyle the city-states into sovereign, territorial states. In Florence, for example, the Medici began to perform many regalian tasks during the sixteenth century. They tried to regulate the manufacture of goods, stabilize the metal content of coins, bring internal peace, centralize jurisdiction, and provide more certitude in the tax environment.<sup>163</sup>

The success of these initial efforts is unclear. Economically the subject cities seem to have declined after annexation by the dominant city. Although the differences between subject towns and dominant city were lessened, even the Medici did not grant them equal status. As said, only leading citizens of subject towns obtained citizenship, and internal barriers remained in existence.<sup>164</sup> Even by the beginning of the eighteenth century, there had been little progress in eliminating economic localism.<sup>165</sup> And although the Venetian Council attempted to bring Venetian statutes "in conformity with the principles of clarity, simplicity and rationalization . . . the terra ferma continued to be ruled according to Roman law codes very different from the law observed in the metropolis."<sup>166</sup>

The Venetian government moreover remained locked in a system in which only noble families who had centuries before been entered into the Golden Book were allowed to participate. Only after 1646 were 127 new families admitted. Even so, the absolute size of the patriciate had only increased by 100 members when the patriciate was closed again in 1718. Only in 1775 was it reopened again, at which time membership could be purchased at a very high price. As a consequence, the patrician ruling class declined from 2,500 members in the 1550s to 1,100 in 1797.<sup>167</sup>

Few families from the mainland gained any influence in Venetian government. Moreover, administration continued to be the privilege of noblemen rather than of "men raised from the dust," as in France and England. Hence, unlike the government of the French king, commoners and lesser nobles

gained little access to the system.<sup>168</sup> Consequently, there was little room for the development of the notion of a sovereign as a neutral arbiter who could advance the interests of a variety of groups. Government was closed and operated for the benefit of the few who had consolidated their positions centuries earlier.

The implications of this imperfect territorial integration have yet to be uncovered. For example, despite this type of government, Venetian coinage was relatively stable, and it is unclear how far mainland economies were sacrificed for Venice.<sup>169</sup> There were cases wherein Venice forbade mainland production of, for example, silk, because the Venetians wished to restrict competition with Venice proper.<sup>170</sup>

In any case, it is clear that Venice never fully integrated the Terra Ferma. And although many city-states tried to centralize government in the eighteenth century, they failed. "Nobles and ecclesiastics, cities and communes . . . resisted, in the name of their legal and customary rights, the encroachments of the central administration."<sup>171</sup> They clung to their historically developed, local, and particularistic self-rule.

Continued local particularism and the turn from mercantile pursuits to landed interests brought the Italian economy full circle. Refeudalization occurred throughout Italy. Some believe this happened because the nobility was always involved in Italian commerce.<sup>172</sup> The bourgeois movement in northwestern Europe, by contrast, had separated itself from this aristocratic mode of life. In Italy, that avenue always remained open. Whatever the explanation might be, the turn to landed pursuits accompanied by considerable autonomy became a reality. Like the feudal aristocracies of the past, leading families claimed illustrious genealogical ancestries.<sup>173</sup> Even the confusing crosscutting jurisdictions that we know so well from feudal France returned. "The notion of borders between political entities vanished as well . . . since many of the same feudatories held contiguous domains on both sides of what was supposed to be the border."<sup>174</sup>

Only after the second half of the eighteenth century did centralization achieve some measure of success. Intellectuals looked abroad to foreign rulers such as Frederick and Catherine the Great and argued that only princes (that is, sovereign authorities) could be effective agents of reform.<sup>175</sup> In summary, the city-states slowly transformed themselves into sovereign, territorial states. Nevertheless, even then the unification of weights and measures was not completed. That only occurred under Napoleonic occupation in 1807.

I argue, therefore, that city-states, unlike city-leagues, were compatible with a system of sovereign states. Consequently they survived with the German principalities for many centuries after Westphalia. They acknowledged territorial delimitation of their political control and a final locus for external interactions.

However, because of their imperfect territorial integration and absence of a fully articulated sovereign authority, they proved to be less competitive than their sovereign, territorial counterparts. Local autonomy and factional interests prevented an effective and efficient mobilization of the city-states' resources.<sup>176</sup>

Although attempts were made to transform city-states from a system in which dominant cities exploited their subject territories to one that was territorially integrated, such efforts largely failed. Historically developed privileges, and the intransigence of elites in the dominant cities to relinquish their position, made such development impossible. By the end of the eighteenth century the city-states looked for alternative models of rule. The model they turned to was that of the consolidated, sovereign state.

#### THE GENERAL NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL SELECTION

The prevalent view that war is the all-decisive selective mechanism needs to be amended. Warfare did not obliterate the alternatives to the state. There were no decisive battles to end the Hanseatic League or the Italian city-states. Although it is true that the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) devastated many individual towns, it was not the war that led to the demise of the Hansa. That process had started much earlier. Similarly, one cannot argue that the Spanish and French invasions after 1494 ended the existence of the city-states. Some city-states went through an economic revival in the late sixteenth century. They continued to exist until the Napoleonic era. War, therefore, was not the dramatic decisive selective mechanism. The city-leagues and city-states were not like the Incan Empire crumbling before the Spanish.

Success in war, however, may indicate the effectiveness and efficiency of types of organization. Although Venetian defeat at the hands of the French was not such that Venice disappeared as an institutional type, it did prove that some forms of organization were institutionally superior. Sovereign states were better, in the long run, in raising more revenue and larger numbers of troops.<sup>177</sup> War did not work as an evolutionary process that selected among types of units, but it did indicate to political elites and social groups which type of organization was the more efficient, and they subsequently adopted the most competitive institutional form.

Moreover, the ability to wage war needs to be explained. I have suggested that size and population are at best imperfect predictors of military power. The argument that the Italian city-states had to give way to territorial states because they were too small neglects the rise of Portugal and the Netherlands which were no larger in terms of territory or population. Instead, I have advanced the argument that the ability to wage war was a function of institutional arrangements. Organizational types that were fraught with freeriding and factionalism, that had problems rationalizing their economies and reducing transaction costs—in short, those that could not make the transition to consolidated national economies—were less effective and less efficient in mobilizing resources than sovereign states.<sup>178</sup> The ability to wage war operated as an intermediate cause of selection but was ultimately propelled by the consequences of particular institutional logics.<sup>179</sup>

Selection was thus partially driven by competitive efficiency. It also advanced, however, by the process of mutual empowerment. Sovereign actors

only recognized particular types of actors as legitimate players in the international system. Because the Hanseatic system of rule proved to be incompatible with that of territorially defined states, and because it was less able to credibly commit itself to international treaties, it was not considered to be a legitimate player in international relations.<sup>180</sup> As I mentioned, it was barely recognized in the Peace of Westphalia. Yet very small entities, which were organizationally compatible with sovereign states, were considered to be legitimate. The miniature states of Germany and Italy continued in the international system until their respective unifications.<sup>181</sup>

During this process of competition and empowerment, social and political actors engaged in institutional learning. First, actors tried to create institutions that corresponded with their belief systems and best met their economic and political interests. This occurred with the formation of new institutions during the Late Middle Ages in response to economic expansion. Over time some of these institutional choices proved to be better than others, and the lesser ones were structurally weeded out by competition and the process of mutual empowerment. There were good reasons to prefer systems of rule that could make credible commitments and systems that would not encroach upon one's own jurisdiction.<sup>182</sup> Simultaneously, social actors instrumentally switched their allegiances to their newly preferred form of organization, and political entrepreneurs copied the more successful institutional logic.

The gradual institutionalization of a system of sovereign states thus imposed a certain nonhierarchical order on transnational interactions. The old possibilities of political control over the primary market (the empire) or of leaving social actors to fend for themselves (a self-help system) were replaced by diplomatic focal points. Sovereigns spoke on behalf of their subjects. To use Nettl's words, they became gatekeepers for international transactions.<sup>183</sup>

This description should not be understood as introducing an element of teleological development into my view of institutional evolution. I continue to maintain (like Gould) that evolution is adaptation, not progress. Although attrition of the less competitive occurs, this only leads to the development of the "most competitively efficient" institution for that particular environment. Efficiency is thus historically contingent. Selection occurs among the synchronic rivals that emerge after a broad environmental shift. Had the institutional form of the sovereign state not emerged—and it did not outside Europe—then the selective process might have operated between city-states and city-leagues. Moreover, with another dramatic transformation, the contemporary "winner" of this process of selection and empowerment—that is, sovereign, territorial authority—might prove to be susceptible to change itself.

#### CONCLUSION

The evolution of the state and the development of a state system were mutually reinforcing processes.<sup>184</sup> On the one hand, the emergence of sovereign states had direct consequences for the other types of institutional arrangements in the

system. The system selected out those types of units that were, competitively speaking, less efficient. In other words, the competitive nature of the system determined the nature of the constitutive units. At the same time, sovereign states preferred similar modes of organization in their environment. Actors intentionally created a system of sovereign, territorial states. They preferred a system that divided the sphere of cultural and economic interaction into territorial parcels with clear hierarchical authorities.

The entire process can thus be seen in micro-macro or agent-structural terms. In the first phase the variety of units form the elements of a system. Because of competitive pressure between these dislike units, and through mutual empowerment as well as individuals' choices, the system is gradually transformed into a network of similar actors. At that point the system imposes structural limits on the type of units that are possible and will be recognized by the other actors as legitimate forms of organization in international politics. With that in mind, we might sensibly speculate on the development of the state in the future.

## PART IV

---

### Conclusion

problematic in his *Planetary Politics: Ecology and the Organization of Global Political Space*, forthcoming. For the impact of international financial markets, see Ralph Bryant, *International Financial Intermediation* (1987).

7. The literature here is vast. To name but a few contemporary examples that have put the historical and future development of the state back on the agenda, see, for example, Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990* (1990); Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (1985); John Hall, *States in History* (1986). Several recent sets of essays have probed the possibility of change in the current system, for example, James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State* (1989); Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (1989); James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (1992).

8. I use Gilpin's definition of systems change. Systems change is a transformation in the nature of the constitutive units. An example of such a change is the decline of empires in favor of feudal organization. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (1981), pp. 39, 40.

9. In methodological terms, the previous focus has been on explaining by the method of agreement. That is, the previous literature focused on locating the critical, similar, independent variable that could explain the similarity in outcome—the emergence of the state—in a variety of contexts. However, since some of the independent variables correlate, for example, the growth of the economy and the change in military technology, there is no unique explanation. I submit that comparing by difference is more fruitful. Given a similarity of some independent variables, which variation among the other independent variables might account for the different outcomes? See Skocpol's discussion in Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (1984), pp. 378, 379. Similarly, Given has argued that history has paid little attention to the merits of a variation finding strategy to explain phenomena across two or more cases. James Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe* (1990), pp. 36, 251.

10. This is not simply due to material resources. Indeed, as Braudel argues, initially the balance swung against states in favor of the cities. As will be clear from my case studies, these alternatives could for many centuries raise armies and extract taxes on a par with any state. Fernand Braudel, *The Perspective of the World* (1984), p. 91.

11. Zolberg makes a similar argument for the integration of internal analysis and the study of competitive dynamics between units. Aristide Zolberg, "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England," *International Social Science Journal* 32 (1980), pp. 687–716.

12. I am interested in the de facto emergence of sovereign states and the gradual empowerment of the idea of sovereignty. I am, of course, fully cognizant of the fact that the theoretical articulation of the idea only occurred with Bodin (several centuries after the first claims that kings were sovereign in their own realm). Hinsley even argues that the idea was only fully articulated with Vattel in 1758, because only then was the idea of a Christian community abandoned. F. H. Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States," in W. J. Stankiewicz, ed., *In Defense of Sovereignty* (1969), p. 283.

13. Because of the variant impact of trade, in terms of volume and added value, the European towns did not all have the same preferences. This will provide a first estimate of the type of coalitions one might expect.

14. In this sense institutional selection differs from the purely environmental selection within, for example, biology or unrestrained market competition. Selection also

occurs because actors consciously seek to establish and favor compatible types of organization. That is, states empowered only like types. Additionally, one might speculate that the existence of other territorial states strengthened the positions of sovereigns domestically. Political elites might benefit from decreasing the set of plausible institutional alternatives from which their citizens might wish to choose. Furthermore, the existence of other sovereign states might serve to enhance the domestic legitimacy of the political leader claiming sovereignty at home.

15. Note that I have only argued that the sovereign state proved to be superior to European city-states and city-leagues. I am not explaining why the European state proved superior to forms of organization outside Europe, such as Imperial China or Japan. Tilly would argue that it was due to the superior war-making capacity of the national state. My own explanation for the worldwide spread of the European mode of international organization would lie closer to that of Hall and Baechler. See Jean Baechler, John Hall, and Michael Mann, eds., *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism* (1988). That is, once a competitive state system emerged, rather than an imperial organization, the competitiveness between states led to further economic and technological development. Furthermore, I would hypothesize that imperial systems were also incompatible with sovereign, territorial states. On this, more work would be needed, but my estimate is that rule that legitimates itself as religiously sanctioned cannot accept other political authorities as equals. Yet as Kratochwil argues, territorial sovereignty implies exactly that states are equal. Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality," p. 35. The preference for compatible institutions also explains the global extension of the principle of sovereign territoriality by the European states. That is, nonsovereign forms of organization were deliberately transformed.

16. See particularly the essays by Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984), pp. 223–246; and "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in Caporaso, *The Elusive State*, pp. 69–96, for the application of Gould's idea of punctuated equilibrium.

#### CHAPTER I

1. Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (1970), p. 27.

2. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 41.

3. This work is large in volume and varies in its epistemological position, degree of criticism, and substantive argument. See, for example, the essays in Caporaso, *The Elusive State*; Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*; John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (1986), pp. 131–157; Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (1987); Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, pp. 255–300; Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335–370.

4. As Zolberg states, "thus while recent decades have witnessed, on the one hand, an abundance of theories concerning international relations and, on the other, a proliferation of comparative analyses dealing with the regime or the state, very little effort has been directed towards the interface." Zolberg, "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States," pp. 688–689.

5. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), pp. 88, 104; and his "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, p. 323f.

6. For Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, see Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (1933); Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Steven Lukes, ed. (1982).

7. International relations is thus driven by a transhistorical logic. "Through all of the changes of boundaries, of social, economic, and political form, of economic and military activity, the substance and style of international politics remain strikingly constant. We can look farther afield, for example, to the China of the warring states era or to the India of Kautilya, and see that where political entities of whatever sort compete freely, substantive and stylistic characteristics are similar." Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," pp. 329–330. See also Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 66.

8. Waltz explicitly responds to Ruggie on this point. He says in regard to Ruggie's emphasis on dynamic density that "the account, however, tells us nothing about the structure of international politics." Furthermore, he adds, "Ruggie would lower the level of abstraction by adding . . . characteristics of units and of unit level processes." Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," pp. 328, 330.

9. Game theorists, for example, have explored the conditions under which cooperation or conflict arise. The number of actors, the particular payoffs that actors expect, and the shadow of the future all influence the probability for conflict or cooperation. The character of the unit is largely irrelevant to the logic of the analysis. See, for example, Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (1986). But note how Conybeare's article in that volume indicates how the type of unit might be relevant for such calculations. John Conybeare, "Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts," in Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, pp. 147–172.

10. Dynamic density is thus "the quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions." Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," p. 142f.

11. For interesting discussions on the connection between political authority and spatial order, see, for example, Robert Dodgson, *The European Past* (1987).

12. For good discussions of the differences between the feudal era and the contemporary state system, see, in addition to Ruggie's "Continuity and Transformation," Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality"; and Holzgrefe, "The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory."

13. The attempts to create a state monopoly on the use of force arguably started as early as the mid-thirteenth century when Louis IX tried to limit the bearing of arms by the nobility. State monopoly over the means of violence, however, was not yet fully complete even in the nineteenth century. On the latter issue, see Janice Thomson, "Sovereignty in Historical Perspective: The Evolution of State Control over Extraterritorial Violence," in Caporaso, *The Elusive State*, pp. 227–254; and Janice Thomson, "State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (March 1990), pp. 23–48.

14. The royal domain was seen as the personal property of the king. See Herbert Rowen, *The King's State* (1980).

15. This conclusion is similar to Wendt's argument that neorealism sees the system ontologically as separate units. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem."

16. Consider, for example, how one might apply the contemporary vocabulary of international relations theorizing to the feudal era. Should one describe the system as tripolar consisting of Christian Europe, the Muslim world, and Mongol Eurasia? Would it be bipolar in terms of the contest of empire and papacy? Or was it multipolar? I would argue that the term *hyperpolar* seems more apt, in that a multitude of actors could wield

effective force. Even more problematic would be to define the international system. In short, what the modern state system has done is to make unambiguous what the system is and who the actors are.

17. Anthony Giddens describes structuration theory as having two main objectives. "First, to acknowledge the essential importance of a concept of action in the social sciences. . . . Second, to formulate such an account without relapsing into a subjectivist view, and without failing to grasp the structural components of the social institutions which outlive us." Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (1981), pp. 15. For adaptations in political science, see John Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, pp. 21–36; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem"; David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441–473.

18. James Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy: The Neoclassical Approach to Institutions," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 135.

19. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," p. 259.

20. For an example of a rich historical argument that the English state is a cultural construct, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch* (1991).

21. Biersteker suggests that poststructuralism added to the epistemological debate surrounding international relations theory, but it has added little in the way of substantive social theory. Thomas Biersteker, "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (September 1989), pp. 263–267. For a suggestion on how to reconcile various approaches through more detailed historical analysis of nonstate logics of order, see Richard Mansbach and Yale Ferguson, "Between Celebration and Despair," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (December 1991), pp. 363–386.

22. Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" p. 447.

23. In this sense, I view Wendt's focus on symbolic interactionism as more problematic than his first critique of neorealism contained in "The Agent-Structure Problem." His later work takes the symbolic interactionist view. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–426.

24. In short, I see this work as a response to the earlier critique which required neorealism to specify how the system emerged, thus recognizing the historical specificity of the state system. That is how I read Ruggie and Wendt's earlier critiques. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation"; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem." Redefining the nature of the system in an inductivist sense creates several problems. An inductive understanding based on a taxonomy of interactions becomes far less parsimonious. For example, Richard Rosecrance identifies nine systems in *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (1963). As Waltz notes, particularly in his critique of Rosecrance, an inductive "bottom up" generalization of actor behavior redefines the system in terms of agent behavior rather than in a priori structural dictates which constrain such behavior. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 50, 64.

25. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 89; and "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," p. 339.

26. See Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide* (1984), for the argument that Fordist production systems are being pushed out by craftlike production systems.

27. Instead it is similar to Waltz's notion of Darwinian imperatives for socialization. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 73–77.

28. Similarly, one could argue that the change from personalistic to more bureaucratic corporations was a structural change. See, for example, Alfred Chandler, *Strategy and Structure* (1962).

29. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 255f.

30. An exception might be the entrance of new members to cartel-like arrangements.

31. This is well described by Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (1961).

32. See Thomson, "Sovereignty in Historical Perspective." For a fine description of the ambiguities of acceptable practice, see Robert Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates* (1986).

33. Kratochwil comments of sovereignty that "it denotes internal hierarchy as well as external equality." By denying some types equal status, they were delegitimized as units in the system. Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality," p. 35.

34. I will argue that city-leagues were incompatible with sovereign, territorial states because leagues, such as the Hansa, had no clear territorial boundaries. In their desire to extend their political control over their economic sphere of interaction, they would inevitably encroach on territorial units. Second, because of the absence of sovereign hierarchy, they lacked a clear focal point through which to coordinate their behavior. City-states were more compatible in that they did have specific territorial limits to their claims of authority. Hence, external sovereignty and juridical equivalence came easier to that logic of organization.

35. Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 519–549. He argues that the African states clearly lack the traditional empirical trappings of statehood but that they are juridically empowered. Also see, Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 272.

36. Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality," p. 36.

37. For the difference between traditional universal empires and sovereign, territorial states, see particularly Roberto Unger, *Plasticity into Power* (1987); John Hall, *Powers and Liberties* (1985); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, vol. 1* (1974), p. 15; and Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 79f. Rundolph notes that it was only because of the failure of the Holy Roman Empire that Europe diverged from the world norm. Susanne Rundolph, "Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia—Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (November 1987), p. 736.

38. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (1977). Bull recognizes the existence of sovereign states but sees them as placed in a societal order (p. 24). Keens-Soper, also a Grotian, notes that this society was uniquely European: "The implications of political fragmentation did not call in question the continued spiritual and legal unity of Christendom." Maurice Keens-Soper, "The Practice of a States-System," *Studies in History and Politics*, vol. 2 (1981–82), p. 17. The Ottomans could play no part in this system. In Keens-Soper's interpretation, the Peace of Westphalia reinforced this notion of states self-consciously being part of an association of states united by a shared culture.

39. Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (1982), pp. 60–61.

40. On the universalist claims of Rome, see Hinsley, "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States," p. 276. Similarly, the German emperor claimed to rule as *dominus mundi*, "lord of the world." Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, p. 60; Gerald Straus,

"Germany: Idea of Empire," in Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5 (1985), p. 495.

41. Ruggie rightly stresses the conceptual parallel between the exclusivity of property rights and sovereign territoriality. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," p. 143.

42. To use the normal concept "international" relations, rather than translocal, indicates how the state transformed politics and how we perceive such interactions. See Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," p. 142.

43. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1988); Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft* (1983), p. 11.

44. Those who analyze the feudal-state transformation recognize that balancing and self-regarding behavior occur. The point is that neorealism implicitly assumes that it is evident who the actors are (states) and that it is clear when the condition of anarchy holds. That is, neorealism is premised on the separability of hierarchical and anarchical realms. It is that very separability that the emergence of the state system institutionalizes. I disagree here with Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Confictual Practices," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 427–466. Ruggie similarly critiques Fischer's position as a misstatement of his position and the theoretical problem posed by the feudal-state transformation. John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139–174, particularly note 57.

45. Stephen Jay Gould's view of evolution is a useful metaphor for an alternative understanding of institutional evolution. Gould likens biological evolution to water running down a slope. The water divides itself in different branches, the directions of which cannot be predicted. It is, however, possible to explain after the fact why a particular branch dried up, why it proved to be a dead end. In short, at critical junctures a multiplicity of alternatives emerge. Only over time do many of these turn out to be evolutionary dead ends. Gould, *The Panda's Thumb*, p. 140.

46. As said, of these three, Weber's views are the least nonlinear.

47. I label this competitive efficiency, but one can read it as relative ability. I do not imply that there is a particular form of organization that is a priori optimally efficient. Efficiency is not to be understood absolutely but relatively; that is, a particular form of organization is more or less efficient vis-à-vis its rivals. It might be more efficient in reducing transaction costs, preventing freeriding, raising revenue, etc. Comparative efficiency thus stands for the comparative superiority of one form of organization over the other, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

48. Chapter 2 discusses this in greater detail.

49. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, vol. 1*, p. 7.

50. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy* (1984), p. 33.

51. Charles Tilly reaches a similar conclusion in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975), p. 601f. See also Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birbaumer, *The Sociology of the State* (1983), for a critique of functionalist and Marxist accounts of state emergence.

52. Aristide Zolberg argues that the development of states preceded the world economy, "Origins of the Modern World Economy," *World Politics* 33 (January 1981), pp. 253–281. See Baechler, Hall, and Mann, *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*, for the argument that the development of states actually aided the development of capitalism. See also Hall, *Powers and Liberties*, and Gilpin, who argues that "the emergence of a world market economy was dependent on the pluralistic structure of the European (and,

subsequently, the global political system." Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 133. He rightly notes how earlier international markets were displaced by imperial economies.

53. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem," p. 348.

54. Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (1974), p. 198.

55. Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), p. 18.

56. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, p. 138.

57. Badie and Birnbaum note that Durkheim "is less aware than Marx of the extreme diversity of modern processes of political centralization, and he is much more attached than Marx to a narrowly evolutionary view of state formation. He supposes that all states always develop according to the same laws." Badie and Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State*, p. 12. Ruggie's earlier reliance on Durkheim's work to account for change does not satisfactorily explain sovereignty from my point of view because it cannot account for the variety in institutional types. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation," p. 142.

58. Consequently, one problem with a Weberian approach is that it does not easily lend itself to parsimonious theorizing. This evinces itself, for example, in the work of Reinhard Bendix. Bendix carefully retraces political developments in a variety of countries to examine why they resulted in monarchical or democratic rule. Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People* (1978). Rueschemeyer says of Bendix's work: "Ad hoc explanations abound in Bendix's narrative." He believes that Bendix is skeptical of any systems theory. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Theoretical Generalization and Historical Particularity in the Comparative Sociology of Reinhard Bendix," in Skocpol, *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, pp. 151, 159.

59. This would, for example, be Habermas's interpretation of Weber. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984).

60. I believe that such accounts are prevalent in explanations of contemporary European developments. We are often told that a larger European community is "inevitable" because of increased competition. That actors who lose in this process might prevent further integration is not considered.

61. See, for example, Richard Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State," *Journal of Economic History* 33 (1973), pp. 203–221. See also David Friedman, "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," *Journal of Political Economy* 85 (1977), pp. 59–77; and Leonard Dudley, "Structural Change in Interdependent Bureaucracies: Was Rome's Failure Economic or Military?" *Explorations in Economic History* 27 (April 1990), pp. 232–248.

62. For the usefulness of biological metaphors to explain social evolution see, for example, Krasner, "Approaches to the State." Runciman goes one step further by suggesting that biological evolution does not serve as a mere metaphor but that it and social evolution are analogues. W. G. Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory*, vol. 2 (1989), pp. 45–47, 449. I discuss my position at greater length in Chapter 2.

63. Many of the points raised here resemble Caporaso's discussion of weaknesses in rational choice theory. The close correspondence between flaws in rational choice theory and unilinear evolutionary views is not surprising. Both views run the risk of affirming the consequent. Caporaso argues that some of these weaknesses may be resolved through a clearer specification of alternatives, actual choices of individuals, and subsequent selective dynamics among these choices. All these points are very similar to my concerns regarding unilinear views, and my response in this book to those concerns is very similar to Caporaso's proposed research program. Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy," pp. 135–160.

64. Eugene Rice, *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460–1559* (1970), p. 15.

65. As I already noted, this institutional phenomenon, a system of discrete but interacting units, is viewed as decisive in the rise of capitalism. See Baechler, Hall, and Mann, *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*.

66. Caporaso uses the term *low level equilibrium trap*. Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy," p. 150. Similarly, Elster notes how selection need not proceed to any optimal position. He speaks of *low maximum traps* wherein a higher optimum could only be reached after a brief decline. Consequently, new innovations that move toward the higher optimal result, but are initially inferior, will not be selected. The end result is that the higher optimum does not develop. Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts* (1989), pp. 72–73.

67. Like Gilpin, I will thus argue that unit change needs to be explained by the preferences of actors. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 42.

68. For a discussion of the advantages of rational choice applications, see Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (1988), particularly the conclusion and appendix. My analysis takes a methodological individualist approach but seeks to redress some problems with a strict rational choice approach.

## CHAPTER 2

1. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 11.

2. The economic transformation in the Late Middle Ages played such a role.

3. Fernand Braudel, *On History* (1980), pp. 3, 4, 27. For discussions of Braudel's work, see John Armstrong, "Braudel's Mediterranean," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977), pp. 626–636; Stuart Clark, "The Annales Historians," in Quentin Skinner, ed., *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (1985), pp. 177–198.

4. It has, for example, influenced Sahlins's work. He describes how individuals, whilst embedded in structures of signification, have some room to redefine the operational repertoire of that structure. Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (1985), p. 125.

5. On this issue, see, for example, James Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 15f.

6. The distinction is from Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 40. Peter Katzenstein also uses this typology, albeit with a slight twist. He separates systems change from actor change, whereas the two are the same for Gilpin. Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 294.

7. There are considerable debates on the periodization of such hegemonic shifts, particularly in long-cycle theory. For a good overview and discussion of different views, see Joshua Goldstein, *Long Cycles* (1988).

8. Since biologists see it as a model, I sometimes use that term. However, I pragmatically use it as a metaphor which helps us think through social evolution.

9. I say "ironically" because the idea of evolution as progressive and increasingly complex, which has influenced social science and everyday imagery, comes from misreading Darwinian selection.

10. The relevance of Gould's views of change for social science was particularly suggested by Krasner, "Approaches to the State."

11. Stephen Jay Gould, *Wonderful Life* (1989), p. 32.

12. Gould's theory can thus account for the problem of "missing links" which perplexed orthodox Darwinians. Such links simply never existed.

13. I do not deny that complexity can have advantages. Hominids with larger brain stems were more likely to survive than hominid types with smaller ones. Given a certain environment, complexity does have its rewards. But should the environment change in a dramatic manner, there is no reason to suppose that the most complex form will survive.

14. Gould, *The Panda's Thumb*, p. 79.

15. Krasner makes a compelling case for the relevance of this view for politics in "Approaches to the State"; and Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in Caporaso, *The Elusive State*, pp. 69–96. For a variety of discussions on the punctuated equilibrium model, see Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, eds., *The Dynamics of Evolution* (1992). For the argument that biological evolution is not merely a metaphor for social evolution, see Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory*, vol. 2, p. 45f.

16. On this issue, see particularly Krasner, "Sovereignty."

17. One cannot identify a punctuation event a priori. However, one can suggest what types of changes might upset existing political coalitions or dramatically affect the probability that institutions will change. A punctuation is thus an event that alters domestic balances of power and lowers the costs of altering existing institutional arrangements. One can recognize the punctuation event on our level of historical analysis, unit change, by identifying which causal factor led to institutional innovation. I see no reason, however, why the logic of the punctuated equilibrium metaphor could not be extended to the levels of interaction change or hegemonic shifts.

18. This is, therefore, another example of how unilinear theories fail.

19. Otto Hintze, *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, Felix Gilbert, ed. (1975).

20. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966).

21. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (1979); Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8 (Autumn 1977), pp. 281–313; Peter Gourevitch "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s," *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 95–129; and Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (1986).

22. Part 2 of this book centers on that question.

23. A factor endowment model would not determine the outcome of social coalitions. First of all, the paucity of exact data makes the model difficult to apply to the medieval period. Even more troubling is the fact that whereas factor endowments might provide for a first guess of societal cleavages and incentives, they do not give a clear prediction of outcomes. For example, North and Thomas try to explain the decline of feudalism by the increase in the land/labor ratio. Because of the plague, shortage of labor led serfs to bargain their way out of their indentured conditions. Yet earlier in their work, North and Thomas attribute the decline of feudalism to a period of population growth. Douglass North and Robert Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World* (1973). See Alexander Field's critique of their model on this point. "The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North-Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe," *Explorations in Economic History* 18 (April 1981), pp. 174–198. For use of the factor endowment model in a different context, see Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (1989).

24. A belief system is a conceptual framework through which individuals aggregate and evaluate social events. I take these as generalized insights into understanding and legitimating the social order beyond perceptions, which I see as more narrow. I will argue, and I will clarify this further in Chapter 4, that different social groups often have

different belief systems because of the elective affinity of interests and beliefs. For example, burghers had a different conception and different valuation of manual labor than the warrior aristocracy; the burghers valued Roman law for its established trial procedure and property rights, and they stressed merit rather than genealogy. For a similar understanding of belief systems in a different area of research, see Robert Legvold, "Soviet Learning in the 1980s," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (1991), pp. 684–732.

25. Elster notes how evolution might get stuck in local maximum traps. Elster, *Nuts and Bolts*, p. 72. For a discussion of equilibrium traps and a suggestive critique of the new economics of organization, see Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy."

26. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (1984), p. 81. For other brief and insightful critiques of this problem, see Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy* (1978), p. 169; Beth Yarrow and Robert Yarrow, "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990), pp. 252–255; and Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics* (1992), pp. 7–10.

27. Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy," p. 148. See also Gilpin's remarks on the limitations of new economic history. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 74.

28. Wilsford argues a similar point. David Wilsford, "The Conjunction of Ideas and Interests," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (October 1985), pp. 357–372.

29. For a discussion of Weber's understanding of elective affinity see, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (1946), pp. 62–63.

30. I have chosen France rather than England as the exemplar of state formation because the English case is actually atypical. England was unified early and by exceptional circumstances. "France, which had many provinces with widely differing institutions, was far more typical of the European political situation." Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, p. 49. For a different argument that France is a better case, see Robert Bates, "Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988), pp. 499–516. Says Bates: "[T]he English case supports invalid inferences. Rather, it is the French case from which the lessons of history should be drawn" (p. 500). Likewise Corrigan and Sayer suggest that the English experience diverges from that of the continent. Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great Arch*.

31. I agree with Stephen Krasner's argument that Westphalia was neither the beginning of the sovereign state nor the end of all the old remnants. By my own account the beginning of sovereign, territorial statehood can be found at the end of the thirteenth century, but is not completed even after Westphalia. However, the Peace of Westphalia does serve as a useful indicator of this transition because it was understood by seventeenth-century writers themselves as something of a watershed. For Krasner's position, see Stephen Krasner, "Westphalia," (1991). Samuel Pufendorf, writing in about 1682 on the rights of the princes vis-à-vis the emperor, did perceive Westphalia as a juncture: "[T]ill in the Westphalian Peace their Rights and Authority have been expressly and particularly confirm'd and establish'd." In Herbert Rowen, ed., *From Absolutism to Revolution, 1648–1848* (1963), p. 75.

32. Note that an account of evolutionary selection bolsters the methodological individualist argument by clarifying the set of choices available at a particular point in time.

For related arguments, see Caporaso, "Microeconomics and International Political Economy"; Yarborough and Yarborough, "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization"; and Keohane, *After Hegemony*. My work thus differs in two ways from standard rational choice accounts. First, I focus on the variety of institutional possibilities and then analyze why some were selected out over time. Second, I pay explicit attention to the importance of shared belief systems to clarify preferences and to link choices to outcomes.

33. Note that I do not contend that war is unimportant—far from it. Instead I argue that relative success in war itself needs to be explained. I explain success largely by institutional makeup.

34. This is somewhat similar to Axelrod's discussion of how particular types of units, even when in a minority, can become the dominant set. Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981), pp. 306–318; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (1984).

35. For a discussion of institutional mimicry, see Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48 (April 1983), pp. 147–160.

36. One of my misgivings with Tilly's earlier explanations of state emergence was exactly that he did not account for the variety of forms in Europe; see *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Tilly's earlier work also did not distinguish the generative from the selective process. Both these problems are redressed in his challenging recent work *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.

37. In earlier arguments (1975 and 1985) Tilly stated that "war made states." This suggested a uniform response to a changing military environment. Tilly himself admits this.

38. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 30.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

40. Tilly defines a national state as "states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures." He adds that "most states have been non-national: empires, city-states, or something else. The term national-state, regrettably, does not necessarily mean nation-state, a state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity." Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, pp. 2–3.

41. Tilly is confusing on this issue. He concedes that if kings started to provide protection at Strayer's earlier date, then his argument is wrong. Indeed, there is evidence that kings already tried to regulate violence in the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries. See, for example, Aline Vallee, "État et Sécurité Publique au XIV<sup>e</sup> Siècle. Une Nouvelle Lecture des Archives Royales Françaises," *Histoire, Economie et Société*, vol. 1 (1987), pp. 3–15. Nevertheless, I do not see how this fact alone would be a decisive refutation of Tilly. The importance of coercive power remains emphasized. More important is the question of how this power was obtained in the first place, since the Capetian Dynasty started with very weak kings. In other words, Tilly is gracious in acknowledging possible counterarguments, but he misses the kernel of the counterargument that is presented by Strayer. That is, if state making preceded the military revolution, the centralization that occurred must have been based on factors other than military protection.

42. North and Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World*; and Douglass North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (1981). Tilly, however, also includes property

rights as a central element, but he sees them as only tangentially related to either of the two paths. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 100.

43. Tilly implies that the tsar possessed more power than rival aristocrats. The tsar had only to gradually overcome the competition. But if that is the case, there is little to explain—it is a simple matter of a strong monarch expanding his rule at the expense of the weaker. A more powerful version of Tilly's argument would be that the tsar had to strike a bargain with other actors, who were willing to ally with the tsar in exchange for particular benefits. An example of such a bargain would be the type of deal between the elector of Brandenburg-Prussia and the Junkers. Hans Rosenberg, "The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg-Prussia, 1410–1653," *American Historical Review* 49, part 1 (October 1943), pp. 1–22; and 49, part 2 (January 1944), pp. 228–242.

44. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 36.

45. Empires concentrated coercive force but did not accumulate very much, whereas city-states and urban federations accumulated considerable force but in a highly fragmented fashion. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 21.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

47. Of course, size does matter at some point. But for those who wish to explain Venetian decline by France's preponderant size, one does well to remember that the Dutch Republic, with roughly the same population as Venice (1.5 million) and only one tenth that of France, was on its way to becoming a near hegemonic power in that same period.

48. On this issue my views are similar to those of North and Weingast, who clarify how the institutional arrangements in England allowed it to raise more revenue than France. If we could classify seventeenth-century England as less coercive than absolutist France, particularly after the English Revolution, then the war-fighting ability of the English was enhanced, not diminished, by its greater reliance on bargaining with capital owners. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49 (December 1989), pp. 803–832.

49. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 2.

50. Perhaps this is the reason why Spain under the Habsburgs is classified as an empire (an inefficient form of organization) and later as a national state (an efficient form). Empires are coercive intensive, capital poor, and have weak towns. Still there is something troubling about classifying Imperial Spain, with its Latin American gold and silver resources, as capital poor.

#### CHAPTER 3

1. Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (1987), p. 11. First published 1900.

2. Walter Schlesinger, "Lord and Follower in Germanic Institutional History," in Frederic Cheyette, ed., *Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe* (1975), p. 90.

3. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," p. 149. See also Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality."

4. I refer to Eugen Weber's telling account of how even as late as the nineteenth century, France still contained many different language groups and much regional specificity. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1976). Also see the discussion of Pizzorno, in which he distinguishes the state from kinship and religious organization.

94. Parry, *The Discovery of the Sea*, p. 70. Taxes in Genoa in 1293 yielded by some estimates three and a half times those of France; see Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, p. 193.

95. For a brief discussion of the rivalry between Genoa and Venice, see Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony* (1989), pp. 110, 121; Scammel, *The World Encompassed*, p. 96. For a chronicler's account of the brutal Pisan war in 1284, see the description of the Franciscan Salimbene in Mundy and Riesenber, *The Medieval Town*, p. 107, document 6.

96. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 113.

97. Brown, "Florence," pp. 298–299; Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 255.

98. McNeill, *Venice*, p. 123.

99. Martines, *Power and Imagination*, pp. 222, 228.

100. There were good reasons to try to keep with the old galley ships. First, the Mediterranean did not always provide sufficient wind. Furthermore, the Venetian Arsenal had perfected its design and was able to manufacture the ships along assembly-line techniques. Galleys were also difficult to combine with sailing ships. Hence, the Venetian navy would have had to be completely overhauled. Thus, although the Venetians experimented with alternative models, the galley remained the ship of preference. McNeill, *Venice*, p. 130.

101. Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 172. Although not as spectacular as the profits in long-distance commerce, profits on landed wealth could yield between 15 and 20 percent. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 53.

102. This war was partially propelled by Florentine concerns over a secure grain supply. Florentine worry with their food supply was of long standing. In the thirteenth century, for example, they actually aided bishopric control over their contado provided the bishop remained subject to the town council and provided the city with grain. George Dameron, "Episcopal Lordship in the Diocese of Florence and the Origins of the Commune of San Casciano Val di Pesa, 1230–1247," *Journal of Medieval History* 12 (June 1986), pp. 135–154.

103. Heer, *The Medieval World*, p. 77.

104. Leuschner, *Germany in the Late Middle Ages*, p. 106; Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 275.

105. Paul Coles, "The Crisis of Renaissance Society: Genoa 1488–1507," *Past and Present* 11 (April 1957), p. 21.

106. I borrow the term from Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 21.

107. Peter Burke, "City-States," in John Hall, ed., *States in History* (1986), pp. 142, 151. He goes on to provide a rather tautological definition of the city-state by essentially describing the character traits of the Italian city-state, but he provides no answer as to their differences with sovereign states.

108. That would also be empirically inaccurate. The Venetian republic was qua population no smaller than the Dutch Republic of the sixteenth century or Portugal. In territorial terms, it was also a good deal larger than the Dutch provinces, and yet Portugal and the Dutch Republic were to become world powers. In short, *small* is often used as a posterior assessment.

109. Giorgio Chittolini, "Cities, 'City-States,' and Regional States in North-Central Italy," *Theory and Society* 18 (September 1989), p. 699.

110. Tilly makes the general point that strong centralized states emerged where

towns were weakest. Charles Tilly, "Cities and States in Europe, 1000–1800," *Theory and Society* 18 (September 1989), pp. 563–584. I discuss the implications of the status of subject cities in greater detail in Chapter 8.

111. The reasons why this might be the case are potentially very interesting. I, however, do not deal with this topic in this book. I am not explaining why kings exist, or what special position they have. I merely wish to analyze how they operate vis-à-vis other political actors.

112. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 89.

113. Note that I am not merely suggesting that the towns dominated the rural areas politically. One might, for example, counter that Paris also dominated the provinces. The population of the French provinces, however, were still full French subjects. The position of subjects in Italian territories almost resembled semicolonial status.

#### CHAPTER 8

1. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 281.

2. My research strategy is endogenous. I explain the relative success of different institutions in a similar environment. That is, the advent of a monetarized economy with considerable trade eroded the old feudal order and gave rise to a variety of institutions. The changed economic context created roughly similar environmental opportunities for which some institutional responses were more suited than others. The alternative is ecological analysis which explains success of similar institutions in different types of environments. For the difference between these two strategies, see Robert Putnam et al., "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government," *American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983), p. 55.

3. For the discussion of sovereignty as a constitutive element of the state system, see, for example, Onuf, "Sovereignty"; Robert Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, *Contending Sovereignties: Rethinking Political Community* (1990). Although my analysis focuses on the European alternatives to the state, the argument clearly has implications for the spread of this system of rule in general. That is, there were specific advantages to units that were internally hierarchical and limited in their territorial jurisdiction.

4. See, for example, Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (1948), p. 259.

5. The popular account, however, that the circumnavigation of Africa by the Portuguese and Spanish pushed the Italians out of the spice trade is not uncontested. The Italians soon restored their trading position through the Mideast. See McNeill, *Venice*, p. 127; Martines, *Power and Imagination*, p. 171.

6. We have already seen this in the spread of the idea and organization of the independent commune. Similarly, early fiscal administration in Normandy and, through the Norman conquest, also in England paralleled developments in Capetian France.

7. For example, Gilpin, *War and Change*; Goldstein, *Long Cycles*.

8. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 42.

9. By competitive superiority I mean that the sovereign, territorial state survived and became the dominant form of organization in the international system, rather than its alternatives. Such superiority is not to be understood in a functionalist, teleological sense.

10. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 41.

11. Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State"; Dudley, "Structural Change in Interdependent Bureaucracies."

12. The *Adler*, for example, measured 3,000 tons and carried sixty-eight guns, perhaps the largest gun platform of its time. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 338.

13. White, *Medieval Religion and Technology*, p. 149f. This particular account is interesting in that it demonstrates how patent law was instrumental in bringing intellectual talent to England and in fostering inventions.

14. For a textbook account, see, for example, Lewis Spitz, *The Renaissance and Reformations Movements* (1971), chapter 9. Even very informed and sophisticated accounts sometimes suggest that efficiency of scale is critical. See, for example, Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 260; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 65. Tilly, however, simultaneously notes the theoretical problem posed by the continued existence of small states.

15. See Ringrose, "Comment on Papers by Reed, de Vries, and Bean," p. 222f.

16. Mackenney argues that Venice was still a considerable military force by the late sixteenth century. In the 1570s it had about 33,000 troops which compared quite favorably with some sovereign states. The English army in Ireland, for example, numbered about 18,000 troops. Richard Mackenney, *The City-State* (1989).

17. Of course, I do not deny that the international arena is a predatory one. Indeed, that is one core premise in explaining my view of institutional, unit selection. But the historical and empirical oddities suggest that an explanation of selection needs to account for some puzzling phenomena such as the success of relatively small entities.

18. Mark Greengrass, among others, notes the problem in his recent work. See Mark Greengrass, *Conquest and Coalescence* (1991), p. 4.

19. On this issue my focus lies close to that of North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment." At some point size does matter. David does not always beat Goliath. However, I suggest that the efficiency of institutions has often been neglected whereas efficiency-of-scale arguments have been overemphasized.

20. For some of these explanations, see McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*; Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change* (1992); Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution* (1988).

21. Myers, *Medieval Kingship*, p. 318.

22. Ronald Zupko, "Weights and Measures, Western European," in Strayer, *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12 (1989), p. 582. For a discussion of the variation in Mediterranean weights and measures, see Lopez and Irving, *Medieval Trade*, p. 11f.

23. For a fascinating account, see Witold Kula, *Measures and Men* (1986). Representational measurement lent itself to regional specificity. Even attempts at standardization were particularistic. For example, the standard ell in Bremen was allegedly defined as the distance between the knees of the statue of Roland in front of the town hall.

24. Kula, *Measures and Men*, pp. 5, 162, 163.

25. Held, "Hansische Einheitsbestrebungen."

26. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 24.

27. Held, "Hansische Einheitsbestrebungen," p. 166. "Bei den übrigen Massen ist eine Einheitlichkeit nicht erzielt werden. . . . Nicht anders verhielt es sich mit den Längmassen. . . . Was das Gewicht anbetrifft, so fehlte es auch da an einer Einheit" (With the other measures no unity was achieved. . . . It was no different with measures of length. As far as weight is concerned, there was no standardization either).

28. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 36.

29. The classic work on freeriding in the absence of a dominant actor is Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965).

30. Baldwin, *The Government of Philip Augustus*, p. 348.

31. See Hallam, *The Capetian Kings*, p. 284; Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, pp. 289, 294.

32. Kula, *Measures and Men*, p. 168.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 172, 183.

36. Briggs, *Early Modern France*, p. 149. For a discussion of the efforts of the English Crown at standardization, see Ronald Zupko, *British Weights and Measures* (1977). See particularly chapter 3.

37. I am fully aware that this was a lengthy process. Economic standardization in France took many centuries to complete. The point is that such standardization can only come about when there is hierarchical authority with a claim to final jurisdiction. There needs to be an actor who can overcome freeriding. Thus Germany only standardized after 1870. See Zupko, "Weights and Measures."

38. See the tabulation in Kula, *Measures and Men*, p. 224.

39. "One can only imagine the difficulties of poor Thomas Betsen, when into his counting-house there wandered in turn the Andrew guilder of Scotland, the Arnoldus gulden of Gueldrs (very much debased), the Carolus groat of Charles of Burgundy, new crowns and old crowns of France, the David and Falewe of the Bishopric of Utrecht, the Hettinus groat of the Counts of Westphalia, the Lewe or French Louis D'Or, the Limburg groat, the Milan groat, the Nimuegen groat, the Phelippus or Philippe d'Or of Brabant, the Plaques of Utrecht, the Postulates of various bishops, the English Ryall . . . the Scots Rider or the Rider of Burgundy . . . the Florin Rhenau of the Bishopric of Cologne and the Setillers. He had to know the value in English money of them all, as it was fixed by the time being by the Fellowship, and most of them were debased past all reason." Eileen Power, *Medieval People* (1963), p. 148.

40. There are two issues in this context with which we might be concerned: the diversity of coinage and the issue of debasement. My primary interest in this context is the variety of mints and coinage, which raised transaction and information costs. Debasement compounded the problem, because not only would merchants have had to figure out what the prevalent exchange rates were, but they would also have needed to have some idea of whether the currency to which they were exchanging had been debased or not, or was about to be debased. The complexity bedevils even modern economic historians. See Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, p. 11.

41. Wilhelm Jesse, "Die Münzpolitik der Hansestädte," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 53 (1928), p. 79.

42. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 205f.

43. Peter Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 2 (1987), p. 813. See also Leuschner's comments: "The more the German Empire split up into principalities, the more the princes were privileged to issue coins, the more important became the recurrent attempts—which it must be added, always failed—to maintain a uniform currency." Leuschner, *Germany in the Late Middle Ages*, p. 19.

44. See Holborn for that conclusion. The estimate of the number of local authorities is also his. Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 38–39, 68.

45. There were some attempts to simplify currency in the Wendish currency union, to which also some non-Hansa towns were part, but "they were only very partially adhered to." Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 208.

46. Only for a brief period in medieval history, during the English kingdom of Wessex (970) through the Danish and Norman periods, until the reign of Henry II (1180), was English coin symbolic. That is, the value of the coin was not equivalent to the real

value of the coin in metal (silver, gold, or an alloy). Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," pp. 808, 809. The relative stability of English currency might account for the prevalence of sterling throughout the North Sea and Baltic, before the English made significant inroads there. Lewis and Runyan, *European Naval and Maritime History*, p. 142. Overall, merchants were aware that debasement was detrimental to their business. The charter of Speyer (not in the Hansa) had a clause that stated that "the coinage was not to be altered except with the common consent of the citizens." Ennen, *The Medieval Town*, p. 134. The Hansa towns, therefore, did not tend to debase their currency as a source of revenue. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 207. However, the minting of coinage in some Hansa towns, such as Westphalia, was still under the control of the bishops and hence less amenable to Hanseatic interests.

47. Particularly from Philip Augustus onward, kings tried to extend royal coinage through the entire realm. Berman, *Law and Revolution*, p. 467; Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," p. 809. For the large number of mints in France prior to centralization, see Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy*, p. 249; Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," pp. 802, 806.

48. Jordan, *Louis IX*, p. 208.

49. Myers, *Medieval Kingship*, p. 319.

50. Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 175. He also notes that "the German cities strove to conform to a common standard, but the general picture was one of great diversity."

51. Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," p. 812.

52. Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," p. 853. But this apparently occurred less than sometimes thought. Hicks argues that the currencies were actually relatively stable over the centuries. John Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (1969), pp. 88, 89. This was particularly true for the great currencies rather than the local ones.

53. Thus Philip the Fair could only use that policy instrument sporadically. Strayer, *The Reign of Philip the Fair*, pp. 394–395. Nobles and clergy, who increasingly relied on fixed rents, as well as bankers and ordinary merchants, became consistent enemies of such policies. See Fryde, "The Financial Policies," p. 834.

54. Cipolla notes how English coinage debased the least; French debased a good deal more, but less than that of the Italian city-states. This is partially due to nonpolitical factors such as the scarcity of precious metals. He argues that England debased the least because minting was centralized and the baronage would therefore not benefit from debasement, whereas the French system was less centralized, and hence they could debase their own coinage. Paradoxically, he notes that the Italian merchants benefited from debasement by requiring their credits to be paid in gold. My argument would suggest that the more fragmented sovereignties might have had reasons to debase more, perhaps because short-run strategies predominated in such systems. Carlo Cipolla, "Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe," *The Economic History Review* 15 (1963), pp. 413–422.

55. Governments manipulated their currency, but "this situation generally discouraged outright debasement, since governments were aware of the dangerous implications this would have for their international position." Briggs, *Early Modern France*, p. 44. Note that this was an advantage of a competitive state system over imperial alternatives as in the Mideast and the Orient. See also Hall, *Powers and Liberties*, p. 137. Hicks also notes the possibility of capital flight. Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History*, p. 90.

56. Although kings of course had fiscal reasons to manipulate currency to their advantage, their authority was not unlimited. The townsfolk did resist, as in, for example, the

kingdom of Aragon. There "it was the merchants who put a stop to royal coin-debasing." Myers, *Medieval Kingship*, p. 227. Petit-Dutaillis notes how the Capetian kings consulted with the towns on currency issues. Petit-Dutaillis, *The Feudal Monarchy*, p. 238. In exchange for stability in currency, the towns made explicit agreements with high lords and kings to pay certain taxes. See, for example, the agreement with Philip Augustus in the early thirteenth century. Thomas Bisson, *Conservation of Coinage* (1979), p. 44.

57. Some standardization occurred within Germany and the Baltic when towns adopted the laws of their mother cities. But even so, this led to more than a dozen legal systems. Forty-three towns adopted Lübeck law, forty-nine Frankfurt law, four Hamburg law, and two Bremen law. Berman, *Law and Revolution*, p. 376.

58. It only drafted a formal constitution after the Hansetag of 1557.

59. For these claims of the king as arbitrator, see Jordan, *Louis IX*, pp. 202–203. Indeed, the whole idea of sovereignty, as it was gradually established by the scholars of Roman law and by the actual practice of kingship, was that the king was the final judge.

60. Hallam, *Capetian France*, p. 244.

61. "Contracts are to be honored." Berman, *Law and Revolution*, pp. 476, 477. "Other laws extended the royal coinage to the entire realm, enforced more rigorous control over the towns, and, in general, increased the efficiency of royal government."

62. We must be cautious, however, in identifying this with a modern state. The king did manage to codify local codes, and exercise high justice, but on many lesser issues the 80,000 seigneurial courts still had considerable local influence. Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism*, p. 22. Consolidation was under way, but it was a slow and gradual process.

63. Webber and Wildavsky, *A History of Taxation*, p. 198. See also Miller, "Government Economic Policies," p. 346. For a longer time perspective on French royal finance, see Collins, *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism*, who suggests that the tax system from the Late Middle Ages went unchanged for many centuries.

64. This does not always have to be a problem for a city-league provided it can overcome collective action problems. For example, Athens was so predominant in the Delian League that it could enforce compliance with general levies on all its members. Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (1969), p. 98f. However, one might question whether this is more rightly called the Athenian Empire rather than a true league.

65. Guenee notes that the Rhineland states of the fifteenth century derived 60 percent of state revenue from tolls. Simultaneously, Louis XI (1461–1483) obtained most of his revenue by direct tax. Bernard Guenee, *States and Rulers* (1985), p. 109. From this we might conclude that the king had less reason to rely on the incidental tolls.

66. See Conybeare's account in *Trade Wars* (1987).

67. Matthias Puhle, "Der Sächsische Städtebund und die Hanse im Späten Mittelalter," p. 29.

68. Lensen and Heiting, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 155.

69. T. H. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse 1157–1611* (1991), p. 175. The Zui-derzee and Prussian towns were unwilling to support the Wend towns in their war with Denmark in 1426. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 296. In the War of the Roses in England, the Hanseatics differed on which claimant to support. Weiner, "The Hansa," p. 238.

70. Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 259; Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse*, pp. 361–362.

71. Ralph Davis, *English Overseas Trade 1500–1700* (1973), p. 29; Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 359.
72. Davis, *English Overseas Trade*, p. 43. In other words, Hanseatic decline started well before the Thirty Years War.
73. Lübeck and the other Wend towns were no doubt the most important elements in the league. Wernicke, "Die Städtehanse," p. 28. Nevertheless, Lübeck was almost excluded from the league in 1440 for acting against the league's best interest.
74. Dietrich Schäfer, "Zur Frage nach der Einführung des Sundzolls," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 5 (1875), pp. 33–43.
75. Davis, *English Overseas Trade*, p. 11.
76. Miller, "Government Economic Policies," p. 356.
77. Already in the thirteenth century, royal interventionism proved beneficial to newly incorporated areas. In Languedoc, for example, trade expanded following the ousting of local coin and the implementation of early mercantilist policies of the Capetians. Given, *State and Society*, pp. 145–146.
78. Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 289; Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 315.
79. John Nef, *Industry and Government in France and England 1540–1640* (1957), chapter 3.
80. Bernard notes how in the fourteenth century there were forty tolls on the Garonne and more than seventy on the Loire, which added more than 20 percent to the price. On the Seine, such tolls added up to 50 percent. Bernard, "Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages," p. 313. Colbert tried to reduce the number of tolls by dividing the country into three zones. In the north, in the Cinq Grandes FERNES, there were to be no tolls at all. The two other areas of France were regarded as "reputed foreign" and "effectively foreign," and movement between these zones thus still required customs. Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 298. Even though Braudel suggests that the importance of these tolls is overstated, since they did not raise the price on many commodities by a high margin, he does note that even as late as the nineteenth century there were still many tolls that were time consuming. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 290.
81. The English king had started with mercantilist type policies at an even earlier date. Edward II tried to prevent imports of foreign cloth in the early fourteenth century. By 1331 Edward III was trying to attract Flemish weavers. In 1381 the English Crown passed its first navigation acts, thus precluding foreigners from transporting English goods. (Hence the importance of gaining privileges such as those of the Hansa which provided exceptions to such regulations.) Shepard Clough, *The Economic Development of Western Civilization* (1959), p. 115.
82. Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism*, p. 17. Likewise Poggi argues that towns favored the commercial extension of the sovereign state. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State*, pp. 63, 64, 78. Central government also had an interest in protecting taxpayers from aristocratic and ecclesiastical exploitation. Briggs, *Early Modern France*, p. 50. Rösig likewise notes that the towns tended to favor the king because they preferred a large unified area of trade. Rösig, *The Medieval Town*, p. 182.
83. The Hundred Years War was a major factor in this development. The later stages of this war, in the middle of the fifteenth century, saw the formation of standing Companies d'Ordonnances of approximately 12,000 men. C. W. Previté-Orton, ed., *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 2 (1971), p. 983. But note that this development only reinforced the monarchy. By then the position of the king as the logical defender of the realm had already been established.

84. For some evidence on this point, see Vallee, "État et Sécurité Publique," The king was particularly opposed to aristocrats' negotiations with the English.
85. The quote is from the French historian Olivier-Martin in Rowen, *The King's State*, p. 13.
86. When Charles VII was willing to cede Normandy to the English during the Hundred Years War, the bishop of Laon objected because the king was "the administrator, tutor, curator, and procurator" of the kingdom. Rowen, *The King's State*, p. 23.
87. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, p. 126. The law became synonymous with the king. "Lex est rex."
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
90. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. xvii.
91. Lewis and Runyan, *European Naval and Maritime History*, p. 152.
92. Holborn notes that the Hansa did not close its ranks against territorial lords in Holland, England, and Russia. Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 81–82. Rösig notes that the Hansa ultimately lost to England because it lacked a central power. Rösig, *The Medieval Town*, p. 70. Dollinger argues that "the main cause of the Hanseatic failure . . . was their lack of unity." Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 195. Lloyd emphasizes the divergent interests of regional versus Hanseatic diets. Lloyd, *England and the German Hansa*, p. 366. Puhle notes how the Saxon towns were gradually subjected to territorial rulers during the 1480s and 1490s without much aid from the Hansa. Puhle, "Der Sächsisch-Städtebund," p. 30. Likewise the towns in Livonia gradually came under Swedish and Russian territorial influence. Dollinger, *The German Hansa* p. 338.
93. Scammel, *The World Encompassed*, pp. 44, 64; Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 344; Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 82, 85.
94. Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History*, p. 60.
95. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 367.
96. In effect, Giddens raises the same issue. Transnational communication and exchange require the state's administration of domestic conditions (such as the maintenance of property rights) and reciprocal agreements between states. For a discussion of this point, see Justin Rosenberg, "A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty? Giddens' The Nation-State and Violence," *Millennium* 19 (1990), p. 254.
97. Lloyd, *England and the German Hansa*, p. 294.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
99. Fink, "Die Rechtliche Stellung der Deutschen Hanse," p. 134. Although the Hansa had actually handed over a list in reaction to the demands of the Privy Council in 1560, the English objected to the inclusion of certain towns, and the Hansa did not accept the final agreement. Lloyd, *England and the German Hansa*, p. 319. The demand for such a list, by the way, preceded this period by more than a century. On the English demands for such a list, also see Weiner, "The Hansa," p. 226.
100. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 85f.
101. The Hansa thus refused to provide a list because such a list "might be used as a basis for collective claims for compensation and demands for indemnities." The Hansa refused to accept that principle. Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, pp. 86, 106–107. For another argument that the Hansa deliberately obfuscated membership to avoid responsibility, see Volker Henn, "Die Hanse: Interessengemeinschaft oder Städtebund?" *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 102 (1984), p. 120.
102. Lloyd, *England and the German Hansa*, p. 370.
103. "Finally, it was difficult to enforce any agreements that were reached, primarily

because of domestic disunity on both sides. . . . The English claimed it was difficult to control piracy and the Hanse found it nearly impossible to get any trade agreement with England adhered to by all Hanse cities." Conybeare, *Trade Wars*, p. 115. (During the time focused on by Conybeare, English disunity was due to the War of the Roses.) See also Zupko, *British Weights and Measures*, p. 72.

104. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse*, pp. 204, 311.

105. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 148.

106. Bernard, "Trade and Finance," p. 314.

107. For an example, see Mundy and Riesenbergh, *The Medieval Town*, p. 42.

108. For an illuminating example, see Chayette, "The Sovereign and the Pirates."

109. This was not unique to the French Crown. Sawyer says this of the English king: "One of the prerogatives claimed by the English kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was the right to regulate merchants and commerce. They freed particular groups of merchants from various obligations, they licensed markets, granted charters of privilege to boroughs and to guilds of merchants and craftsmen, they levied customs and controlled the coinage. One obvious motive was to increase revenue." P. H. Sawyer and I. N. Wood, eds., *Early Medieval Kingship* (1977).

110. See Thomson, "Sovereignty in Historical Perspective," and her discussion of the control of nonstate coercive force in "State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenaries."

111. For the gradual shift of state policy regarding piracy, see Ritchie, *Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates*.

112. In game theoretic terms, the interaction between the Hanse and sovereign states, such as England, proved to be noniterative. Arguably the Hanse preferred a situation of deadlock. It sought to maintain its monopoly over northern trade no matter what the other actor did. For a discussion of this logic, see Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, particularly chapter 1.

113. Nicholas Abercrombie, "Knowledge, Order and Human Autonomy," in James Hunter and Stephen Ainlay, eds., *Making Sense of Modern Times* (1986), p. 18.

114. This is Giddens's argument. "But imperial expansion tends to incorporate all significant economic needs within the domain of the empire itself, relations with groups on the perimeter tend to be unstable. . . . Imperial systems . . . do not adjoin other domains of equivalent power, as nation-states may do today." Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, pp. 80–81. For a brief discussion of empire and economy, see also Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, vol. 1, pp. 15, 16.

115. See the excellent discussion in Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality."

116. Werner Link, "Reflections on Paradigmatic Complementarity in the Study of International Relations," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 101.

117. The properties of Hanseatic merchants thus acquired "a kind of extraterritoriality." They were administered by the bailiff of the local town, but Lübeck law exceeded all other, i.e., local law. Verlinden, "Markets and Fairs," pp. 148–149. In England the Hanse had acquired charters that granted them immunity from parliamentary statutes. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse*, p. 375.

118. Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, p. 82.

119. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse*, p. 181.

120. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 155.

121. Spies, "Lübeck, die Hanse und der Westfälische Frieden."

122. *Ibid.*, p. 114. My translation.

123. The Peace of Westphalia in itself was only one point in a long process in which nonsovereign forms of organization were weeded out.

124. "The territorial rulers of Germany were the chief winners of the peace negotiations of Osnabrück and Münster. Their power over their own subjects, their *ius territoriale*, or *droit de souveraineté*, as the French draft called it, was recognized without reservations." Holborn also notes that "at the end of the Age of Reformation the states emerged as sovereign agencies in foreign affairs. At the same time their internal sovereignty had grown immensely." Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 371, 373.

125. There is some debate on the importance of Westphalia. Krasner argues that Westphalia was less important than often suggested and that developments toward a state system predated the Peace. Nor did the conference end medieval elements such as the free knights and the Holy Roman Empire. Krasner, "Westphalia." Although I agree that the Peace did not mark the beginning of a state system—indeed, my entire account dates the origin of the state several centuries earlier—the Peace was perceived as significant by contemporaries such as Pufendorf (see note 129). For contemporary arguments about the importance of Westphalia, see Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989* (1991), chapter 2; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (1992), chapter 17. (There is also some confusion about terminology. Tilly, for example, speaks of the *Treaty of Westphalia* on page 165 of *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, but Krasner and most others use the term *Peace* since two conferences were involved.)

126. DiMaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited." They place less emphasis on competition than I do. This is probably due to the fact that they are largely concerned with organizations within a domestic setting. Such an environment differs from the anarchical environment of international politics.

127. This is somewhat similar to what DiMaggio and Powell call *coercive isomorphism*. Such isomorphism results from "pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which such organizations function." DiMaggio and Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited," p. 150.

128. As in sovereign states that formed earlier, the use of Roman law was important, as was the recruitment from the burgher classes. Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 35, 57; Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, pp. 279, 342, 349.

129. Consequently, Pufendorf observed in 1682: "But besides this, the Estates of Germany some of which have great and potent countries in their possession, have a considerable share of the Sovereignty over their subjects; and tho' they are Vassals of the Emperour and Empire, nevertheless they ought not to be consider'd as Subjects . . . for they are actually possess'd of the supreme Jurisdiction in the Criminal Affairs; they have power to make Laws and to regulate Church Affairs . . . to dispose of the Revenues rising out of their Own Territories; to make Alliances, as well among themselves as with Foreign States . . . they may build and maintain Fortresses and Armies of their own, Coin Money and the like." In Rowen, *From Absolutism to Revolution*, p. 75. See also Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, p. 382.

130. In the discussion to come of the Italian city-states, I give a rough comparison of the growth of their respective revenues.

131. There is only sporadic evidence of individual assessments. The common treasury was only established by 1612, when the Hanse was just a shell of its former self.

132. The Reformation also contributed to centralization of authority in the many German principalities. The Reformation put control over ecclesiastical institutions squarely under the prince. Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, p. 374. "The whole weight of the organized churches, including their influence over education and morality, was thrown into the scales on the side of government: they were content to preach the duty of obedience to divinely-appointed authority."

133. The emperor chose not to support the Hansa's claims against England. Lloyd, *England and the German Hanse*, p. 331. Religious differences between the Catholic emperor and the largely Protestant towns might have made cooperation more difficult.

134. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 37. For other descriptions of the Hansa's attempts to reinvigorate its organizational strength, see Dollinger, *The German Hansa*, p. 332f.

135. Weiner, "The Hansa," p. 247.

136. Leuschner, *Germany in the Late Middle Ages*, p. 139. Similarly, Barraclough argues that the German towns benefited from territorial princes through the reduction of localism. Barraclough, *The Origins of Modern Germany*, p. 351. This was not always a voluntary process; some towns were forced into making the choice. Brandenburg, for example, forced all its cities to leave the Hanseatic League. Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, p. 32.

137. Lensen and Heitling, *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*, p. 39.

138. At the last Hanseatic Diet only three cities (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck) were present.

139. Thus we find the oddity that at the signing of the Declaration of Paris—a treaty sponsored by France and England against piracy—many German cities and ministates signed on a par with the Netherlands, Sweden, and Portugal. Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, landlocked Frankfurt, Hanover, and many other German cities and territories each individually signed the treaty in 1856. See Thomson, "Sovereignty in Historical Perspective."

140. See Peter Burke on the difficulty of giving a general definition of city-states. In effect, he ends up simply describing the Italian city-states. Burke, "City-States."

141. For example, see the description of Francesco Pegolotti in Brucker, *Renaissance Florence*, p. 70.

142. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 89.

143. Chittolini, "Cities, City-States, and Regional States in North-Central Italy," p. 699. See also Wim Blockmans, "Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe," *Theory and Society* 18 (September 1989), pp. 733–756. Extension over other important towns was easier if local rule was left intact. See Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, pp. 113–114.

144. Brian Pullan, ed., *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1968), p. 15. For a similar assessment, see Knapton, "City Wealth," p. 191. Mackenney sees in this a more federalist form of organization rather than subjection. Mackenney, *The City-State*, p. 49. In any case, it was not integrated as a coherent whole.

145. Eric Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527–1800* (1973), p. 9.

146. Runciman notes how in general the extension of citizenship is an important element of fostering allegiance with the dominant center. Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory*, p. 438.

147. Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries*, p. 66.

148. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, pp. 59, 105.

149. See Richard Rapp, *Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth Century Venice* (1976), p. 141.

150. There has been relatively little research on the period of economic decline. See, for example, Pullan's comments in the introduction to Pullan, *Crisis and Change*. Hay and Law note further that the history of the subject cities has been neglected. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 113.

151. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, pp. 79–80.

152. Spufford, "Coinage and Currency," p. 814.

153. For this suggestion, see Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 289, although he does not delve deeply into this matter. See also Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries*, p. 66.

154. Knapton, "City Wealth," p. 189. Hocquet suggests that Venice was a mosaic of different communities. Venice "did not dream of issuing an ordinance that might have applied to the entire city-state." Jean-Claude Hocquet, "Venise, les Villes et les Campagnes de la Terreferme, XV–XVIIe Siècles," in Bulst and Genet, *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie*, p. 210.

155. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 117; Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries*, p. 47; Eric Cochrane, *Italy 1530–1630* (1988), p. 9.

156. Cochrane, *Italy 1530–1630*, p. 47.

157. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 261. Anderson is right in his assessment that in contrast to territorial monarchs, Italian leadership was often perceived as illegitimate. Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, p. 163.

158. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 118.

159. Benedict, for example, argues that French commerce and the wealth of the cities increased between 1560 and 1700, while this consolidation of a national economy was proceeding. Philip Benedict, *Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France* (1992), p. 31.

160. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 157; Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, p. 11. And for a full discussion, see Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*.

161. Rice, *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe*, p. 115.

162. Braudel sometimes seems to suggest that city-states were simply too small. Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 61. At other times he dispels the notion that size is critical: "immediate visible differences—those of size and area—are less important than they appear." Instead what matters is that "cities and territories both attached themselves in identical fashion to an international political economy." Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, p. 295. He goes on to argue that city-states might even have an advantage in that they focus on high added value commodities rather than agriculture. See pp. 296, 325. This comes far closer to my own view that success is determined by how well institutional forms cue in to the particular economic environment.

163. Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries*, pp. 51–59.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

165. Thus Woolf speaks of "obstacles to trade . . . and the survival of innumerable transit duties." There was a continued existence of "protectionist duties and internal barriers to trade" and "innumerable checks to internal trade." Stuart Woolf, *A History of Italy 1700–1860* (1979), pp. 52, 59, 60.

166. Cochrane, *Italy*, p. 48.

167. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, p. 430; James Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* (1962), pp. 109, 118–124.

168. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility*, p. 104. Cochrane notes that the constitutional bodies of the city-states had to be nobles or citizens of the dominant city. There was thus little room for entry by influentials from the subject towns. Cochrane, *Italy*, p. 45.

169. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, pp. 427, 431.

170. Rapp, *Industry and Economic Decline*, p. 160. Knapton notes several other areas in which Venice was reluctant to develop the mainland economy. Knapton, "City Wealth," p. 194.

171. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, p. 63.

172. This is Romano's explanation. Ruggiero Romano, "Italy in the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in Peter Earle, ed., *Essays in European Economic History 1500–1800* (1984), p. 195.

173. Hay and Law, *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance*, p. 65.

174. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, p. 14. Feudal forms of tenure likewise survived as obstacles to the possession of full property rights (p. 51).

175. Woolf, *A History of Italy*, pp. 84–85. The task of such enlightened rulers was to remove obstacles to the economy and the code of law.

176. A rough indicator is revenue. By the end of the 1400s, Venetian revenue was roughly equal to that of France: approximately 1 million ducats. Counting the Terra Firma, Venetian revenue was 60 percent higher. But then the French intake started to rise dramatically. During the reign of Charles VII (middle of the fifteenth century) revenue was between 1.8 and 2.25 million livres. By Francis I (1515–1547) that had gone up to 8 million. In 1549, it was 8.3 million and in the 1580s about 30 million. For these estimates see Collins, *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism*, pp. 48, 51, 55. Parker estimates these revenues more conservatively and suggests that revenues in the 1620s were about 16 million, 33 million in 1635, and 38 million by 1640. Parker, *The Making of French Absolutism*, p. 140. For another set of estimates, roughly between those of Collins and Parker, see Richard Bonney, *The European Dynastic States 1494–1660* (1991), pp. 352–353. See also Briggs, *Early Modern France*, p. 213f. By contrast, Venetian revenue had only doubled by 1570 (2 million ducats), reached 2.45 million in 1602, and 3.4 million by 1621. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, p. 426. Similar figures are provided by Rapp, *Industry and Economic Decline*, p. 141f. In real terms Venetian revenue was probably declining, whereas French revenue in real terms was increasing. Knapton, "City Wealth," p. 204. (Precise calculations are very difficult because inflation and the real intake of revenue are hard to estimate.)

177. Even so, we must be cautious when looking back into history. The size of the French army was not particularly great until the defeat of the Swedish at the battle of Nordlingen in 1634. Only then was there a significant rise in the number of troops. Downing, *The Military Revolution*, p. 121f.

178. The Dutch Republic would appear at first glance to violate this thesis, because of the considerable autonomy of its provinces. It should have had similar problems of defection and freeriding as the Hanseatic League and the Italian city-states. I would argue, however, that in practice the fragmentation of the republic was severely curtailed by the predominance of Amsterdam which by some accounts provided two-thirds of the Dutch budget. Mackenney, *The City-State*, p. 31. For a more conservative estimate, see R. J. Holton, *Cities, Capitalism and Civilization* (1986), p. 108. It would be interesting to examine, although I do not do it here, whether the failure of the Dutch to meet the challenge of the English was to some extent due to the lack of consolidation of the republic. Holton follows the historian Swart in suggesting that this was indeed the case. See also Boxer: "The result of this political deadlock was that nothing effective was done

to improve the condition of either the army or the navy." C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Sea-borne Empire 1600–1800* (1965), pp. 119–120.

179. Whereas some scholars have looked at relative efficiency and effectiveness between territorial states, I extend that argument to nonstate forms. My argument thus complements analyses that compare the relative merits of states such as that in North and Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World*, and North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment." I do not claim that absolutist sovereign states were the best states available. Indeed, as North and Weingast show, more democratic forms might have had considerable advantages. I have, however, argued that sovereignty, with a hierarchical actor who can prevent freeriding and defection and who has a vested stake in overcoming localism, had advantages over institutional forms that failed to meet those criteria. Such advantages were internal as well as external.

180. Of course I recognize the implications of anarchy. Sovereigns might defect from agreements. The point is that the negotiators of the Hansa could not commit their members even if they wanted to, because a means of internal control over defectors was absent. Seen from the perspective of a two-level game, the Hanseatic negotiators could not credibly claim control over the domestic side of the bargain. Whatever might be agreed in international fora need not have had any bearing on the commitment of the Hanseatic members. Imagine, if you will, a contemporary analogue wherein international negotiators had little ability to commit their societies to the terms of a treaty. For some reflections on the nature of two-level games, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460.

181. Similarly, the postcolonial era empowered many societies as states. Jackson, "Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory." He argues that the African states clearly lacked the European traits of statehood but that they were juridically empowered as such. See also Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p. 272.

182. From a game theoretic perspective, these allow for long-run iterative benefits. See Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation"; and his *The Evolution of Cooperation*.

183. See Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable."

184. This view of the development of the state system concurs with Giddens's argument concerning agent-structure interaction. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*. See also Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?"; Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem." Their arguments have largely been epistemological in nature with a call for more empirical work on the origins of the state. I believe this explanation is quite compatible with their intent.

## CHAPTER 9

1. Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges," p. 2.

2. For the argument that three roughly coequal regions are developing, see John Zysman, "Technology and Power in a Multi-Polar Global Economy," Berkeley Roundtable on International Economy (1990).

3. Strange and Russett both believe that American decline is vastly overstated. Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 551–574. Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), pp. 207–231. For a discussion of the hegemonic stability literature, see, for example, Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

4. One of the first to question the relevance of the state given the development of

nuclear weapons was John Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*, chapter 3. Lipshutz and Conca, for example, discuss the relation between the global ecology and the state. Ronnie Lipshutz and Ken Conca, eds., *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics* (1993). Some of these epic changes are also highlighted by John Ruggie, "Unraveling Trade: Global Institutional Change and the Pacific Economy," Fulbright Symposium paper (1991).

5. For a popular and readily accessible account, see Jeffrey Frieden, *Banking on the World* (1989), p. 238.

6. For a discussion of the explosive growth of Eurocurrencies, see Bryant, *International Financial Intermediation*. See particularly his figures in chapter 3.

7. The Reformation postdates the advent of these institutional types and thus does not explain the lack of state formation in, for example, Germany.

8. "Evolution to professionals, is adaptation to changing environments, not progress." Gould, *Wonderful Life*, p. 32.

9. Note that biological science is unable to predict the direction of evolution. At best, evolutionary theorists can provide explanations of why particular paths turned out to be dead ends. Their discipline is a retrodictive one. Even in the midst of such change, one need not recognize it or dare predict it.

10. The idea that Gould's view of punctuated equilibrium might serve as a metaphor for understanding institutional change is from Krasner, "Approaches to the State." See also Krasner, "Sovereignty," p. 80. Katzenstein refers to this view of history as "a sequence of big bangs." Katzenstein, "International Relations Theory," p. 296.

11. For an intuitive argument that the nation is becoming increasingly irrelevant, see Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations* (1991). Although Porter argues that nations continue to be important in the international economy, the nation-state is not the relevant unit of analysis. One understands the international economy not as states competing under anarchy but as firms competing in international markets. The unit of analysis is the industry with the state as one actor affecting the proximate environment of that industry. Michael Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (1990), p. 33. Ruggie also discusses the changes in the international economic environment in "Territoriality and Beyond."

12. See, for example, Peter Cowhey, "The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology," *International Organization* 44 (Spring 1990), pp. 169–200.

13. As I implied earlier, it would be wrong to suggest that the decline of the state might occur as the result of a linear process of increased communication and exchange. Broad environmental changes are a necessary but not sufficient cause. Such changes are mediated by political entrepreneurs and social groups.

14. Vaubel, for example, makes that type of argument. Roland Vaubel, "A Public Choice Approach to International Organization," *Public Choice* 51 (1986), pp. 39–57.

15. Social actors might make international contracts transaction-specific for both parties, so that both parties have an incentive to adhere to the agreement without the necessity of enforcement by national governments. For a discussion of transaction specificity and its implications for cooperation, see Yarborough and Yarborough, "International Institutions"; and their "Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade: After Hegemony, What?" *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987), pp. 1–26.

16. David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State* (1989), pp. 214–242. Even the idea that the state has diminished in scope, which Held takes as evident, can be contested. Kahler suggests that the economic policies of the European states have not been

dramatically altered by changes in their environment. Miles Kahler, "The Survival of the State in European International Relations," in Charles Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political* (1987), pp. 287–319.

17. Sbragia makes that argument in "Thinking About the Future: The Uses of Comparison," in Alberta Sbragia, ed., *Europolitics* (1992), pp. 257–291.

18. Although the changes in economic environment are preconditions for such changes, they cannot explain why certain arrangements for the internal market were chosen over alternatives that also would have represented Pareto improvements for EC members. Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 533–560. For another critique of neofunctionalism which stresses the importance of intergovernmental bargains, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45 (Winter 1991), pp. 19–56. See also Linda Cornett and James Caporaso, "And Still It Moves: State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community," in Rosenau and Czempiel, *Governance Without Government*, pp. 219–249.

19. Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," *World Politics* 42 (October 1989), p. 128.

20. Goodman notes that integration has proceeded far more on competition and trade policy than on monetary and tax issues. John Goodman, "Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Economic Policymaking in the European Community," in Norman Ornstein and Mark Perlman, eds., *Political Power and Social Change* (1991). Even for supposedly strong states, trade policy rests to considerable extent in Brussels. Helen Milner, "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States During the 1970s," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987), p. 654.

21. See, for example, recent comments in *The Economist*: "Nevertheless, some American officials admit to feeling frustrated with Europe's Byzantine way of organizing foreign policy. It is not always clear whether they should deal with officials from the commission, the council or an individual country. . . . Political co-operation is a particularly slow animal to deal with, since it cannot take a position until 12 foreign ministries have reached a consensus." *The Economist* 316 (July 7, 1990), p. 11 (European Community Survey).

22. That is, the role of the sovereign state as an ordering device of both domestic as well as international relations is not that easy to replace. This would conform with Krasner's argument that the state system will not be easily dislodged. Krasner, "Sovereignty." Even Frieden, who highlights the globalization of finance, notes how national governments continue to be critical players in international financial markets, particularly in periods of crisis. "Nevertheless, the Euromarkets are not stateless." Frieden, *Banking on the World*, p. 116.

23. A relatively new body of literature concerning the relation of state and identity is the field of gender studies. Unfortunately my work is incognizant on the implications of such study for the future of the territorial state.

24. To what extent growing economic interdependence and modernization are causes for a search for alternative identities is a matter of great debate and a complex question which I do not address here. Some of the literature on nationalism certainly suggests that economic transformation does provoke changes in people's loyalties, identities, and interests. Hobsbawm, for example, sees the recent surge of ethnic and linguistic agitation as a defensive move against modernity. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Na-*

*tionalism Since 1780* (1990), p. 164. Benedict Anderson notes how modernity and particularly the advance of vernacular print-language can affect national consciousness. *Imagined Communities* (1991). For a set of essays dealing with the tension between increasing global interdependence and individual affinities, see Zdravko Mlinar, ed., *Globalization and Territorial Identities* (1992).

25. For that argument, see James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (1986). Gregory Cause notes the continued existence of the state system in the Mideast despite the historical challenges to it under the principle of Pan-Arabism. Gregory Cause, "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (Winter 1992), pp. 441–469.

26. For a discussion of African states and their empowerment see Jackson, "Quasi-States"; Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," *International Organization* 43 (Autumn 1989), pp. 673–692.

27. Krasner, "Sovereignty."

28. International organizations empower actors as juridical equals in international affairs. Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, chapter 10.

29. See Ruggie's argument in "Territoriality and Beyond."

30. To paraphrase Wendt's claim, I argue that "states make anarchy." See Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It." It is exactly because of the historical development of territorially circumscribed and exclusive jurisdictions that we today take anarchy as a self-evident concept. Wendt suggests that identities play a critical role in understanding how states behave under anarchy. My focus is a different one in that I argue that what anarchy means is partially determined by the nature of the units.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abercrombie, Nicholas. "Knowledge, Order and Human Autonomy." In James Hunter and Stephen Ainlay, eds., *Making Sense of Modern Times*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986.
- Abulafia, David. *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Abu-Lughod, Janet L. *Before European Hegemony*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971.
- Ames, Edward, and Richard Rapp. "The Birth and Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis." *Journal of Economic History* 37 (1977), 161–178.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso, 1991.
- Anderson, Perry. *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*. London: Verso, 1974.
- . *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso, 1974.
- Armstrong, John. "Braudel's Mediterranean." *World Politics* 29, 4 (July 1977), 626–636.
- Ashley, Richard. "The Poverty of Neorealism." In Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Axelrod, Robert. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." *American Political Science Review* 75, 2 (June 1981), 306–318.
- . *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
- Badie, Bertrand, and Pierre Birnbaum. *The Sociology of the State*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Baechler, Jean, John Hall, and Michael Mann, eds. *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*. London: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Baldwin, John. *The Government of Philip Augustus*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- Baron, Hans. "The Social Background of Political Liberty in the Early Italian Renaissance." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, 4 (1960), 440–451.
- Barraclough, Geoffrey. *The Origins of Modern Germany*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
- Barry, Brian. *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Bartlett, Christopher, and Sumantra Ghoshal. *Managing Across Borders*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Bates, Robert. "Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France." *World Politics* 40, 4 (1988), 499–516.
- de Battaglia, Otto. "The Nobility in the European Middle Ages." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, 1 (1962), 60–75.
- Bean, Richard. "War and the Birth of the Nation State." *Journal of Economic History* 33 (1973), 203–221.
- Becker, Marvin. "Some Aspects of Oligarchical, Dictatorial and Popular Signorie in Florence, 1282–1382." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* II, 4 (1960), 421–439.
- . "Changing Patterns of Violence and Justice in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth-Century Florence." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 18, 3 (1976), 281–296.

- Becker, Marvin. *Medieval Italy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.
- Behr, Hans-Joachim. "Die Landgebietspolitik Nordwestdeutscher Hansestädte." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 94 (1976), 17-37.
- Beik, William. *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Bendix, Reinhard. *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Benedict, Philip. *Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Benn, Stanley. "Sovereignty," In Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 7/8. New York: MacMillan, 1967, 501-505.
- Benn, Stanley, and Richard Peters. *Social Principles and the Democratic State*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959.
- Berman, Harold. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- Bernard, Jacques. "Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages, 900-1500." In Carlo Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, vol. 1. Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1972.
- Bernstein, Richard. *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
- . ed. *Habermas and Modernity*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
- . ed. *Philosophical Profiles*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986.
- Bewes, W. A. *The Romance of the Law Merchant*. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1923.
- Biddick, Kathleen. "People and Things: Power in Early English Development." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, 1 (January 1990), 3-23.
- Biersteker, Thomas. "Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 33, 3 (September 1989), 263-267.
- Bisson, Thomas. *Conservation of Coinage*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Bloch, Marc. *Feudal Society*, 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Blockmans, Wim. "Princes Conquérants et Bourgeois Calculateurs." In Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie et La Genèse de L'État Moderne*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.
- . "Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Pre-industrial Europe." *Theory and Society* 18, 5 (September 1989), 733-756.
- Bode, Wilhelm. "Hansische Bundesbestrebungen in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 25 (1919), 173-246; 26 (1920/21), 174-193.
- Bonney, Richard. *The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Boswell, Alexander. "The Teutonic Order." In J. R. Tanner, ed., *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Bouwisma, William. "Swanson's Reformation." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10, 4 (July 1968), 486-491.
- Bowsky, William. "Keeping the Urban Peace." In Stanley Chodorow, ed., *The Other Side of Western Civilization*, vol. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.
- Boxer, C. R. *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800*. London: Penguin, 1965.
- Braudel, Fernand. *On History*. Translated by Sarah Matthews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

- . *The Perspective of the World*. Translated by Sian Reynolds. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
- Briggs, Robin. *Early Modern France, 1560-1715*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Brinton, Crane, John Christopher, and Robert Wolf. *A History of Civilization*, vol. 1. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1955.
- Brown, Alison. "Florence, Renaissance and Early Modern State: Reappraisals." *Journal of Modern History* 56, 2 (June 1984), 285-300.
- Brown, Peter. "Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change." *Daedalus* 104, 2 (Spring 1975), 133-151.
- Brucker, Gene. *Renaissance Florence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Brundage, James. "Tithe." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.
- . "Usury." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.
- Bryant, Ralph. *International Financial Intermediation*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
- Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Bulst, Neithard, and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie et La Genèse de L'État Moderne*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.
- Burke, Peter. "City-States." In John Hall, ed., *States in History*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- . "Republics of Merchants in Early Modern Europe." In Jean Baechler, John Hall, and Michael Mann, eds., *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism*. London: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Caporaso, James, ed. *The Elusive State*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989.
- . "Microeconomics and International Political Economy: The Neoclassical Approach to Institutions." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- Chandler, Alfred. *Strategy and Structure*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.
- Chevalier, Bernard. "L'État et les Bonnes Villes en France au Temps de leur Accord Parfait." In Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie et La Genèse de L'État Moderne*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.
- Cheyette, Frederic. "The Sovereign and the Pirates, 1332." *Speculum* 45, 1 (1970), 40-68.
- . ed. *Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe*. New York: Robert E. Krieger, 1975.
- Chittolini, Giorgio. "Cities, 'City-States' and Regional States in North-Central Italy." *Theory and Society* 18, 5 (September 1989), 689-706.
- Cipolla, Carlo. "Currency Depreciation in Medieval Europe." *The Economic History Review*, 15, 2 (1963), 413-422.
- . *Guns, Sails, and Empires*. Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1965.
- . ed. *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, vol. 1. Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1972.
- . *Before the Industrial Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1980.
- Clark, Stuart. "The Annales Historians." In Quentin Skinner, ed. *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Clough, Shepard. *The Economic Development of Western Civilization*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959.

- Cochrane, Eric. *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527–1800*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
- . *Italy, 1530–1630*. Julius Kirshner, ed. London: Longman, 1988.
- Cohn, Norman. *The Pursuit of the Millennium*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Coleman, Janet. "The Civic Culture of Contracts and Credit: A Review Article." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28, 4 (October 1986), 778–784.
- Coles, Paul. "The Crisis of Renaissance Society: Genoa, 1488–1507." *Past and Present* 11 (April 1957), 17–47.
- Collins, James. *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Collins, Randall. *Weberian Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Contamine, Philippe. *War in the Middle Ages*. Translated by Michael Jones. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
- Conybeare, John. "Trade Wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts." In Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- . *Trade Wars*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- Cornett, Linda, and James Caporaso. "And Still It Moves: State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community." In James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Corrigan, Philip, and Derek Sayer. *The Great Arch*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
- Cowhey, Peter. "The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology." *International Organization* 44, 4 (Spring 1990), 169–200.
- Craig, Gordon, and Alexander George. *Force and Statecraft*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Crone, Patricia. *Pre-Industrial Societies*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
- Curtin, Philip. *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, and James Rosenau, eds. *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- Dameron, George. "Episcopal Lordship in the Diocese of Florence and the Origins of the Commune of San Cascaiano Val di Pesa, 1230–1247." *Journal of Medieval History* 12, 2 (June 1986), 135–154.
- Davis, James. *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.
- Davis, Ralph. *English Overseas Trade, 1500–1700*. London: MacMillan, 1973.
- Delbrück, Hans. *Medieval Warfare*. Translated by Walter Renfro. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. First published 1923.
- Dessler, David. "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43, 3 (Summer 1989), 441–473.
- Deutsch, Karl. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1956.
- DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48 (April 1983), 147–160.

- Dodgson, Robert. *The European Past: Social Evolution and Spatial Order*. New York: MacMillan, 1987.
- Dollinger, Philippe. *The German Hansa*. Translated by D. Ault and S. Steinberg. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970.
- Doran, Charles, and Wes Parsons. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power." *American Political Science Review* 74, 4 (December 1980), 947–965.
- Downing, Brian. *The Military Revolution and Political Change*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Doyle, Michael. *Empires*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Du Boulay, F. R. *Germany in the Later Middle Ages*. London: Athlone Press, 1983.
- Duby, Georges. *Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1968.
- . *The Early Growth of the European Economy*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974.
- . *The Three Orders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Dudley, Leonard. "Structural Change in Interdependent Bureaucracies: Was Rome's Failure Economic or Military?" *Explorations in Economic History* 27 (April 1990), 232–248.
- Dunbabin, Jean. *France in the Making, 843–1180*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Dundes, Alan, and Alessandro Falassi. *La Terra in Piazza*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.
- Durkheim, Emile. *The Division of Labor in Society*. New York: Free Press, 1933.
- . *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Steven Lukes, ed. New York: Free Press, 1982.
- Earle, Peter, ed. *Essays in European Economic History 1500–1800*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
- Elster, Jon. *Nuts and Bolts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Ennen, Edith. *The Medieval Town*. Translated by Natalie Fryde. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1979.
- Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Fawtier, Robert. *The Capetian Kings of France*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960.
- Fesler, James. "French Field Administration: The Beginnings." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5 (1962), 76–111.
- Field, Alexander. "The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: A Critique with Special Reference to the North-Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe." *Explorations in Economic History* 18 (April 1981), 174–198.
- Finer, Samuel. "State and Nation Building in Europe: The Role of the Military." In Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- Fink, Georg. "Die Rechtliche Stellung der Deutschen Hanse in der Zeit ihres Niedergangs." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 61 (1936), 122–137.
- Fischer, Markus. "Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices." *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992), 427–466.
- Fleckenstein, Josef. *Early Medieval Germany*. Translated by Bernard Smith. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978.
- Fox, Edward. *History in Geographic Perspective*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971.

- Francois, Martha. "Reformation and Society: An Analysis of Guy Swanson's Religion and Regime." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 14, 3 (June 1972), 289–305.
- Freed, John. "Germany: 843–1137." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 473–478.
- . "Germany: 1138–1254." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 478–485.
- . "Germany: Stem Duchies." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 505–511.
- . "Translation of Empire." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, 143.
- Freising, Otto. *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*. Translated by Charles Mierow. New York: W. W. Norton, 1953.
- Frieden, Jeffrey. *Banking on the World*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
- Friedman, David. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations." *Journal of Political Economy* 85 (1977), 59–77.
- Friedrichs, Christopher. "Capitalism, Mobility and Class Formation in the Early Modern German City." *Past and Present* 69 (November 1975), 24–49.
- Fryde, E. B. "The Financial Policies of the Royal Governments and Popular Resistance to Them in France and England c. 1270–1420." In E. B. Fryde, *Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance*. London: Hambledon Press, 1983.
- Fuhrmann, Horst. *Germany in the High Middle Ages c. 1050–1200*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Fulbrook, Mary, and Theda Skocpol. "Destined Pathways: The Historical Sociology of Perry Anderson." In Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market." *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992), 533–560.
- Gause, Gregory. "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East." *Journal of International Affairs* 45, 2 (Winter 1992), 441–469.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gelsinger, Bruce. "Hanseatic League." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 6. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 90–97.
- Genicot, Leopold. "La Noblesse au Moyen Age Dans L'Ancienne France: Continuité, Rupture ou Évolution?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, 1 (1962), 52–59.
- Gerbenzon, P., and N. Algra. *Voortgangh des Rechtes*. Groningen: Tjeenk Willink, 1975.
- Gerth, H. H., and C. Wright Mills, eds. *From Max Weber*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Giard, Luce. "La Procès d'Emancipation de l'Anglais à la Renaissance." Paris: CNRS, LP 21 (manuscript), 1989.
- Giddens, Anthony. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- . *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Gierke, Otto. *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. Translated by F. Maitland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. First published 1900.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

- . "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism." In Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Given, James. *State and Society in Medieval Europe*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990.
- Goldstein, Joshua. *Long Cycles*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988.
- Goodman, John. "Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Economic Policymaking in the European Community." In Norman Ornstein and Mark Perlman, eds., *Political Power and Social Change*. Washington: AEI Press, 1991.
- Goody, Jack. *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Gould, Stephen Jay. *The Panda's Thumb*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1980.
- . *Wonderful Life*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1989.
- Gourevitch, Peter. "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8, 2 (Autumn 1977), 281–313.
- . "The Second Image Reversed. The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32, 4 (Autumn 1978), 881–911.
- . "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s." *International Organization* 38, 1 (Winter 1984), 95–129.
- . *Politics in Hard Times*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Green, Louis. "Lucca under Castruccio Castracani." *I Tatti Studies* 1 (1985), 137–159.
- Green, Vivian. "Taxation, Church." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.
- Greengrass, Mark. *Conquest and Coalescence*. London: Edward Arnold, 1991.
- Gross, Leo. "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948." In Richard Falk and Wolfram Hanrieder, eds., *International Law and Organization*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968.
- Guenee, Bernard. *States and Rulers*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- Haas, Ernst. "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New Europe." In Joseph Nye, ed., *International Regionalism*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *Toward a Rational Society*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
- . *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
- Hagen, William. "How Mighty the Junkers? Peasant Rents and Seigneurial Profits in Sixteenth-Century Brandenburg." *Past and Present* 108 (August 1985), 80–116.
- . "Capitalism and Countryside in Early Modern Europe: Interpretations, Models, Debates." *Agricultural History* 62, 1 (1988), 13–47.
- Hall, John. *Powers and Liberties*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- , ed. *States in History*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- Hallam, Elizabeth. *Capetian France, 987–1328*. New York: Longman, 1980.
- Harris, R. W. *Absolutism and Enlightenment, 1660–1789*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Haskins, George. *The Growth of English Representative Government*. New York: Perpetua, 1960.
- Haverkamp, Alfred. *Medieval Germany, 1056–1273*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Havighurst, Alfred. *The Pirene Thesis*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976.
- Hay, Denys. *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. London: Longman, 1989.
- Hay, Denys, and John Law. *Italy in the Age of the Renaissance, 1380–1530*. London: Longman, 1989.

- Hazeltine, Harold. "Roman and Canon Law in the Middle Ages." In J. R. Tanner, ed., *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
- Heaton, Herbert. *Economic History of Europe*. New York: Harper and Row, 1948.
- Heer, Friedrich. *The Medieval World*. Translated by Janet Sondheimer. New York: New American Library, 1961.
- Held, David. *Political Theory and the Modern State*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989.
- Held, Otto. "Hansische Einheitsbestrebungen im Mass und Gewichtswesen bis zum Jahre 1500." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 45 (1918), 127-167.
- Henn, Volker. "Die Hanse: Interessengemeinschaft oder Städtebund?" *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 102 (1984), 119-126.
- Henneman, John. *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- . *The Medieval French Monarchy*. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973.
- . "Taille, Taillage." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 11. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa." *International Organization* 43, 4 (Autumn 1989), 673-692.
- Herz, John. *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*. New York: David McKay, 1976.
- Hibbert, A. B. "The Origins of the Medieval Town Patriariate." *Past and Present* 3 (February 1953), 15-27.
- Hicks, John. *A Theory of Economic History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Hilton, R. H. *English and French Towns in Feudal Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hinsley, F. H. "The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations Between States." In W. J. Stankiewicz, ed., *In Defense of Sovereignty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- . *Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Hintze, Otto. *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*. Felix Gilbert, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Hirschman, Albert. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- . *The Passions and the Interests*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Hocquet, Jean Claude. "Venise, les Villes et les Campagnes de la Terreferme, XV<sup>e</sup>-XVI<sup>e</sup> Siècles." In Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie et La Genèse de L'État Moderne*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.
- Hohenberg, Paul, and Lynn Lees. *The Making of Urban Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Holborn, Hajo. *A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Holsti, Kalevi. *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Holton, R. J. *Cities, Capitalism and Civilization*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.

- Holzgrefe, J. L. "The Origins of Modern International Relations Theory." *Review of International Studies* 15 (1989), 11-26.
- Iggers, Georg. *New Directions in European Historiography*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1984.
- Jackson, Robert. "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World." *International Organization* 41, 4 (Autumn 1987), 519-549.
- Jeannin, Pierre. "Das Handbuch in der Berufsausbildung des Hansischen Kaufmanns." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 103 (1985), 101-120.
- Jesse, Wilhelm. "Die Münzpolitik der Hansestädte." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 53 (1928), 78-96.
- Johnston, R. J. *Geography and the State*. London: MacMillan, 1982.
- Jones, E. *The European Miracle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Jordan, William. *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Kagan, Donald. *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969.
- Kahler, Miles. "The Survival of the State in European International Relations." In Charles Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst. *The King's Two Bodies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Katzenstein, Peter. "International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- Kedar, Benjamin. *Merchants in Crisis*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976.
- Keegan, John. *The Face of Battle*. New York: Dorset, 1976.
- Keen, Maurice. *The Pelican History of Medieval Europe*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
- Keens-Soper, Maurice. "The Practice of a States-System." *Studies in History and Politics*, 2, 2 (1981-82), 15-36.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Decline of Great Powers*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- , ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Keohane, Robert, and Joseph Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977.
- . "Power and Interdependence Revisited." *International Organization* 41, 4 (Autumn 1987), 725-753.
- Kiernan, V. G. "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy." *Past and Present* 11 (April 1957), 66-86.
- . "State and Nation in Western Europe." *Past and Present* 31 (July 1965), 20-38.
- . "Private Property in History." In Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk, and E. P. Thompson, eds., *Family and Inheritance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Kinder, Hermann, and Werner Hilgemann. *The Anchor Atlas of World History*, vol. 1. Translated by Ernest Menze. New York: Anchor Press, 1974.
- Knapton, Michael. "City Wealth and State Wealth in Northeast Italy, 14-17th centuries." In Neithard Bulst and Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *La Ville, La Bourgeoisie et La Genèse de L'État Moderne*. Paris: CNRS, 1988.

- Krasner, Stephen. "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." *Comparative Politics* 16, 2 (January 1984), 223–246.
- . "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective." In James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989.
- . "Westphalia." Unpublished manuscript. Stanford University, 1991.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System." *World Politics* 39, 1 (October 1986), 27–52.
- Kula, Witold. *Measures and Men*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Laitin, David. *Hegemony and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Lake, David. "The Expansion of Sovereignty: Imperialism, Decolonization, and the Constitutive Principle of International Relations." Paper delivered to the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 1987.
- . "The State and the Production of International Security: A Microeconomic Theory of Grand Strategy." Discussion paper no. 1. Los Angeles: Center for International Studies, University of Southern California, 1990.
- Lane, Frederic. *Venice: A Maritime Republic*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Lattimore, Owen. "Feudalism in History." *Past and Present* 12 (November 1957), 47–57.
- Leff, Gordon. "Heresy and the Decline of the Medieval Church." *Past and Present* 20 (November 1961), 36–51.
- Le Goff, Jacques. *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- . *Medieval Civilization*. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Legvold, Robert. "Soviet Learning in the 1980s." In George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds. *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991.
- Lensen, Leo, and Willy Heitling. *De Geschiedenis van de Hanze*. Deventer: Arko, 1990.
- Leps, Curt. "Das Zunftwesen der Stadt Rostock bis um die Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 58 (1933), 122–156.
- Leuschner, Joachim. *Germany in the Late Middle Ages*. Translated by Sabine MacCormack. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1980.
- Levi, Margaret. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Lewis, Archibald. *Knights and Samurai*. London: Temple Smith, 1974.
- Lewis, Archibald, and Timothy Runyan. *European Naval and Maritime History, 300–1500*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982.
- Lewis, P. S. "The Failure of the French Medieval Estates." *Past and Present* 23 (November 1962), 3–24.
- . *Essays in Later Medieval French History*. London: Hambleton Press, 1985.
- Leyser, Karl. "The German Aristocracy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century." *Past and Present* 41 (December 1968), 25–53.
- Link, Werner. "Reflections on Paradigmatic Complementarity in the Study of International Relations." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- Lipshutz, Ronnie, and Ken Conca, eds. *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Lipson, Charles. "Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts." In Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

- Lloyd, T. H. *England and the German Hanse, 1157–1611*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Lodge, Eleanor. "The Communal Movement, Especially in France." In J. R. Tanner, ed., *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
- Lönnroth, E. "The Baltic Countries." In M. Postan, E. Rich, and E. Miller, eds., *Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- Lopez, Robert, and Irving Raymond. *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1967.
- Lyon, Bryce, and Adriaan Verhulst. *Medieval Finance*. Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1967.
- Mackenney, Richard. *The City-State*. London: MacMillan, 1989.
- Maier, Charles, ed. *Changing Boundaries of the Political*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Mair, Lucy. *Primitive Government*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.
- Mann, Michael. *The Sources of Social Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Mansbach, Richard, and Yale Ferguson. "Between Celebration and Despair." *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 4 (December 1991), 363–386.
- Markovits, Andrei, and Warren Oliver. "The Political Sociology of Integration and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Emile Durkheim and Karl Deutsch." In Richard Merritt and Bruce Russett, eds., *From National Development to Global Community*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
- Martines, Lauro. *Power and Imagination*. New York: Vintage, 1979.
- . "Italy, Rise of Towns In." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 7. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986, 12–18.
- Mattiangoli, Carrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. New York: Dover, 1988.
- McFarlane, K. B., et al., "War and Society 1300–1600." *Past and Present* 22 (July 1962), 3–35.
- McNeill, William. *Venice: The Hinge of Europe, 1081–1797*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- . *The Pursuit of Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2 (1990), 1–23.
- Miller, Edward. "Government Economic Policies and Public Finance, 1000–1500." In Carlo Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, vol. 1. Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1972.
- Milner, Helen. "Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s." *International Organization* 41, 4 (Autumn 1987), 639–666.
- Miskimin, Harry. *The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe, 1300–1460*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Mlinar, Zdravko, ed. *Globalization and Territorial Identities*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1992.
- Modelski, George. "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978), 214–235.
- . "Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?" *International Organization* 44, 1 (Winter 1990), 1–24.

- Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community." *International Organization* 45, 1 (Winter 1991), 19–56.
- Morrall, John. *Political Thought in Medieval Times*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.
- Mundy, John. "Medieval Urban Liberty." Unpublished manuscript. New York, 1993.
- Mundy, John, and Peter Riesenbergh. *The Medieval Town*. New York: Van Nostrand Publishing, 1958.
- Myers, Henry. *Medieval Kingship*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982.
- Nef, John. *Industry and Government in France and England, 1540–1640*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Great Seal Books, 1957.
- Nettl, J. P. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." *World Politics* 20, 4 (1968), 559–592.
- Nicholas, David. "Economic Reorientation and Social Change in Fourteenth Century Flanders." *Past and Present* 70 (February 1976), 3–29.
- North, Douglass. "A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History." *Explorations in Economic History* 16 (1979), 249–259.
- . *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1981.
- . *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- North, Douglass, and Robert Thomas. *The Rise of the Western World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49 (December 1989), 803–832.
- Oakley, Francis. *The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979.
- Olson, Glenn. "Italian Merchants and the Performance of Papal Banking Functions in the Early Thirteenth Century." In David Herlihy, Robert Lopez, and Vsevolod Slessarev, eds. *Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1969.
- Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- . *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Onuf, Nicholas. "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History." *Alternatives* 16 (1991), 425–446.
- Owen-Hughes, Diane. "Urban Growth and Family Structure in Medieval Italy." *Past and Present* 66 (February 1975) 3–28.
- Oye, Kenneth, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Painter, Sidney. *Mediaeval Society*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951.
- . *The Rise of the Feudal Monarchies*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1951.
- Parker, David. "The Social Foundation of French Absolutism, 1610–1630." *Past and Present* 53 (1971), 67–89.
- . *The Making of French Absolutism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Parker, Geoffrey. "Warfare." In Peter Burke, ed., *New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

- . *The Military Revolution*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Parry, J. H. *The Discovery of the Sea*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Pepper, Simon, and Nicholas Adams. *Firearms and Fortifications*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Perroy, Edouard. "Social Mobility Among the French Noblesse in the Later Middle Ages." *Past and Present* 21 (April 1962), 25–38.
- Petit-Dutaillis, Charles. *The Feudal Monarchy in France and England*. London: Kagan, Paul, Trench & Trubner, 1936.
- Piore, Michael, and Charles Sabel. *The Second Industrial Divide*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
- Pirenne, Henri. *Medieval Cities*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. First published 1925.
- . *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1956.
- Piscatori, James. *Islam in a World of Nation-States*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Pitz, Ernst. "Steigende und Fallende Tendenzen in Politik und Wirtschaftsleben der Hanse im 16. Jahrhundert." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 102 (1984), 39–77.
- Pizzorno, Alessandro. "Politics Unbound." In Charles Maier, ed., *Changing Boundaries of the Political*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. *The Development of the Modern State*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978.
- Polanyi, Karl. "Primitive Feudalism and the Feudalism of Decay." In George Dalton, ed., *Economic Development and Social Change*. New York: Natural History Press, 1971.
- Porter, Michael. *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*. New York: Free Press, 1990.
- Post, Gaines. "Patriapotestas, Regia Potestas and Rex Imperator." In David Herlihy, Robert Lopez, and Vsevolod Slessarev, eds., *Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1969.
- Power, Eileen. *Medieval People*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963. First published in 1924.
- Previté-Orton, C. W., ed. *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Puhle, Matthias. "Der Sächsische Städtebund und die Hanse im Späten Mittelalter." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 104 (1986), 21–34.
- Pullan, Brian, ed. *Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. London: Methuen and Co., 1968.
- Putnam, Robert, et al. "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government." *American Political Science Review* 77, 1 (March 1983), 55–74.
- . "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, 3 (Summer 1988), 427–460.
- Rapp, Richard. *Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth Century Venice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Rasler, Karen, and William Thompson. "War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global War." *American Political Science Review* 79, 2 (June 1985), 491–507.
- Reich, Robert. *The Work of Nations*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991.
- Reynolds, Susan. *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

- Rice, Eugene. *The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460–1559*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970.
- Riesenberg, Peter. "Civism and Roman Law in Fourteenth-Century Italian Society." In David Herlihy, Robert Lopez, and Vsevolod Slessarev, eds., *Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1969.
- Ringrose, David. "Comment on Papers by Reed, de Vries, and Bean." *Journal of Economic History* 33 (1973), 222–227.
- Ritchie, Robert. *Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
- Rogowski, Ronald. *Commerce and Coalitions*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Rogozinski, Jan. "The Counsellors of the Seneschal of Beaucaire and Nîmes, 1250–1350." *Speculum* 44, 3 (July 1969), 421–439.
- Romano, Ruggiero. "Italy in the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century." In Peter Earle, ed., *Essays in European Economic History, 1500–1800*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
- Root, Hilton. *Peasants and King in Burgundy: Agrarian Foundations of French Absolutism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- de Roover, Raymond. "The Organization of Trade." In M. Postan, E. Rich, and E. Miller, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- Rörig, Fritz. *The Medieval Town*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Rosecrance, Richard. *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.
- . "International Theory Revisited." *International Organization* 35, 4 (Autumn 1981), 691–713.
- . *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
- . "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations." *International Organization* 41, 2 (Spring 1987), 283–302.
- Rosenau, James. "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics for the 1990s." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- Rosenau, James, and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Rosenberg, Hans. "The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg-Prussia, 1410–1653." *American Historical Review* 49, part 1, (October 1943), 1–22; 49, part 2 (January 1944), 228–242.
- Rosenberg, Justin. "A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty? Giddens' 'The Nation-State and Violence.'" *Millennium* 19, 9 (1990), 249–259.
- Rotz, Rhiman. "German Towns." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 457–471.
- Rowan, Steven. "Germany: Electors." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 491–493.
- . "Germany: Principalities." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 498–504.
- Rowen, Herbert, ed. *From Absolutism to Revolution, 1648–1848*. New York: MacMillan, 1963.
- . *The King's State*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980.
- Rudolph, Susanne. "Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia—Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study." *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, 4 (November 1987), 731–746.

- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. "Theoretical Generalization and Historical Particularity in the Comparative Sociology of Reinhard Bendix." In Theda Skocpol, ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Ruggie, John. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity." In Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- . "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1989.
- . "Unraveling Trade: Global Institutional Change and the Pacific Economy." Paper prepared for the Fulbright Symposium on Managing International Economic Relations in the Pacific of the 1990s. Canberra, December 1991.
- . "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization* 47, 1 (Winter 1993), 139–174.
- . *Planetary Politics: Ecology and the Organization of Global Political Space*. Forthcoming.
- Runciman, W. G. "Origins of States: The Case of Archaic Greece." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (July 1982), 351–377.
- . *A Treatise on Social Theory*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Russell, J. C. "Population in Europe, 500–1500." In Carlo Cipolla, ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, vol. 1. Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1972.
- Russett, Bruce. "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39, 2 (Spring 1985), 207–231.
- Sahlins, Marshall. *Culture and Practical Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- . *Islands of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Saltman, Michael. "Feudal Relationships and the Law: A Comparative Inquiry." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, 3 (July 1987), 514–532.
- Sandholtz, Wayne, and John Zysman. "1992: Recasting the European Bargain." *World Politics* 42, 1 (1989), 95–128.
- Sauveplanne, J. G. "Codified and Judge Made Law." Report of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences. New Series 45/4. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1982, 95–120.
- Sawyer, P. H., and I. Wood, eds. *Early Medieval Kingship*. Leeds: University of Leeds, 1977.
- Sbragia, Alberta. "Thinking About the Future: The Uses of Comparison." In Alberta Sbragia, ed., *Europolitics*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992.
- Scammell, G. V. *The World Encompassed: The First European Maritime Empires c. 800–1650*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Schäfer, Dietrich. "Zur Frage nach der Einführung des Sundzolls." *Hanstsche Geschichtsblätter* 5 (1875), 33–43.
- Schelling, Thomas. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Schildhauer, Johannes. *The Hansa*. Translated by Katherine Vanovitch. New York: Dorset Press, 1988.
- Schlesinger, Walter. "Lord and Follower in Germanic Institutional History." In Frederic Cheyette, ed., *Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe*. New York: Robert Krieger, 1975.

- Schluchter, Wolfgang. *The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber's Developmental History*. Translated by Cuenther Roth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Schmidt-Wiegand, Ruth. "Hanse und Gilde. Genossenschaftliche Organisationsformen im Bereich der Hanse und ihre Bezeichnungen." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 100 (1982), 21–40.
- Schumamer, Reinhold. *Italy in the Last Fifteen Hundred Years*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986.
- Scott, James. "Resistance Without Protest and Without Organization: Peasant Opposition to the Islamic Zakat and the Christian Tithe." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, 3 (July 1987), 417–452.
- Scott, Martin. *Medieval Europe*. New York: Dorset Press, 1964.
- Skinner, Quentin. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed. *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. ed. *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Solo, Robert. "The Formation and Transformation of States." In W. Ladd-Hollist and F. Lamond Tullis, eds. *International Political Economy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985.
- Somit, Albert, and Steven Peterson, eds. *The Dynamics of Evolution*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Southern, Richard. *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages*. London: Penguin, 1970.
- Spies, Hans-Bernd. "Lübeck, die Hanse und der Westfälische Frieden." *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 100 (1982), 110–124.
- Spitz, Lewis. *The Renaissance and Reformation Movements*, vol. 1. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia, 1971.
- Spufford, Peter. "Coinage and Currency." In M. Postan, E. Rich, and E. Miller, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Stankiewicz, W. J. *In Defense of Sovereignty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Stark, Walter. "Untersuchungen zum Profit beim Hansischen Handelskapital in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts": *Abhandlungen zur Handels und Sozialgeschichte*, Bd. 24. Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger, 1985, 1–147.
- Stephenson, Carl. *Mediaeval Institutions*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954.
- Strange, Susan. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." *International Organization* 41, 4 (Autumn 1987), 551–574.
- Straus, Gerald. "Germany: 1254–1493." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 485–491.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Germany: Idea of Empire." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 5. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985, 493–497.
- Strayer, Joseph. *Feudalism*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Reign of Philip the Fair*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, 13 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985–1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Survey of the European Community." *The Economist* 316 (July 7, 1990).
- Tabacco, Giovanni. *The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Thelen, Kathleen, and Sven Steinmo. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." In Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Thompson, William. "Long Waves, Technological Innovation, and Relative Decline." *International Organization* 44, 2 (Spring 1990), 201–234.
- Thomson, Janice. "Sovereignty in Historical Perspective: The Evolution of State Control over Extraterritorial Violence." In James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State*. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "State Practices, International Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism." *International Studies Quarterly* 34, 1 (March 1990), 23–48.
- Tierney, Brian. *The Crisis of Church and State, 1050–1300*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Middle Ages: Sources of Medieval History*, vol. 1. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973.
- Tilly, Charles, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Cities and States in Europe, 1000–1800." *Theory and Society* 18, 5 (September 1989), 563–584.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- Tracy, James, ed. *The Rise of Merchant Empires*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Unger, Roberto. *Plasticity into Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Urban, William. "Lübeck." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 7. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1986.
- Vallees, Aline. "État et Sécurité Publique au XIVe Siècle: Une Nouvelle Lecture des Archives Royales Françaises." *Histoire, Economie et Société*, vol. 1 (1987), 3–15.
- Van Houtte, J. "The Rise and Decline of the Market of Bruges." *Economic History Review* 19, 1 (1966), 29–47.
- Vaubel, Roland. "A Public Choice Approach to International Organization." *Public Choice* 51 (1986), 39–57.
- Verhulst, Adriaan. "The Origins of Towns in the Low Countries and the Pirenne Thesis." *Past and Present* 122 (1989), 3–35.
- Verlinden, C. "Markets and Fairs." In M. Postan, E. Rich, and E. Miller, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- Waley, Daniel. *The Italian City-Republics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.
- Walker, Robert, and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *Contending Sovereignties: Rethinking Political Community*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Modern World System*, vol. 1. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1974.

- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Politics of the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House, 1979.
- . "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Walzer, Michael. "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought." *Political Science Quarterly* 82, 2 (June 1967), 191–204.
- Warren, W. L. *King John*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
- Watson, Adam. *The Evolution of International Society*. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Webber, Carolyn, and Aaron Wildavsky. *A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Weber, Max. *The City*. Translated by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth. New York: Free Press, 1958.
- . *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
- Weiner, A. "The Hansa." In J. R. Tanner, ed., *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958, 216–247.
- Wendt, Alexander. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory." *International Organization* 41, 3 (Summer 1987), 335–370.
- . "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992), 391–426.
- Wernicke, Horst. "Die Städtehanse 1280–1418," in *Abhandlungen zur Handels und Sozialgeschichte* Bd. 22. Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger, 1983, 1–204.
- van Werveke, H. "The Rise of the Towns." In M. Postan, E. Rich, and E. Miller, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.
- White, Lynn. *Medieval Religion and Technology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- . "The Technology of Medieval Knighthood." In Stanley Chodorow, ed., *The Other Side of Western Civilization*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.
- Wight, Martin. *Systems of States*. N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977.
- Wilsford, David. "The Conjunction of Ideas and Interests." *Comparative Political Studies* 18, 3 (October 1985), 357–372.
- Wolf, Eric. *Europe and the People Without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Wolf, John. *The Emergence of the Great Powers*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951.
- Wolfe, Martin. *The Fiscal System of Renaissance France*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Woolf, Stuart. *A History of Italy, 1700–1860*. London: Methuen and Co., 1979.
- Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*, vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.
- Wuthnow, Robert. "Processes of Early State Development: A Review Article." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28, 1 (1986), 107–113.
- Yarborough, Beth, and Robert Yarborough. "Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade: After Hegemony, What?" *International Organization* 41, 1 (1987), 1–26.

- . "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization." *International Organization* 44, 2 (Spring 1990), 235–259.
- Zacour, Norman. *An Introduction to Medieval Institutions*. Toronto: MacMillan, 1969.
- Zolberg, Aristide. "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and England." *International Social Science Journal* 32 (1980), 687–716.
- . "Origins of the Modern World System: A Missing Link." *World Politics* 33, 2 (January 1981), 253–281.
- Zupko, Ronald. *British Weights and Measures*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin, 1977.
- . "Weights and Measures, Western European." In Joseph Strayer, ed., *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, 582–596.
- Zysman, John. "Technology and Power in a Multi-Polar Global Economy." Berkeley Roundtable on International Economy, Berkeley, Calif., Manuscript. September 1990.